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ABSTRACT 
'Institutional critique' is a term that refers to a range of diverse artistic 
practices and discourses that emerged at the end of the 1960s and that 
continue in the present. In spite of their differences, they all share a 
concern with the institutional conditioning of artists and artworks. Various 
historicizations of institutional critique (Alberro and Stimson, 2009; Raunig 
and Ray, 2009; Welchman, 2006) concur that one could distinguish two 
'phases': artists of the 1960s and 1970s allegedly investigated the 
possibilities of an escape towards an 'outside' of the art institution, 
whereas those of the 1990s analysed the ways in which the artistic subject 
reproduced the structures of the art institution. 
 Since the beginning of the 2000s various artists and authors have 
revisited the histories and legacies of institutional critique. This growing 
interest was triggered by the perceived intensification of a process that 
began at the end of the 1960s; it refers to the recuperation and 
neutralization of artistic types of critique by what Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005) have called the 'new spirit' of capitalism. In this context, the 
Austrian philosopher Gerald Raunig and the members of the European 
Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies have proposed the hypothesis 
that 'a new phase' of institutional critique was to emerge. However, this 
proposition was based less on empirical evidence, than on a 'political and 
theoretical necessity to be found in the logic of institutional critique' 
(Raunig, 2009, 3).  
 This thesis is a response to this set of circumstances. By asking 
'what are the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique?' it 
investigates the categories of institutional critique's logic. My main 
argument is that a 'phase change' of institutional critique could and should 
be understood through the apparatus of Derridean deconstruction. This 
 x 
 
implies a criticism of the idea that one needs to escape the art institution in 
order to respond to urgencies stemming from the social, economic, and 
political realms (Truth Is Concrete Platform, 2012). At the same time, I will 
also refute the idea that institutional critique is trapped in the art institution 
(Fraser, 2009a). Institutional critique works on the remainder and ‘rest’ that 
necessarily escapes the instituting will and intention of defining and 
describing in an exhaustive manner the ‘whatness’ of what (art) is 
(Boltanski, 2011). I show that between critique and the art institution there 
is an irreducible relation of symbiosis and cohabitation, and that the 
deconstructive logic of institutional critique allows it to be both partner and 
adversary, at the same time, of the art institution. 
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KEYWORDS 
art institution; artwork; co-optation/recuperation of artistic critique; 
deconstruction (of the art institution); inside/outside (of the art institution); 
institutional critique; institutional frames/parergon; instituting speech 
acts/declarations; justice/law; partner and adversary of the art institution; 
the ‘whatness’ of what art is 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is a response to the recent range of discourses and positions 
concerning the possibility of a 'phase change' in institutional critique. By 
institutional critique I understand an artistic concern with the institutional 
conditioning of artists and artworks, that emerged at the end of the 1960s 
and that continues in the present. The historical canon of institutional 
critique has established 'two waves': a first generation of artists of the 
1960s and the 1970s (Hans Haacke, Robert Smithson, Daniel Buren, 
Marcel Broodthaers) supposedly articulated tactics and strategies for 
migrating to an outside of the art institution, whereas artists of the 1990s 
(Andrea Fraser, Fred Wilson, Renée Green) have focused on the manner 
in which the subjectivity of the artist embodied and reproduced the 
structures of the art institution. In the mid-2000s the Austrian philosopher 
Gerald Raunig, one of the initiators of the European Institute for 
Progressive Cultural Policies and of the web journals transform and 
republicart, proposed the hypothesis that 'a new phase' of institutional 
critique was to emerge; nevertheless, this proposition was based less on 
empirical evidence, than on a 'political and theoretical necessity to be 
found in the logic of institutional critique' (Raunig, 2009, 3). 
 The following chapters will investigate precisely the dimensions of 
this 'logic' of institutional critique. The question that guides this research is: 
'what are the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique?' I will 
argue that the logic of institutional critique, from which its conditions and 
possibilities unfold, could be understood by employing the apparatus of 
deconstruction. In contradistinction to a binary and oppositional logic of 
critique of the type either/or (e.g. institutional critique is set up either inside 
the art institution or outside of the art institution), I will show that the logic 
of institutional critique is of the type neither/nor or both/and (e.g. 
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institutional critique is mounted neither inside of the art institution nor 
outside of it, or both inside of the art institution and outside of it).  
 
Institutional Critique and the Capitalist Recuperation of Artistic 
Critique 
 
In this thesis I argue that the recent interest in institutional critique is 
justified by the intensification of a process that began at the end of the 
1960s, amounting to the recuperation and neutralization of artistic types of 
critique by what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) have called the 'new spirit' 
of capitalism. Boris Buden contends that one still talks about institutional 
critique in the field of art because it is believed that art has the ability to 
'criticize the world and life beyond its own realm and even, by doing that, 
to change both' (Buden, 2009, 33). In other words, the articulation of a 
'new phase' of institutional critique should preclude the idea that the 
capitalist recuperation of art is total and exhaustive. The question is, 
however, how to accomplish this precisely when, in the present age of 
apparent economic scarcity, art institutions are pressed to engage in 
partnerships with corporate and private capital?    
 In order to approach the complexities of this situation allow me to 
bring into the discussion the following example. In 2003 Mute magazine 
invited activist and theorist Brian Holmes to write a statement explaining 
his participation in the Geography and the Politics of Mobility exhibition, 
curated by artist Ursula Biemann at the art space of the Generali 
Foundation in Vienna (Holmes, 2008a). Generali Foundation is one of the 
four major corporate art collections in Vienna, alongside Kontakt – the 
Collection of Erste Bank, EVN and Verbund collections (Seidl and Morariu, 
2013, 105). As the editors of Mute wrote, Generali had made itself a 
reputation for supporting critical exhibitions, artists such as Marcel 
Broodthaers, Maria Eichhorn, Valie Export, Andrea Fraser, Hans Haacke, 
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and Martha Rosler being part of their collection. The exhibition aimed at 
investigating 'the transformative quality of locations at a time when 
subjects are no longer bound to one particular place' (Biemann, 2003); it 
consequently analysed issues related to new formations of power (state 
and corporate), globalized labour relations, gender, ethnicity, and 
migration.  
 The reason that the editors of Mute gave for inviting Holmes 
pertained to the fact that the exhibition made its object of critique 'the 
capitalist system and the types of political relations it brings into being'. 
This seemed surprising 'for a cultural institution whose sole patron is one 
of the largest insurance companies in the world' (Holmes, 2008a, 95–96). 
For the editors of Mute, what needed to be addressed was the issue of co-
optation, and Holmes was invited ‘to discuss his rationale for taking part, 
and to elaborate on his statement that a policy of straight-talking is the 
only genuinely disruptive move' (Holmes, 2008a, 96).  
 In his response, the theorist acknowledged this almost contradictory 
situation: a person who theorizes anti-capitalism, he is invited and paid by 
a life-insurance company. 'At whatever distance you place the operations 
of a foundation from the financial holding behind it, the connection through 
the proper name is complete' (Holmes, 2008a, 97). In other words, the 
Generali foundation cannot be divorced from the Insurance Company 
Generali, the institutional entity that provides its funds. This implies that 
the Generali foundation functions in the symbolic – ethical, and ideological 
– frames that the Generali Insurance Company provides. Generali is, of 
course, enmeshed in the logic of deterritorialized corporate capitalism. 
Since it is a life insurance company, the object of its business is rather 
death (Holmes, 2008a, 96): it makes a series of bets regarding the death 
dates of those who 'invest' with it. It is, finally, a major player in 'financial 
speculation, whose results are a deadly imbalance of over – and 
underdevelopment, acceleration and decay, glut and starvation.' (Holmes, 
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2008a, 96). As part of the global corporate culture, it has an immense 
force and capacity to organize meaning and representation. It could be 
said, therefore, that whatever the proper name Generali refers to, it gains 
reputation, prestige, and social and cultural distinction by constructing a 
reputed art collection that includes instances of critical and political art. 
 These institutional entities are 'unbearable', writes Holmes: 
Generali, for example, 'has picked institutional critique as their brand of 
hypocritical theory' (Holmes, 2008a, 97). And indeed, Holmes 
recommends a policy of truth, revisiting to a certain extent what Michel 
Foucault theorised some thirty years ago as parrhesia: 'a verbal activity in 
which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his 
life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other 
people (as well as himself)' (Foucault, 2001a, 19–20). For Holmes, then, a 
policy of straight-talking implies the process of making visible the 
connections between the proper name and the nature of the bearer. Part 
of his response to the concrete case of the Geography and the Politics of 
Mobility exhibition was a text titled Liar's Poker, that proposed a game of 
poker between artists and public, and whose stake is the telling of truth. 
There Holmes states that 
 
when people talk about politics in an artistic frame, they're lying. 
Indeed, the lies they tell are often painfully obvious, and worse is the 
moment when you realize that some will go forever unchallenged and 
take on, not the semblance of truth, but the reliability of convention 
(Holmes, 2008b, 81).  
 
In other words, in the frames of the (corporate) contemporary art 
institution, lying appears as unavoidable. Or, otherwise said, the frames of 
the art institution prevent critical-political statements of art having any 
meaning for a project of criticizing 'the world and life beyond its own realm 
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and even, by doing that, to change both' (Buden, 2009, 33). Yet Holmes 
also makes an interesting point: only when lying goes unchallenged does 
hypocrisy take the form of a 'semblance of truth'. A policy of truth telling, 
then, implies that one should question the very conditions and possibilities, 
and therefore, the institutional frames, that makes lying in the art institution 
unavoidable.  
 
The Contradictory Position of the Institutional Critic 
 
The example I provided above describes a contradictory situation in which 
the politicised statements of art seem to be voided by the nature of the 
frames of the art institution. In this thesis I will argue that this state of 
contradiction structures the contemporary fields of art and culture. It 
describes situations in which the neoliberal 'spirit' of capitalism increases 
its reserves by extracting value from material and symbolic gestures of its 
critics; situations in which the possibility of reclaiming ideals of democratic 
participation in culture, justice and fairness presupposes armistices and 
compromises with those very entities and powers that one aims to criticize. 
Inner-conflicts, hypocrisy, délire de toucher, and co-optation appear to 
structure the very reality of our contemporary culture. But this is, in a way, 
old news. As Alexander Alberro writes, the artistic practices that in the late 
1960s and 1970s were described as institutional critique 'juxtaposed in a 
number of ways the immanent normative (ideal) self-understanding of the 
art institution with the (material) actuality of the social relations that 
currently formed it' (Alberro, 2009, 3). However, whereas institutional 
critique practices of the 1960s and the 1970s emphasized 'the need for a 
resolution of the tension or contradiction (Alberro, 2009, 3), this thesis 
claims that such a resolution of tension or contradiction is impossible in 
the age of the corporate art institution.  
  
6 
 
 Brian Holmes contended that 'it's just too late in the day to hang 
around gnawing the bones of institutional critique' (Holmes, 2008a, 98), 
implying that the artistic concern known as institutional critique failed in its 
attempts to change the structures of the art institution. This thesis attempts 
to counter pessimistic positions such as that of Holmes. It reconstructs the 
contradictory position of the artist/critic in the institution of art as a situation 
that Jacques Derrida would call a 'pharmakon' (Derrida, 2004, 67-186), 
implying that art frames are both negative and positive, both cure and 
poison. I am interested in situations in which for each institutional 
backdrop there corresponds an institutional opportunity. To employ the 
example used above, I investigate the conditions and possibilities of 
exhibitions such as Geography and the Politics of Mobility. They are 
precisely those situations that test the limits of the claims of institutional 
critique. In this context, I believe that the charge of co-optation is too easily 
addressed since, in the name of an alleged purity of a place for 
institutional critique untouched by global capitalism, it prevents us from 
looking at what really happens within the art institution. It diagnoses, 
dismisses and dispenses the institutional situation too quickly. Far from 
inviting only destructive effects, I will show that this state of contradiction 
has its own opportunities which critical art needs to acknowledge and 
make use of.  
 In other words, I argue that the state of contradiction in which 
institutional critique finds itself is unsolvable in a dialectical synthesis; it 
rather takes place within a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and. From 
this perspective, I will claim that art reaches its political potential once it is 
articulated, at the same time, as an institutional critique; and that 
institutional critique is neither inside of the art institution, nor outside of it, 
or both inside and outside of the art institution, constructing on the 
remainder which necessarily escapes the institutional exhaustive 
determination of – to borrow Luc Boltanski's term (2011) - the 'whatness' of 
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what art is and does. This implies that I will advocate a concept of 
institutional critique in which difference is reinscribed. Each and every time 
when institutional critique occurs, it will be both singular and different: 
there is no theory, no recipe and no organon that institutional critique 
should follow.  
 
Research Question and Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis asks: what are the conditions and possibilities of institutional 
critique? The answer that I will provide aims to unfold the categories of a 
logic of institutional critique capable of challenging situations of institutional 
contradiction that, in my understanding, are effects of the processes of 
recuperation and neutralization of the 'new spirit' of capitalism (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005).  Essentially, my argument is that the apparatus of 
deconstruction provides us with the tools with which one can articulate 
such a logic. 
 In the first chapter I observe the recent resurgence of interest 
regarding the manner in which practitioners of the art field have received, 
acknowledged and transformed the legacies of institutional critique. I 
propose that this interest should be understood as a reaction to the 
intensification of processes of recuperation and instrumentalization of 
artistic critique by what Boltanski and Chiapello describe as the ‘new spirit’ 
of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). This recent interest refers to 
a range of attempts that try to overcome the dilemma of artistic critique, of 
choosing between either restoring old critical paradigms or adopting self-
defeatist positions. They have been inspired by arguments drawn from 
poststructuralist and postoperaist philosophies, though they pay little 
attention to the possibilities offered by deconstruction. Against this 
background, I will show that one can identify already, even in what has 
been coined as the two waves of institutional critique, elements that 
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amount to a deconstructive logic.  
 Chapters two and three proceed to a conceptual analysis of the 
logic of instituting and the logic of critique. In chapter two I propose, 
following Searle (2010; 1995), Derrida (2002; 1988a; 1988b), and 
Boltanski (2011), that institutions are primarily semantic and deontic 
entities and that they are founded on an irreducible violence, the violence 
of an intention and will of defining and describing the 'whatness' of what is 
as if that is all that there is. I show, at the same time, that this exhaustive 
determination of the meaning of what is instituted is impossible, and that 
critique constructs precisely on the remainder and rest that necessarily 
escapes institutional laws and rules. Chapter three argues that we need to 
move away from the binary logic of the modern concept of critique of the 
type either/or and adopt a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and that 
would be able to grasp singularity and difference. Despite the singularity 
and multiplicity of its iterations, there is an identity of critique that I 
recognise in what Foucault calls 'the critical attitude' (Foucault, 1997), an 
attitude of being both partner and adversary of the powers that be. As a 
consequence of the analyses from the second and the third chapters, I 
propose that between institutions (and I include here the art institution) 
and critique there is an irreducible relation of cohabitation and symbiosis. 
 Chapter four investigates the topology of an institutional critique that 
operates with a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and. I argue that 
institutional critique is and ought to be neither inside nor outside, or both 
inside and outside, at the same time, of the art institution. I show that this 
positioning allows institutional critique to articulate a critical attitude, of 
being both partner and adversary, at the same time, of the institutional 
powers that be.  
 In chapter five I explain why it is necessary that institutional critique 
remains inside the art institution, but also, in a sense, outside of it. This 
necessity stems from the parergonal nature of the frame: on the one hand, 
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frames appear to have the negative function of cutting off the meaning of 
what is contained within them. But at the same time, they do have the 
positive utility of augmenting, enhancing and contributing to the 
performative effect of whatever appears within them. I claim that the 
topology of institutional critique allows it to employ the parergonal nature of 
the frame: institutional critique will operate before and beyond frames, but 
precisely on the frame and with the frame framing, as it were, the frames 
that frame it.  
 Finally, in chapter six, I explain that the logic of institutional critique, 
a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and, is to be understood as 
pertaining to the categories of deconstruction. What particularly interests 
me in this chapter is to show that institutional critique as a deconstruction 
does have a political scope; part of the argument is to show in which 
sense institutional critique as a deconstruction is an 'invention of the other' 
and makes 'justice'. At the same time, I discuss the possible ways in which 
it challenges the situation of institutional contradiction that I emphasized in 
this introduction, the fact that institutional critique is always-already co-
opted. Given the argument of the entire thesis, I will show that co-optation 
represents the positive condition of an institutional critique that inserts 
itself and subverts the layers of art institutions. 
 
Methodological Delimitations 
 
The structure of this thesis and the articulation of the themes of this 
research have been extensively influenced by Jacques Derrida's texts. I 
chose to talk about the violence of instituting speech acts and about the 
cohabitation and symbiosis of the art institution and of critique; I discuss 
the limitations of the binary concept of critique, and I investigate the 
positioning of institutional critique in relation to the inside/outside of the art 
institution and its use of the parergonal nature of the frame. Finally, I ask in 
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what sense institutional critique is inventive, affirmative, and to what extent 
it produces or is itself a form of justice. I believe that, by developing these 
themes, I advance a theoretical construct which is capable of showing that 
the logic of institutional critique is deconstructive and that, in the present, 
social, economic and cultural circumstances of the contemporary art 
institution, institutional critique could be carried further only if it is a 
deconstruction.  
 Inevitably, these methodological choices imply that some possible 
themes of discussion will be left aside. First, this thesis is not a 
historicization of institutional critique, in the sense that it is less interested 
in distinguishing the shifts in the artistic styles and mediums of expression 
of whatever passes as institutional critique in the canon of art history. One 
particular consequence is that I have decided to postpone for a later study 
a sustained investigation of the connections between the historical avant-
gardes and institutional critique and a revaluation of Peter Bürger's Theory 
of the Avant-Garde (1984) which, Andrea Fraser tells us (Fraser, 2009a, 
410), had an important influence on what has been canonized as the 
second generation of institutional critics.   
 Second, the range of practices and discourses that I will refer to 
belong to the cultural, political, economic and social geographies of the 
modern, Western, late capitalist societies. Even more specifically, it will 
become evident to the reader that much of the analyses of this thesis are 
influenced by my direct engagement with various European art institutions 
or projects. Thus I already accept as valid a possible criticism made from 
the perspective of post-colonial theory: my thesis inherits the limits of a 
Western type of institutional critique, which remains a 'privilege' of artists 
working in the relatively abundant economies of Europe and the United 
States. In my previous practice within the collective ArtLeaks, to which I 
will refer in chapter one, I have met, in fact, expressions of institutional 
critique stemming from spaces of the former Socialist Block, South-East 
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Asia and Latin America. But lacking a direct experience and an expertise 
of these contexts, I have decided to focus on a much narrower context.  
 Third, I acknowledge the significant and productive concatenation 
between gender and feminist discourses and themes, and the practice of 
institutional critique in the work of artists like Martha Rosler, Adrian Piper, 
or Andrea Fraser, or artist groups like the Guerrilla Girls or, more recent, 
Pussy Riot. Without diminishing its impact, I considered the theme of 
feminism to be of a far greater complexity to be treated only in the limited 
space of a chapter. This thesis rather describes the general conditions and 
possibilities of a critique that occurs within the art institution. This logic 
amounts, I argue, to a deconstruction; given that the intersection between 
deconstruction and feminism made possible the ground-breaking work of 
authors such as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray, here I can only indicate 
a possible development of this research, which should offer the deserved 
attention to the connections between institutional critique as a 
deconstruction and feminism.  
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
During my research I have encountered various attempts to 
reconceptualize the categories of institutional critique, particularly by 
borrowing themes from the poststructuralist philosophies of Deleuze and 
Guattari and Foucault, or the postoperaist theory of Negri. I refer to them 
in the first chapter of this thesis. To my knowledge, however, little attention 
has been paid to the manner in which deconstruction is helpful in thinking 
through the 'phase change' of institutional critique. Therefore, I regard this 
thesis' contribution to knowledge as two fold. First, this thesis fills in a gap. 
It provides a different conceptual toolbox, akin to the categories of 
deconstruction, which is able to decipher the dimensions of the 'political 
and theoretical necessity to be found in the logic of institutional critique' 
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(Raunig, 2009, 3) grounding the hypothesis of its 'new phase'. I believe 
that this toolbox amounts to a coherent and consistent articulation: if my 
argument is correct, these investigations have the potential of becoming 
the base of further research that would tackle precisely those concerns 
which, for reasons that I have already announced, have been consciously 
left out. Second, the aim of this thesis is to counteract pessimistic claims 
that emphasize the total recuperation and neutralization of institutional 
critique. I show that the recuperation and instrumentalization of institutional 
critique is not and cannot be total. But the included analyses will not let 
themselves be seduced by uncritical optimism. The current processes of 
the corporatization and privatization of art institutions do, indeed, provide 
some of the most difficult conditions in which the critical potential of an art 
that wants to bear meaning outside of its realm should be fulfilled. 
However, my argument is that institutional critique as a deconstruction has 
no end and cannot end. If anything, the reader should take this 
investigation as a modest contribution to a differential understanding of not 
only what institutional critique has been, is, or could be, but also, most 
importantly, of what it has done, does, and could do. 
 
 
  
Chapter I: 
Institutional Critique: the State of the Art 
 
Introduction 
  
My aim in this chapter is to offer an account of the circumstances that 
have determined the direction of my research. In this thesis I explore the 
conditions and possibilities of institutional critique, and the context in which 
my investigation unfolds has been significantly shaped by the growing 
interest and the vast amount of literature on the topic of institutional 
critique's legacies and heritage. Let's take a few examples: the Vienna-
based European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies has been 
publishing, ever since 2000, on its web journal platform, dossiers 
focussing on topics such as critique, protest and resistance, progressive 
institutions, instituent practices and institutional critique. John C. 
Welchman edited the proceedings of a symposium that took place at the 
Los Angeles County Museum of Art in a book titled Institutional Critique 
and After (Welchman, 2006). And in 2009 art historians Alexander Alberro 
and Blake Stimson edited what appears to be perhaps the most 
comprehensive compendium of artists’ interviews, manifestos and texts on 
the topic of institutional critique (Alberro and Stimson, 2009). Last but not 
least, one should not forget to mention the activity of groups such as 
ArtLeaks, W.A.G.E, and Arts and Labour1 that have openly acknowledged 
their political contiguity with art projects of institutional critique. 
 This list is, of course, not exhaustive. To be sure, throughout this 
thesis I will have the occasion to refer to other contributions to what has 
become an on-going public debate about the conditions of institutional 
critique. Rather, what interests me is to ask, instead, what makes this 
                                            
1
 See: <http://art-leaks.org/>; <http://ragpickers.tumblr.com/>; <http://artsandlabor.org/>. I will 
discuss some of these initiatives in section three of this chapter. 
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particular historical moment so singular, so unique, that many 
practitioners, from philosophers to art critics, to artists and curators return 
to the legacies and heritage of institutional critique? This is the question 
which guides the narrative of this chapter.  
 The answer that I will propose takes into account, on the one hand, 
the social-historical background, particularly the conditions of art's 
production, distribution and consumption, against which the new 
discourses of institutional critique develop; on the other hand it takes into 
account the current stage of development of critical paradigms for art 
practice and theory. I want to propose, then, that we can understand this 
development by locating two inter-related phenomena. The first one refers 
to the intensification of a process that began in the 1960s, and that 
amounts to the corporatization of art and culture. What seems to me to be 
offering the most compelling explanation of these transformations is Luc 
Boltanski's and Eve Chiapello's widely read theses of the New Spirit of 
Capitalism (2005; initially published in French in 1999). In this book the 
authors propose that capitalism and criticism have historically developed in 
a relation of productive symbiosis. Significantly, however, what emerges 
for the first time in history, in the post-1968 economic and social 
environment, is the capitalist recuperation of what the authors designate 
as the demands of 'artistic critique': namely, the demands for liberation, 
autonomy and authenticity. The first section of this chapter explains the 
layers of this thesis and proposes that an essential feature that 
characterizes the history of institutional critique is precisely the 
intensification of the corporatization and privatization of the arts.  
 In section two I follow this thread by showing that the 
corporatization of the arts has indeed marked positions taken, among 
others, by Martha Rosler, Hans Haacke, and Mel Ramsden. But I want to 
argue, at the same time, that we can identify a particular historical moment 
towards the end of the 1990s, when practitioners of the art field became 
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conscious that the former 'dialectical' approaches addressing the 
corporatization of the arts are inadequate. I consider Benjamin H.D. 
Buchloh's critical reflections in the pages of Artforum (Buchloh, 1997) as 
the symbolic shift to a new way of conceptualizing critical resistance.  
 In section three I explore what I describe as the second 
phenomenon, which legitimises the present historical moment of 
requestioning the possibilities of institutional critique. It refers to a 
perceived need to reevaluate art's critical claims and possibilities for 
effective criticism and social engagement. I discuss this necessity, which is 
both theoretical and practical, in relation to the concerns of redefining 
institutional critique, both through the philosophical labour of conceptual 
analysis and through the efforts of rewriting its historical canon. 
 I conclude the chapter by admitting my theoretical indebtedness to 
those positions that attempt to rethink institutional critique through the 
tools offered by poststructuralist and postoperaist philosophies. At the 
same time, I announce my contribution to the debate, by proposing a 
return to the categories of what Jacques Derrida calls 'deconstruction': my 
claim is that deconstruction is able to provide the tools through which we 
can reinvent a political practice of institutional critique. 
1. The Post-1968 'Spirit' of Capitalism 
 
In their New Spirit of Capitalism (2005) Boltanski and Chiapello propose 
that inherent in every form of capitalism, by which they understand the 
imperative to unlimited accumulation of capital through formally 'peaceful' 
means (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 4) is a certain 'spirit'. The term 
'spirit' designates an ideology that justifies engagement within the capitalist 
order (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 8), a set of beliefs that help to justify 
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it and 'to sustain the forms of action and predispositions compatible with it' 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 10). Part of this 'spirit' is an orientation 
towards the common good, from which it derives reasons of commitment 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 27). But essentially, capitalism is 
characterized by a fundamental incapacity of generating norms for 
common conduct exclusively out of its own resources. As a result the two 
authors explain that the development of capitalism follows a particular 
dynamic which incorporates its critical adversary: capitalism 'needs its 
enemies, people whom it outrages and who are opposed to it, to find the 
moral supports it lacks and to incorporate mechanisms of justice whose 
relevance it would otherwise have no reason to acknowledge' (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005, 27). It follows that capitalism has an intimate 
relationship with critique; that critique, indeed, becomes the engine of its 
development and transformation2.  
 The two authors suggest that at the very base of this dynamic is the 
sense of indignation that capitalism necessarily produces. Indignation is 'a 
bad experience prompting to protest […] an emotional, almost sentimental 
reaction' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 36); it is the very point from 
where critique takes off. But critique is feeble if it remains at this primary, 
emotional level; there is a secondary level, reflexive, theoretical and 
argumentative, that 'makes it possible to sustain ideological struggle, but 
assumes a supply of concepts and schemas making it possible to connect 
the historical situations people intend to criticize with values that can be 
universalized' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 36). The articulation of 
indignation at a reflexive level triggers four types of critical elaborations 
that address the capitalist system: (1) a rejection of inauthenticity; (2) a 
pursuit for liberation; (3) a response to the suffering of the oppressed and 
(4) a refusal of egoism and opportunism.  Boltanski and Chiapello argue 
                                            
2
 To anticipate, in chapter two I will argue that this logic rests on an irreducible cohabitation and 
symbiosis between institutions and critique. 
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that the work of criticism has been unable to provide a holistic framework 
that would accommodate all these demands. On the contrary, they argue 
that the first two have found expression in the artistic and bohemian 
milieux of the nineteenth century in what they identify as 'artistic critique'. 
The last two have been inspired by socialists and Marxists and articulated 
as 'social critique', mainly by labour movements.  
 The main thesis of the New Spirit of Capitalism is that, as a 
consequence of the social turmoil of 1968, capitalism has entered into a 
new, decentralized phase, that one can label 'connexionist' or 'network-
based'. The events of 1968 produced, perhaps for the first time in history, 
an alliance of the two types of critique (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 169-
172). Looking at the case of the French social-historical context (between 
1968 and 1995), the two authors claim that in the first instance the 
response of the capitalist order was to interpret this unique event 
exclusively as social critique and, consequently, to offer significant 
concessions to social demands, amounting to improvement of pay and 
working conditions (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 177). But this did not 
bring protest to a halt and did not reinstate the control over work 
behaviour. Consequently, from amongst the 'innovative fractions of the 
employer class' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 177) stemmed a new 
strategy, that of interpreting the crisis of 1968 in terms of artistic critique 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 177-178). To put it in the terms of the two 
authors, 'autonomy was exchanged for security, opening the way for a new 
spirit of capitalism extolling the virtues of mobility and adaptability, 
whereas the previous spirit was unquestionably more concerned with 
security than with liberty' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 199). This 
tendency would develop throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. 
The post-1968 spirit of capitalism, then, refers to a 'translation' of the 
social and economic environment in the terms offered by artistic critique: 
that is, capitalism responded by incorporating the values of creativity, 
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flexibility, autonomy and self-development and accommodating them in a 
new regime of labour. This triggered the flexibilization of relations of 
production and of the types of work, the disappearance of the distinction 
between work time and leisure time, the decentralization of industrial 
relations, new forms of management and self-management, the 
fragmentation of the wage-earning class and the discrediting of 
frameworks of class struggle. As a direct consequence, one witnessed the 
decline of the leftist parties and demobilization of trade unions, the 
reduction of social protection and security, and the dismantling of the 
welfare state (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, ch. 4 & ch. 5)      
 Following these series of appropriations, Boltanski and Chiapello 
contend that from the end of the 1960s the power of critique has been 
weakened, both as social critique and as artistic critique (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005, 324-327). Social critique received its last major blow at 
the end of the 1980s when the 'communist' world disappeared. Capitalism 
found itself, as it were, on its own while social critique has engaged itself in 
a process of finding new sources of legitimation. On the practical level, it 
delegated its 'wish to act, prompted by indignation in the face of poverty, 
on to a charitable or humanitarian position' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 
325); on the theoretical level, it abandoned all macro-historical and macro-
sociological approaches, and retreated into 'a micro-analysis of actions or 
judgements en situation, often interpreted as indicating “the end of 
critique”' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 325). As for artistic critique, its 
success triggered a process of recuperation of its subversive potential by a 
new generation of managers familiar with the 'spirit of 1968' (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005, 326). The response to the demand for autonomy 
presupposed the replacement of factory supervision with self-control and 
with the responsabilization of the worker in relation to customers. The 
demand for creativity triggered a shift in the nature of economy, which has 
gradually relied on services and cultural production. The exploitation of 
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imagination, innovation and inventiveness is most visible in what is now 
known as the 'cultural industries'. Here alliances, that perhaps would have 
been inconceivable decades ago, would emerge. As a result, the dividing 
lines between 'intellectuals and businessmen and production, between 
artists and bourgeois' have become blurred (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2005, 326). The pursuit of authenticity has been transformed in the 
preoccupation of articulating an 'authentic lifestyle' whose guiding principle 
is the consumption of commodity goods: in this sense, the reduction of 
production costs made available, for larger sections of the population, the 
products of the fashion, leisure, and service industries, and even those of 
the luxury industry. Finally, the demand of liberation did indeed produce, in 
the first instance, a lifting of prohibitions. But soon after, this also led to the 
opening up of new markets. The 'sexual revolution' and its consequence, 
the development of a market for sex-related goods, are the best examples 
illustrating this fact. 
 The 1990s and, I argue, the 2000s saw, indeed, a resurgence of 
social critique in response to new forms of economic injustice, insecurity, 
exploitation and exclusion (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 346). New 
social movements have emerged: appropriating the metaphor of the 
network, they host people with divergent opinions that are brought 
together by a common struggle against exclusion. Often former trade-
union members and political activists are providing the 'oppositional know-
how' that in this case amounts to a distrust in former forms of organization 
(the party, the trade union, etc.), often emphasizing face-to-face action 
instead of political representation and delegation, structural horizontality 
instead of hierarchical verticality, heterogeneity and pluralism instead of 
political homogeneity. The two authors see these movements as possible 
embryos for a common struggle at the level of the legislative mechanisms 
that would limit the relations of force and abuse pertaining to a network-
based capitalist world (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 372-400). 
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 Referring to artistic critique, however, the two authors suggest that 
the forms of capitalism that have developed in the last thirty years, while 
incorporating and subordinating it to profit-making, have indeed anchored 
the demands of liberation and authenticity in people's everyday experience 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 421). But at the same time, this process 
did not take place without a certain ideological reframing that, as I have 
shown already, pertains to new types of social alienation, the 
commodification of difference, and the transformation of the demand for 
liberation and authenticity in the incentive of commodity consumption. In 
other words: the connexionist capitalist world did indeed respond to the 
artistic pursuit of liberation and authenticity, but at the same time it initiated 
a new cycle of recuperation which placed large numbers of people in 
anxiety-inducing situations. Relative to the year 1999 when the New Spirit 
of Capitalism was published in French, artistic critique still offered a sad 
image. On the one hand the solution at hand was to return to a type of 
criticism proper to nineteenth century modernism, which would include the 
denunciation of bourgeois morality, censorship and the repressive cultural 
institutions (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 467). But this would fail to take 
into account the displacements of current forms of capitalism. On the other 
hand, artistic criticism acknowledges capitalism's ability to recuperate 
everything and anything, idealizes a long-gone past, and embraces 
nihilism. But again, this hardly contributes to advancing the work of 
tackling the sources of indignation that capitalism produces. 
 What I have done in this section is to explain, following Boltanski 
and Chiapello, the historical passage that led to the recuperation of artistic 
critique within a ‘new spirit’ of capitalism. If it is true that artistic critique is 
caught in the dilemma of either returning to old types of criticism or 
embrace nihilism, than my argument is that the current attempts to 
rediscuss the heritage of institutional critique represent an effort to 
displace the two horns of this dilemma. This is what, in my understanding, 
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characterizes the particular historical moment which sees the resurgence 
of an interest in the possibilities of institutional critique. In the next sections 
my aim is to show how the transformations triggered by the 'new spirit' of 
capitalism have been mirrored in the critical-artistic discourse, with a 
particular focus on the process of arts' corporatization and privatization 
(section two). Then, in section three I want to explore how recent 
interventions of what could be described as institutional critique respond to 
these developments. 
2. The Corporate Life of the Arts 
In this subchapter I want to refer to the manner in which various 
practitioners of the art field have reflected upon the recuperation of artistic 
critique within the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism. I particularly focus on how 
processes referring to the corporatization and privatization of the arts have 
been perceived. As much as one can discern a constant concern in 
relation to these processes – I highlight positions taken by Mel Ramsden, 
Hans Haacke and Martha Rosler - my understanding is that the end of the 
1990s represents a key moment of acknowledgement of the dilemma in 
which artistic critique is caught. Benjamin Buchloh's intervention in the 
pages of Artforum (1997), in which he 'declares' the demise of critical art, 
is in this sense exemplary. I suggest that this acknowledgement is what 
has directly triggered the resurgence of the discourses of institutional 
critique in the 2000s.  
2.1. Sponsoring Freedom 
 
In 1990, in response to the commission that the Berlin City Council offered 
to Mercedes Benz to redesign the no-man's land of Potsdamer Platz, 
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Hans Haacke installed the Mercedes Benz star on top of two watch 
towers. Potsdamer Platz has a troubled history: bombed and nearly 
erased by Allies during the Second World War, it functioned as a buffer 
zone and 'death strip' of the Berlin Wall from 1961 onwards. The 
reconstruction of the square symbolized the reunification of the city and 
the closing of a painful historical circle. Haacke's installation reminded of 
the Mercedes star installed on top of Europa Center in West Berlin. At the 
same time, by placing the star within a perimeter delimited by large square 
window panes, the work indicated a visual connection with the windows of 
the Palasthotel (Palace Hotel) that the German Democratic Republic had 
reserved for its foreign guests. The installation was entitled Freiheit wird 
jetzt einfach gesponsored (Freedom is now simply sponsored). This is a 
direct acknowledgement, in my opinion, of what Boltanski and Chiapello 
have described as the capitalist recuperation of the demand for liberation. 
It reacts to the rushed manner in which the new reunited Germany 
repressed the remembrance of its recent past and especially of 
communism, by the redecoration of the historical landmark of Potsdamer 
Platz. At the same time, the work points, in a simple and direct manner, to 
the means through which the motivation of being free, that lead to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, was being recuperated in symbolic reappropriations and 
commodified by corporate sponsorship. 
 Haacke has been often described as the champion of anti-corporate 
art. Many of his interventions have targeted multinational companies and 
corporations, such as Mobil, Philips, Mercedes, Deutsche Bank, Saatchi & 
Saatchi PLC, etc. But Haacke was also paying attention to the manner in 
which a new managerial class had taken key positions in institutional 
structures during the 1970s and early 1980s.  In his Museums, Managers 
of Consciousness he described what he calls 'a new breed' of art 
managers, trained by prestigious business schools, that 'are convinced 
that art can and should be managed like the production and marketing of 
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other goods' (Haacke, 2009, 277). Their discourse was structured by the 
vocabulary of business and even 'the intricacies of labour relations and the 
ways in which interpersonal issues might affect the organization are part of 
their curriculum' (Haacke, 2009, 277). The emergence of a new 
managerial class that Haacke talks about is, of course, part of the larger 
phenomenon pertaining to the transformations of the 'new spirit of 
capitalism'. Haacke explained that there is a major difference between the 
manner in which art institutions had been organized in the past and their 
current business-oriented reorganization. In the past, he writes, art 
directors and curators did not see themselves as managers and to some 
extent they kept alive the belief that art retains a certain autonomy. This 
conception of art was of course 'mystical', ideological, and therefore, 
problematic. But essentially there was a common assumption that art has 
to be kept apart from business. The new setting that Haacke was 
contemporary with blurred these borders: and Haacke expected that 'the 
lack of delusions and aspirations among the new art administrators will 
have a noticeable impact on the state of the industry' (Haacke, 2009, 277).  
 Haacke was not alone in paying attention to the transformations 
occurring in the art field as a result of post-1968 capitalist transformations. 
As early as 1975 Mel Ramsden from Art & Language would begin his 
much celebrated On Practice by observing that the New York art of the 
1970s had become a function of the art market system that operates a 
'massive controlling factor in the way we now vector human relations' 
(Ramsden, 2009, 170). The art of the 1970s, in other words, was 
celebrating a model of individual 'freedom'. On the one hand, explains 
Ramsden, this presupposed the 'insular and boring spectacle of fads, 
intoxications, diversions, infatuations, and even the odd pseudo-revolution, 
all under the platitudinous guise of massive evidence of “creativity” and 
“artistic freedom”' (Ramsden, 2009, 171). On the other hand, this was 
accompanied by an increase and diversification in the ranks of institutional 
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bureaucrats that administer these 'manifestations of freedom' and 
instrumentalize them as function of market relations. Artists were slowly 
being commodified, in 'a mode of existence in which what counts is the 
demand for what the market defines as your talents, in which all 
relationships have their monetary value, and it is their monetary value that 
matters' (Ramsden, 2009, 171).  
 Martha Rosler would summarize these developments in 1997 in a 
text in which she responded, together with other writers, to Art Bulletin's 
theme 'Money, Power and the History of Art' (Rosler, 1997). In the 1970s, 
writes Rosler, corporations based in the most powerful economies, such 
as those of Germany, the U.S. and Japan, have infused previously 
unprecedented amounts of capital in the art market; they were looking for 
'superb symbolic goods' (Rosler, 1997, 22) that only art was able to 
provide. Already in the 1980s the art world functioned much more as a 
marketing system. As the role of art critics decreased, that of art dealers 
became more prominent. Rosler observed that younger artists paid little 
interest in the 'noncommodifiable nonobject-centered art that was vital 
since the 1960s' (Rosler, 1997, 22). On the contrary, this generation of 
artists were following a small-producer paradigm with self-marketing as 
'the model of liberation from galleries' (Rosler, 1997, 22). At the same time, 
the gallery world had progressively started to mirror 'designer clothing 
boutiques' (Rosler, 1997, 22). This refers, I suggest, to what Boltanski and 
Chiapello described as the commodification of authenticity in a process 
that exploits the intersection points of art, fashion and lifestyle. Rosler 
claimed that this tendency persisted throughout the 1990s. For the last 
decade of the former century it could be said, then, that  
 
 
the art world […] is dominated by but is not identical with the art 
market. The art world, clearly, is directly related to other capital 
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markets […] the art world is just a little corner of the speculative 
markets – albeit a highly specialized one (Rosler, 1997, 21). 
 
My argument is that Haacke's, Ramsden's and Rosler's positions mirror 
the displacements of what Boltanski and Chiapello described as the 
transformations triggered by a 'new spirit of capitalism'. Furthermore, I 
want to show that the end of the 1990s do represent, indeed, a turning 
point: they configure a historical moment in which practitioners of the art 
field recognize the dilemma in which artistic critique had been caught, the 
dilemma of choosing between an outdated critique and nihilism. In the next 
subsection I will approach what in my reading becomes the symbolic 
expression of this critical point. I will discuss a short though extremely 
interesting intervention dating from 1997 in the pages of Artforum 
International and authored by Benjamin H. D. Buchloh. This text, to put it 
in Yves-Alain Bois' introductory words, marks a 'striking farewell' to a 
certain manner of conducting criticism, leaving open the question of what 
follows after. What follows after, I suggest, is a decade that goes back to 
the legacies of institutional critique.  
2.2. Farewell to Criticism? 
 
Part of the editorial team of the October journal, Buchloh is an art 
theoretician and critic who contributed significantly to the academic 
establishment of institutional critique. His illuminating analyses of the work 
of Hans Haacke, Martha Rosler, Marcel Broodthaers and Daniel Buren, 
among others, have deeply influenced the generation of institutional critics 
of the 1990s. Particularly his Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the 
Aesthetic of Administration to the Critique of Institutions (Buchloh, 1999; 
initially written in 1990) represented a landmark in the theoretical debates 
on institutional critique. Not only because this was one of the most well 
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documented historicizations of conceptual art, which he described as 'the 
most consequential assault on the status of the object of spatial and 
perceptual experience: its visuality, its commodity status, and its form of 
distribution' (Buchloh, 1999, 515); but also because with the same stroke 
he discerned a latent tendency within conceptual art that progressively 
recognized that  
 
materials and procedures, surfaces and textures, locations and 
placement are not only sculptural or painterly matter to be dealt with 
in terms of a phenomenology of visual and cognitive experience or in 
terms of a structural analysis of the sign […] but that they are always 
already inscribed within the conventions of language and thereby 
within institutional power and ideological and economic investment 
(Buchloh, 1999, 528)3.  
 
This is one of the earliest and most influential attempts to give a theoretical 
form to what later became known as institutional critique. Given Buchloh's 
place in its genealogy, it therefore becomes symbolically significant to turn 
to his small text from 1997. 
 Buchloh's Critical Reflections were part of a series in which 
Artforum invites critics and theorists to articulate the role and 
responsibilities of criticism today. This text surprises the reader with, as 
already noticed, a 'striking farewell'. It begins with a paraphrase of Marx: 
just like a social class tends to mistake its own end with the end of the 
world and of history, 'when art critics reach the end of their historical line, 
they tend to mistake the failure of their prognostic identifications or lack of 
comprehension of present practices for the end of art' (Buchloh, 1997). 
Throughout the last four decades, Buchloh has accustomed his readers 
                                            
3
 The fifth chapter of this thesis will investigate how things such as materials and procedures, 
surfaces and textures, locations and placement have become the preferred objects of institutional 
critique. 
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with his scholarly, well-informed, argumentative, and convincing style of 
writing. What we find in the pages of Artforum is, however, something of a 
different sort. Perhaps this is because Artforum is not October; the former 
is closer to what Adorno and Horkheimer called 'culture industry' than the 
latter. Or perhaps because what he includes here is the result of a self-
reflexive process, as Buchloh does indeed point to himself as making the 
same mistake. This is, to be sure, a 'striking farewell'. But what is 
interesting is that what one says farewell to has not yet come into 
existence. What we read is Buchloh   
 
declaring from the vantage point of a critic who has been engaged 
with a relatively limited set of artistic positions and practices that what 
has come into sight as a distinct possibility is, if not the end of art, 
then the end of these historically determined definitions of artistic 
practice and with them, the end of their protagonists and institutions  
(Buchloh, 1997, 69). 
 
 
We read, therefore, a declaration, a speech act, whose performance 
attempts to do what it says it does, that is, bringing into existence the 
demise of a limited set of artistic positions and practices that the author 
has been engaged with. This declaration is 'enhanced' by a certain 
performative force that appeals to Buchloh's authority: from 'the vantage 
point' in which this authority has been accrued, the author declares that he 
is one of those critics that 'have reached the end of their historical line'. 
And how exactly are we to describe this time that ends? First, it is defined 
by artistic practices establishing 'a model of critical resistance and radical 
negativity'; second, it refers to the artists that 'had perceived themselves 
as inextricably linked to yet indisputably opposed to the culture industry'; 
and third, it amounts to institutions that 'had taken seriously their 
historically defined functions of providing a critical space of exemption, if 
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not opposition, within the bourgeois public sphere' (Buchloh, 1997, 69). All 
these, declares Buchloh, have come to an end. 
 It would be interesting to examine this particular constellation of 
artists, practices and institutions that had come to an end. For Buchloh is 
not arguing that the artistic positions and practices that he had engaged 
with presupposed desertion or abandonment of the art institution. On the 
contrary, the practices of 'critical resistance' and 'radical negativity' 
presupposed a certain collaboration and a certain dissent, deployed at the 
same time, in relation with the art institution. To simplify a rather 
complicated, difficult, and troubled relationship: artists were opposed 
though linked with the culture industry, whereas institutions provided a 
space in which artists have mounted their criticism, though not without 
refraining from exercising, at times, the force to censor, repress or shut off 
critical voices. There was, Buchloh would say, a common interest and a 
troublesome collaboration in the preservation of what he would call 'the 
bourgeois public sphere'. But all this has ended. 
 What are Buchloh's arguments? His reasons, I want to suggest, 
pertain to what Boltanski and Chiapello have described as the progressive 
recuperation of artistic critique by the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism. To begin 
with, Buchloh invited the reader to browse through the pages of Artforum, 
in order to discover that 'the sphere of social production traditionally called 
“avant-garde art” and the one called, since 1947, the “culture industry” 
have performed a successful merger' (Buchloh, 1997, 69)4. The merger 
                                            
4
 The term 'culture industry' has been coined by Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectics of 
Enlightenment (1947); it refers to the products of 'film, radio, and magazines' (today one could add 
to the list) whose effect is that it 'infects everything with sameness. […] Even the aesthetic 
manifestations of political opposites proclaim the same inflexible rhythm' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
2002, 94). The term 'culture industry' comports an essential reference to the marketability of culture; 
it maps the manner in which culture is shaped by the sphere of commodity production. Adorno and 
Horkheimer suggested that the public is addressed solely as consumer for which 'there is nothing 
left to classify, since the classification has already been preempted by the schematism of 
production' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 98). The alliance between entertainment and culture 
industry eventually seals the control over consumers (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 108). In what 
amounts to the concept of art, the two authors propose that the only possible mode of existence for 
art in the bourgeois society was through claiming its separate sphere of autonomy (Horkheimer and 
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between culture industry and the avant-garde designates a process in 
which the sphere of commodity production has recuperated critical art. His 
declaration suggests that the extent of this recuperation is total.  
One mechanism that supported this concatenation is the fashion 
industry. Fashion could be seen from two perspectives: as a tool to 
construct a 'mirage of subjectivity' through products provided by an 
industry that designs identity substitutes; at the same time, fashion can be 
seen as a tool of subversion, used against dominant rules of taste and 
convention (Buchloh, 1997, 69). Whereas the avant-garde flirted with both 
meanings, its significant difference from today's fashion industry has been 
'its radical aesthetic, social and political character' (Buchloh, 1997, 69). Its 
practice had a public and collective dimension that would 'separate the 
aesthetic subject from private interests as much as from individual 
privilege in its rehearsal of imaginary models of a collectively accessible 
experience of real autonomy and self-determination' (Buchloh, 1997, 69). 
What Buchloh observes is the disappearance of the public character of 
critical art practice; or better said, that the public dimension of its practice 
is increasingly regulated and controlled by the private sphere of corporate 
power.  
 He supported this observation with three examples. The first one 
refers to Dan Flavin's acceptance of the submission of his fluorescent 
sculptures to corporations 'that spectacularize Minimalism to generate the 
new distinction of the consumption of austerity' (Buchloh, 1997, 69); this is 
the same Dan Flavin whose sculptures Buchloh was seeing as posing a 
                                                                                                                       
Adorno, 2002, 127). Culture industry, however, operates a fundamental shift in the commodity 
character of art, since art 'dutifully admits to being a commodity, abjures its autonomy, and proudly 
takes its place among consumer goods' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 127). Using the Marxist 
distinction between use value and exchange value, the two authors suggested that in the culture 
industry, art's use value (the enjoyment of art for itself) is transformed in exchange value (art's 
possibility to be exchanged with other commodities): 'For consumers the use value of art, its 
essence, is a fetish, and the fetish – the social valuation which they mistake for the merit of works 
of art – becomes its only use value, the only quality they enjoy' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 
127). 
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resistance to corporate culture. The second example relates to the first 
Biennial of Florence, where the curators achieved a seamless fusion of 
'Acconci and Alaia, of Goncharova and Gucci, of avant-garde and fashion 
industry as indivisible and ultimately continuous fields of human enterprise' 
(Buchloh, 1997, 69, 102). The third example refers to Philip Johnson, 'the 
Leni Riefenstahl of corporate architecture' (Buchloh, 1997, 102), and his 
Time Sculpture that was installed at Lincoln Center (New York City). The 
installation was supported by the Movado Watch Corporation whose logo 
appeared on the sculpture; Buchloh's bedazzlement refers to the fact that 
there was no protest from architects, artists or critics that would signalize 
the conflict of interest between public sculpture and corporate-
endorsement contracts.  
 Summing up, Buchloh contended that 'corporations perceive the 
reduction of aesthetic experience to a fashion correlative (on the part of its 
authors and spectators alike) as a confirmation of the success of their own 
incessant agenda' (Buchloh, 1997, 102). The increasingly crushing fusion 
between fashion and artistic production tends to erase the latter's public 
and political character. Corporate sponsors, therefore, will oppose 
precisely those practices 'that require from their spectators and readers 
standards and commitment, and that are inevitably oppositional in their 
political implications' (Buchloh, 1997, 102). But in this process, the art 
institutions themselves tend to perform like corporations, and the 
Guggenheim is perhaps the most notorious example of an art institution 
that becomes the site of an 'advanced spectacle culture'.  
  However, in a strange turn of the narrative thread, Buchloh does 
mention, towards the end of his text, a series of artists such as Raymond 
Pettibon, Allan Sekula and James Coleman, whose practices part ways 
with the alliance between fashion industry and the avant-garde. He added 
the example of an intervention of an anonymous group of Berlin artists that 
carved out an ear from a billboard representation of Philip Johnson; 
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conjuring terrorist actions of the 1960s, they later sent a video of the ear to 
TV stations and requested release from the building in exchange for the 
ear. The practices of all these artists described, in Buchloh's opinion, a 
renewed interest for the rearticulation of the public and political character 
of cultural production. Therefore, 'were it not for figures like these, it would 
be even easier to envisage […] the end of our notions of a relatively 
autonomous, public avant-garde culture altogether and move on to the 
immediacy of the Internet' (Buchloh, 1997, 102). 
 In my understanding, Buchloh's text is one of clearest examples of 
the dilemma in which artistic critique is caught. For what Buchloh does is 
to acknowledge, on the one hand, the impossible move towards a former 
critical model of 'dialectical negation' whose demise he in fact declares. On 
the other hand, he refuses, as well, the positions of critical nihilism, given 
that the work of Sekula, Pettibon and Coleman keeps alive the idea of 
constructing spaces of self-determination and critical engagement. That 
there is a need, both theoretical and practical, to move beyond this 
dilemma is expressed by his acceptance of publishing in the pages of 
Artforum: for as the author writes, Artforum as well operates the merger 
between culture industry and the avant-garde. Here, in these pages, 
Buchloh declares that the culture industry has recuperated the critical 
stance of the avant-garde, that it has neutralized and erased its public and 
political character. He declares, altogether, his own end: his presence in 
this magazine signifies his definite recuperation. But with the same stroke 
he delays and defers the performance of this speech act. For what other 
reason is there to mention Pettibon, Sekula and Coleman, other than 
break one's own promise of delivering the end of a historical period? The 
end is, as it were, spectral. It is about to come but it is not here yet. And 
with this stroke Buchloh deconstructs his own position: placing himself 
within the heart of the culture industry, grafting onto processes of total 
recuperation, he delays and postpones them. The symbolic significance of 
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this deferral amounts to the articulation of an open space of possibilities: 
and my argument is that this space has been occupied, in the last decade, 
by efforts of rearticulating institutional critique. 
3. The Re-evaluation of Institutional Critique's Tools and Potential 
In this section I want to review different arguments concerning institutional 
critique that have been launched in public debate in the 2000s. I suggest 
that their occurrence refers to the theoretical and practical necessity of re-
evaluating and rearticulating the tools and logic of critique in response to 
the recuperation of artistic criticism by the 'new spirit' of capitalism. 
Boltanski and Chiapello suggested that 'if we are to see a revival of the 
artistic critique, it will be on the basis not only of an “intellectual” analysis 
of the phenomena associated with capitalism's current state, but of its 
conjunction with suffering' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005, 420). This 
subchapter is designed in such a way as to show that we are in fact 
witnessing a conjunction between indignation that results from suffering 
and intellectual analysis. I begin, therefore, by analysing the labour of 
three collectives for which the legacies of institutional critique are decisive. 
I move afterwards towards the side of intellectual analysis and explore 
what I perceive as a process of redefining institutional critique's 
possibilities. I conclude by determining the position of my own research 
within this realm of possibilities.  
3.1. The Sense of Suffering in the Art World 
 
As a result of the financial crash that started at the end of 2008 culture, the 
arts, and education have been subject to dramatic budget cuts. In the U.K. 
in October 2010 more than one hundred artists and art workers, including 
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nineteen Turner Prize winners, signed a public letter to Jeremy Hunt, head 
of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in response to 
policies of funds-slashing. Their appeal argued that the cuts will have a 
damaging impact on smaller-scale art institutions, where  
 
many of us had our first inspiring encounters with art [...] Radical cuts 
to the arts would force hundreds of them to close or drastically curtail 
their programmes. This will undermine not only the present health of 
our cultural life, but its future development, and will help ensure that 
one of our country's greatest success stories is brought to a crashing 
and abrupt end (Abdu'Allah, F. et. al., 2010, webpage). 
 
This argument was confirmed two years later when The Guardian website 
published an interactive map with information about the types of cultural 
institutions and the changes triggered by the reduction in cultural spending 
in most of the European countries (Rice-Oxley, Torpey, and Clarke, 2012, 
webpage). Smaller museums, galleries, and theatres were closed in 
countries that suffered from severe economic recession, such as Spain, 
Italy, and the U.K. Staffing was reduced in cultural institutions in, among 
others, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia, and Austria. In most of 
the European countries, museums, galleries, publicly funded cultural 
projects and scholarships, and theatre, ballet and opera houses were 
subject to budget cuts.  
 Claire Bishop points out correctly that 'axing funding to these 
institutions inevitably sends the message that such museums are 
dispensable, and that only commercially viable museums can continue to 
operate' (Bishop, 2011, webpage). She argues that the rationale behind 
these cultural policies is grounded on a market-based logic. Lacking public 
funding, cultural institutions are encouraged to secure private and 
corporate funding. Bishop suggests that  
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private funding hinders creativity and risk-taking, and promotes a 
blockbuster mentality that serves the patrons first and culture 
second; […] some productions are fatally unattractive to sponsors; 
[…] experimental projects rarely receive support, while private 
sponsorship encourages self-censorship and the triumph of market 
imperatives (Bishop, 2011, webpage). 
 
In this chapter I have already made the suggestion that the corporate 
occupation of the field of art and culture and their transformation according 
to the principles of a market-based logic are phenomena referring to the 
'new spirit' of capitalism's recuperation of artistic critique. From a certain 
point of view, therefore, the situation in which the arts and culture find 
themselves in the post-2008 financial crisis could be described as the 
outcome of an accelerated process of recuperation and a market-driven 
polarization: flagship institutions which are attractive to sponsors will be 
able to survive the crisis, whereas smaller galleries, theatres, museums, 
and cultural projects, situated perhaps in less visible urban areas and 
communities, will be shut down (Bishop, 2011, webpage). It will be helpful, 
therefore, to refer to a number of initiatives that emerged after 2009 that 
respond to these transformations.  
 I believe that a growing number of practices such as those of 
ArtLeaks (http://art-leaks.org), the Precarious Workers Brigade/PWB 
(http://precariousworkersbrigade.tumblr.com), and Working Artists and the 
Greater Economy/W.A.G.E. (http://www.wageforwork.com) could be 
described as resulting from indignation triggered by the current precarious 
living and working conditions. Part of this credo comes from my own two-
year long engagement with ArtLeaks, a collective platform initiated by an 
international group of artists, curators, and academics that publishes 
cases of abuse, repression, threatening, intimidation, and censorship 
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taking place in cultural institutions. Within ArtLeaks I had the occasion to 
communicate and collaborate with some of those who have submitted and 
published such cases. I believe that the leakers' stories express a sense of 
indignation and revolt in relation to degrading experiences that they had in 
institutions of art. If anything, the list of cases published on the ArtLeaks 
website shows that labour conditions even in institutions that benefit from 
corporate sponsorship have worsened: unpaid internships, unpaid artists, 
or projects cancelled because of their open criticism against these 
conditions are often reported. In a certain sense, ArtLeaks’s discourse is 
based precisely on the belief that indignation is capable of fuelling a 
sustained collective act of resistance. ArtLeaks' existence is grounded on 
the idea that the act of making public such cases will articulate a general 
index of repression, whose general patterns would be identifiable in 
various contexts across the globe.   
Working Artists and the Greater Economy (W.A.G.E.) is an artist-
activist group based in New York. It focuses on regulating the payment of 
artist fees and attempts to establish sustainable models for best practices 
between cultural producers and cultural institutions. W.A.G.E.'s work 
specifically draws attention to the present economic inequalities within the 
art realm; the collective demands 'an end of refusal to pay fees for the 
work we're asked to provide: preparation, installation, presentation, 
consultation, exhibition, and reproduction' (W.A.G.E., website). 
Interestingly, W.A.G.E. refutes the distinction between symbolic capital and 
economic capital, and asks for 'the remuneration of cultural value in capital 
value' (W.A.G.E., website). One of their main tools is the W.A.G.E. 
Certification, a program that publicly recognizes organizations that 
voluntarily adhere to a best practices model and demonstrate a history of, 
and commitment to, paying fees to cultural workers. The terrain on which 
W.A.G.E. articulates its efforts has been in fact prepared by a series of 
studies by economists that highlight the injustices of art's economy. Hans 
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Abbing for example observes that the arts constitute a mirage for 
youngsters, the vast majority of whom ends up with earning little to nothing 
(Abbing, 2002). His explanation is that the economy of the arts is 
'exceptional' in the sense that it does not function according to a supply-
demand paradigm. The main factor responsible for this situation is a 
certain 'mythology': people understand art as a 'sacred' transcendent, 
even 'holy' realm, and the artist as selfless and not carrying about money, 
suffering but dedicating herself/himself entirely to her/his art. Abbing draws 
a grim picture in which, from an economic standpoint, the arts are 
structured by chronic poverty: artists earn between 30% and 100% less 
than in other professional fields (Abbing, 2002, chapter 5). This picture is 
completed by what Gregorry Sholette has described as the dark matter of 
the art world (Sholette, 2011). Just like in physics the dark matter of the 
universe, though invisible, represents 96% of its mass and is responsible 
for keeping the universe away 'from flying apart', the 'creative dark matter 
also makes up the bulk of the artistic activity produced in our post-
industrial society' (Sholette, 2011, 1). It is composed of the 'makeshift, 
amateur, informal, unofficial, autonomous, activist, non-institutional, self-
organized practices – all work made and circulated in the shadows of the 
formal art world' (Sholette, 2011, 1). Unseen by those who have the power 
and tools for the 'management and interpretation of culture – the critics, art 
historians, collectors, dealers, museums, curators, and arts administrators' 
one finds in the dark matter of the art world all those sweatshops of culture 
and all those cultural producers which, despite uninviting prospects, hope 
that one day they may become visible. 
 The work of W.A.G.E., which is made possible by such studies such 
as Abbing's and Sholette's, should be connected with that of the U.K. 
based Precarious Workers Brigade (P.W.B.), a collective that defines itself 
as a group of 'precarious workers in culture and education' calling out 'in 
solidarity with all those struggling to make a living in this climate of 
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instability and enforced austerity' (About P.W.B., webpage). The group 
claims that its reason to exist 'is not to defend what was, but to demand, 
create and reclaim' (About P.W.B.: webpage). What they demand is equal 
pay, the remuneration of any type of labour, free education, the 
cancellation of debt, democracy and accountability from institutions, and 
shared ownership of space, ideas and resources. There are several 
working groups within the P.W.B. and one of their focus points has been, 
for years, labour conditions in the arts, and particularly the situation of 
unpaid internships. One of the results of the collaboration between the 
Precarious Workers Brigade and the London-based Carrot Workers 
Collective is a counter-internship guide: it describes unpaid internships as 
'an empty promise extending well beyond student life, whose primary aim 
is to teach us to bow down, to know our place, and to be happy with less' 
(C.W.C and P.W.B., 2009, 57). The guide calls out for solidarity from all 
those who are exploited by forms of unpaid labour and advocates the 
invention of new ways to work and learn: it advocates the experiments that 
have been going on in the last years, from the occupation of universities 
and former libraries, to the sit-ins, teach-ins, and forms of free schools. 
(C.W.C. and P.W.B, 2009, 60). 
 Though based in different cities and different continents, the work of 
these three collectives share a common struggle against a phenomenon 
with global implications, the accelerated process of art's and culture's 
corporatization and privatization. They often collaborate with each other, 
and Internet offers an adequate medium for their message to reach 
broader audiences. In my understanding, they exemplify a certain critical 
conscience of the suffering triggered by the exploitative structures of the 
art world. In this context, I want to suggest that the resurgence of 
institutional critique – ArtLeaks often refers to its actions as institutional 
critique – represents a direct answer to this phenomenon. At the same 
time, what I noticed by participating in some of the internal discussions of 
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these groups (mainly ArtLeaks and P.W.B.) is that there is a constant need 
to reinvent paradigms of critical practice precisely at a moment when one 
acknowledges the recuperation and co-optation of artistic critique. In the 
next section I want to show that this practical need is conjoined by a 
theoretical need to rethink the possibilities of critique. Within this 
theoretical need I place the labour of redefining institutional critique and 
rethinking its possibilities. It is where I position, at the same time, my own 
research.   
3.2. The Conceptual Analysis of Institutional Critique's Tools 
 
The work of collectives such as ArtLeaks, P.W.B. and W.A.G.E. has to be 
thought in conjunction with theoretical developments of reconceptualising 
the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique. I would like to 
describe this effort by using a paraphrase. In the introduction to his 
unfinished manuscript of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx famously 
proposed that 'the weapon of criticism cannot, of course, supplant the 
criticism of the weapon' (Marx, 2000, 77). What I want to suggest is that 
the recent interest in institutional critique, from the point of view of a 
conceptual-intellectual analysis, articulates precisely this: a critique of the 
weapon of criticism. In chapter three I will discuss in length about the 
genealogies and meanings of the concept of critique. For our purposes 
here, I will retain the initial sense of critique as judgement that separates, 
discerns, and discriminates. What this judgement operates upon is the 
very ways in which we have received the heritage and legacies of 
institutional critique.  
 But things are not as easy as they seem. To begin with, it is not 
really clear whether institutional critique even exists. Andrea Fraser asks in 
2006 what is institutional critique? (Fraser, in Welchman, 2006, 305-309), 
whereas three years later Blake Stimson would ask in his introduction to 
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Institutional Critique. An Anthology of Artists Writings what was institutional 
critique? (Stimson, 2009, 20-43). Stimson's question should be referred to 
the frames and structures of the book that he edits, and whose fourth 
section includes what Stimson and Alberro coined as Exit Strategies. It 
could be said, therefore, that although Stimson's question is formulated in 
the past tense, there is a certain dimension akin to the present and future 
of institutional critique that haunts it permanently. I have already 
encountered this temporal disjuncture between past, present and future, 
between something that has ended and something that refuses to end, in 
Buchloh's short intervention in the pages of Artforum.  
 Again, it is not entirely clear whether institutional critique is a 
movement in its own right, as John C. Welchman suggests in the 
Introduction to Institutional Critique and After (Welchman, 2006, 11); a 
conceptual art practice that becomes conscious of its institutional framing 
(Buchloh, 1999); a relation between a method (critique) and an object (the 
art institution) (Sheikh, 2009); a methodology of critically reflexive site-
specificity (Fraser, 2006, 305); or even, as Dave Beech seems to suggest, 
the proper name that political art should receive, that is, an art that not 
only represents political topics, but also questions its own frames of 
production (Beech, 2013, webpage). Some clarity is needed and it would 
be perhaps instructive to look at the semantic genealogy of the concept. 
This is a task that the next section tries to accomplish.  
3.2.1. What Does the Term 'Institutional Critique' Refer to? 
 
Alexander Alberro tells us that the word occurred, for the first time, in print, 
in Mel Ramsden's On Practice (1975/2009). But Ramsden's use of the 
word is somewhat ironic; he seems to refer to an established practice that 
does not succeed in properly addressing specific problems within 
institutions, a practice that produces generalizations and slogans, and 
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even possesses the unwanted consequence of affirming that which is 
supposed to be criticized (Ramsden, 2009, 176). His own argument in 
favour of a community type of practice that 'does not embody a commodity 
mode of existence' (Ramsden, 2009, 176) seems to be at odds with what 
was called 'institutional critique'.       
 In a text published in 2005, Andrea Fraser, perhaps unaware of 
Ramsden's text, contemplated the possibility that she was 'the first person 
to put the term in print' (Fraser, 2009a, 410). She refers to a text that she 
had written in 1985 (In and Out of Place) about Louise Lawler. At a certain 
point, this text suggests that although there is a tradition of engaging the 
'institutional determination and acculturation of art' determined by the 
practice of the historical avant-garde (particularly Dada, Surrealism, and 
the Soviet avant-garde), Lawler's work has more in common with that of 
Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren, Michael Asher and Marcel Broodthaers 
(Fraser, 2009b, 293). And although one talks about very diverse practices, 
they all shared the fact that they were 'engaged in institutional critique'. But 
there is no essentialist definition of institutional critique; Fraser would 
rather proceed by enlisting practices, 'ranging from Asher’s and Buren’s 
situational constructions (or deconstructions) of architectural frameworks 
in galleries and museums, to Broodthaers’s directorship of a fictional 
museum, to Haacke’s documentation of high art’s corporate affiliations' 
(Fraser, 2009b, 293). One should add, of course, Lawler's practice as well 
which, unlike the mentioned artists that 'situate institutional power in a 
centralized building (such as a museum) or a powerful elite which can be 
named, [she] located it instead in a systematized set of presentational 
procedures which name, situate, centralize' (Fraser, 2009b, 294). By 
'presentational procedures' Fraser referred to Lawler's practice of working 
with things such as captions, proper names, invitations, documentary 
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photos, catalogues, etc.5 
 One should place Fraser's text from 1985 in a historical context in 
which institutional frameworks progressively came under the scrutiny of art 
scholars. Whereas none of the artists whom are said to have fathered 
institutional critique had used the term before, the writings of Benjamin 
H.D. Buchloh, Douglas Crimp and Peter Bürger, for example were already 
abundant in terms like 'the institution of art', 'institutionalized language', 
'institutional frameworks', 'institutional exhibition topic', etc. (Fraser, 2009a, 
410). But more importantly, I believe that the art practice of institutional 
critique cannot be divorced from a series of contemporary analyses 
stemming from the fields of philosophy, linguistics and the history of ideas, 
which could be read, as well, as 'institutional critiques'. I am referring, of 
course, among others to Michel Foucault's analyses of the prison and of 
the mad house (Foucault, 1979; Foucault, 2001b) or Gilles Deleuze's and 
Félix Guattari's analyses of the psychiatric institution (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983). To this one should add Eileen Cooper-Greenhill's and 
Tony Bennett's Foucault-inspired analyses of the museum (Hooper-
Greenhill, 1992; Bennett 1995); but also Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of art 
(Bourdieu, 1996). What I am suggesting is that critical concerns regarding 
the conditions of art practice within the art institution benefited from the 
circulation of a series of concepts, concerns and even 'institutional 
critiques' among related and, at times, overlapping fields of knowledge 
production. 
 With this point of view in mind, let us return to Fraser's definition of 
'institutional critique' that she provides in 2006. She describes it as a 
methodology of critically reflexive site-specificity (Fraser, 2006, 305). As 
                                            
5
 I take Fraser's description of Lawler's practice as an indication of the fact that by the 1980s the 
concept of the art institution was already undergoing a process of transformation: the art institution 
is not only the physical space of the museum, art gallery and the project space, but gradually 
encapsulates things such as those that Fraser called 'a seemingly plethora of supplements' (Fraser, 
2009b, 294). 
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such, she distinguished it from site-specific practices that 'deal primarily 
with the physical, formal, and architectural aspects of places and spaces 
(Fraser, 2006, 306); institutional critique engages sites as 'social sites, 
structured sets of relations that are fundamentally social relations […] a 
site is a social field of those relations' (Fraser, 2006, 306)6. Fraser, then, 
suggests that institutional critique installs itself in the dynamics of 
domination and struggle inherent in the field in which it operates. But it 
installs itself critically-reflexively, which means that, on the one hand it 
acknowledges the critic's imbrication in the relations of power within that 
field and, on the other hand, that her/his aim is to 'problematize and 
change' the set of relations and hierarchical structures, the material and 
symbolic violence therein (Fraser, 2006, 306)7. Fraser stresses that 
institutional critique is conscious of its own position: she distinguishes it 
from practices that merely represent the structures and hierarchies of the 
field, or those that aim to create 'new spaces for excluded or subaltern 
positions' (Fraser, 2006, 306). Another important aspect of this definition is 
that institutional critique does not limit itself to being 'art about art'. Unlike 
critics that have interpreted her position as a 'governmentality of failure' 
partly stemming from 'Bourdieu's deterministic analysis of the closure of 
the socio-professional fields' (Holmes, 2009, 58), I believe that Fraser also 
points out that an artistic site is not entirely shaped by the visible relations 
                                            
6
 Fraser has admitted her indebtedness to Pierre Bourdieu's sociology, from which she adopted the 
notion of 'field'. In his On Television, Bourdieu defined the field as 'a structured social space, a field 
of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and others who are dominated' (Bourdieu, 
1999, 40). Domination and force are, of course, concepts that refer to the register of power 
relations. Consequently, Bourdieu proposes that an essential characteristic of the field is the 
constant struggle within. 'In a field', writes Bourdieu, 'agents and institutions constantly struggle, 
according to the regularities and the rules constitutive of this space of play (and, in given 
conjunctures, over those rules themselves), with various degrees of strength and therefore diverse 
probabilities of success, to appropriate the specific products at stake in the game.' (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, 102). 
 
7
 In chapter three I will suggest that the logical framework in which we can understand this 
positioning amounts to what Foucault described as the 'critical attitude', an attitude of being both 
partner and adversary, at the same time, of the powers that be (Foucault, 1997). 
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within an artistic field, but relates closely to invisible relations established 
with neighbouring fields as well. Therefore, the relations that institutional 
critiques analyse refer both to 'encroachment and instrumentalization (e.g., 
corporate sponsorship)' and to the 'homologies of structure and interest 
(e.g., the corporatization of museums, galleries, and even studios)' 
(Fraser, 2006, 306). 
 I believe that this complex definition provides us with a 
representation of the manifold dimensions of the concept of 'institutional 
critique'. It particularly facilitates the manner in which I will conduct a 
conceptual analysis of the term in the second and third chapters. The 
difference between my position and Fraser's is that I consider less 
important Bourdieu's critical sociology and particularly the concept of field, 
and I rather follow Luc Boltanski's pragmatic sociology of critique and 
Jacques Derrida's analysis of speech acts which, in conjunction, highlight 
the irreducible symbiosis between institution and critique. In this 
subsection I offered a preliminary investigation of existing definitions of 
institutional critique. In the next section I want to consider how its 
canonization influenced its meaning, reception and understanding. I will 
particularly pay attention to the manner in which different writers discern 
between several 'waves' of institutional critique. 
3.2.2. The Metaphor of 'Waves' 
 
Part of institutional critique's reconceptualization presupposes an 
examination of how art history recorded its complexity. But this triggers a 
certain paradox. It refers to the fact that, as Stefan Nowotny writes, 
'canonization itself belongs to the specifically institutional practices that 
institutional critique refers to – and indeed critically refers to' (Nowotny, 
2009, 21). Canonization is, in other words, not neutral: it involves a 
demonstration of force through which the art institution recuperates its 
44 
 
critical adversary. Arguably, canonizations trigger simplifications and 
desaturations of complex developments. Nowotny paid attention precisely 
to the effects of institutional critique's canonization through various 
historicizations, self-historicizations and examinations of topicality 'which, 
instead of examining it, regularly become entangled in the self-
referentiality specific to the art field, and specifically examining it as 
institutional practice' (Nowotny, 2009, 21). Thus he correctly criticizes 
attempts that fix institutional art practices 'to art as the form of its ends' 
(Nowotny, 2009, 22) and identifies one such flagrant case in Isabelle 
Graw's attempt to extend the canon of institutional critique to painting. 
Instead of targeting 'art' and 'currents', it would be desirable 'not to fall 
back behind the institutional critique of historical political analyses of 
modern art and exhibition institutions – or “art” as an institutional field' 
(Nowotny, 2009, 25). The canon of institutional critique that I will refer to 
discerns two 'waves' of institutional critique. My approach recognizes the 
paradox of canonization; at the same time, my argument is that one 
cannot engage herself/himself in the process of reshaping institutional 
critique unless its canon is revisited and submitted to the labour of de-
canonization.     
 The establishment of this canon was not, of course, free from 
debate and controversies. But as Raunig and Ray write, 'the canonization 
of these practices proceeds on a terrain that is quite orderly, operates by 
clear rules and borders, and is characterized by a certain amount of 
depoliticization and self-reference' (Raunig and Ray, 2009, xv). What do 
these 'waves' amount to? Artists like Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren, Robert 
Smithson, and Marcel Broodthaers are said to belong to the first wave 
(1960s-1970s); they 'investigated the conditions of the museum and art 
field, aiming to oppose, subvert or break out of rigid institutional 
frameworks' (Raunig and Ray, 2009, xiv – xv). The second wave (1980s-
1990s) refers to the practices of artists like Andrea Fraser, Renée Green, 
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and Fred Wilson; 'to the economic and political discourse of their 
predecessors, the practices of this ‘second generation’ added a growing 
awareness of the forms of subjectivity and the modes of its formation' 
(Raunig and Ray, 2009, xiv – xv). Attempts to enlarge this canon have 
been offered by curator Maria Lind who considers three more waves. A 
third change refers to the emergence of dialogism as an artistic practice in 
which artists (Bik van der Pol and Apollonia Šušteršič) would propose 
'changes which sometimes operated with the institution, at other times 
against it but always dialogically and avoiding condemnation' (Lind, 2012, 
26). The fourth phase would be represented by artists such as Marion von 
Osten and Carey Young, who have formulated a critique of the 'whole 
'institution of art', the apparatus itself, not least its economic side', 'again 
from a position inside' (Lind, 2012, 26). Finally, she identifies as the fifth 
phase the propositions advanced by the exponents of the European 
Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, which I will mention in the next 
section. To anticipate, their approach envisages 'a 'non-dialectical' concept 
of resistance and critique, one seeking above all to establish a different 
conceptualization of contradiction, negation, and reaction' (Raunig and 
Ray, 2009, xvi). 
 The canon of institutional critique's 'two waves' is, however, the 
most prevalent. Several writers have added further elements to their 
historicization, and one of the most interesting accounts is provided by 
Hito Steyerl (Steyerl, 2009, 486-492). She proposed that the first wave 
was shaped by a model of democratic participation in the nation-state and 
within a Fordist type of economy which subsidized the art institution; in 
other words, the demands of institutional critics in the first wave regarded 
the democratic participation in the art institution of excluded social, 
cultural, and ethnic minorities. These demands were based on theories of 
the public sphere and consequently interpreted the cultural institution as a 
potential public sphere. The most successful artistic strategies were those 
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that were rather reformist than radical; but their effect was that they were 
integrated in the art institution (Steyerl, 2009, 488). The second wave, 
however, was challenged by what Steyerl describes as a 'right wing form 
of bourgeois institutional criticism' (Steyerl, 2009, 488) that subverted the 
concept of the public sphere. This induced the idea that the cultural 
institution has to be aware of its economic function and, as such, that it 
has to be subjected to the laws of the market. Another transformation took 
place at the level of representation. If the first wave of institutional critique 
functioned in a political and social environment that gave credit to the idea 
of material representation (e.g. of a sexual or racial minority in national 
parliaments) the second wave had to work within a framework for which 
the idea of symbolic representation appeared as sufficient. In other words, 
the process that shows its effects even today is that of a 'cultural or 
symbolic integration of critique into the institution or rather on the surface 
of the institution without any material consequences within the institution 
itself' (Steyerl, 2009, 489). Interestingly, Steyerl suggests that criticism of 
the institution always produces an ambivalent political subject. The 
bourgeois political subject critical of the absolutist order, for example, was 
ambivalent because it was advocating the free use of reason, but at the 
same time restricting its application to those instances that would subvert 
the political order. In relation to institutional critique, Steyerl suggests that 
the critique of institutions from the first wave created a political subject that 
performed criticism whilst being integrated in the institution. In the second 
wave, the critique of representation created a subject that was integrated 
in representation, or what she calls 'an overall spectacle of difference' 
(Steyerl, 2009, 490). In fact, one of the implications of the analysis that I 
will conduct in the next two chapters is that what Steyerl describes as the 
ambivalent subject of institutional critique is a consequence of the 
fundamental relation of cohabitation and symbiosis between institution and 
critique; in chapter six I will argue that what Jacques Derrida called 
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'deconstruction' provides the tools to understand and work around this 
undecidable ambivalence.  
 As the reader may have already noticed, the concept of the 
(bourgeois) public sphere is central in the canonization of institutional 
critique. In the second section of this chapter I have already indicated the 
significance of this concept in Benjamin Buchloh's arguments that 
conducted to his declaration that a certain practice of 'critical resistance' 
and 'radical negativity' has ended. The concept of a necessary connection 
between institutional critique and the public sphere survives, however, in 
various other historicizations. In his introductory text to the anthology of 
texts written by institutional critics (2009), Alexander Alberro proposes that 
what has been known as institutional critique's first wave revised the 
radical promise of the European Enlightenment by confronting the 
institution of art 'with the claim that it was not sufficiently committed to, let 
alone realizing or fulfilling, the pursuit of publicness that had brought it into 
being in the first place' (Alberro, 2009, 3). He implies that these artists' 
gesture of negation was based on a dialectical logic whose aim was 'to 
intervene critically in the standing order of things, with an expectation that 
these interventions would produce actual change in the relations of power 
and lead to genuine reconciliation' (Alberro, 2009, 3). 'Genuine 
reconciliation' refers to, of course, a dialectical moment of synthesis and 
institutional critique would articulate, then, this very moment of dialectical 
reconciliation. A similar thesis is to be found in Blake Stimson's text, the 
co-editor of the same anthology of texts. Stimson describes the social 
upheaval of 1968 as the 'tendance Groucho [Marx]': it points to a general 
distrust in any form of institutionality, and a denunciation of the comedy of 
institutional belonging. This is to be contrasted to 'tendance Karl [Marx]' 
that essentially retains norms of institutionality (Stimson, 2009, 25). 
Stimson associates institutional critique with the second tendency, which 
found inspiration in the  
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great historical figures of the bourgeoisie – the various allegories of 
liberty and equality, the citizen, the parliament, the museum and the 
public sphere – and, later, from the great historical figures of 
socialism – the labourer, the factory, the soviet, the party, the 
international, the masses (Stimson, 2009, 31). 
 
Alberro and Stimson, of course, quote a long list of artistic positions that 
would sustain their account. But as I try to show throughout this thesis, 
particularly in the fourth and fifth chapter, many art projects of institutional 
critique seem to do something else than holding accountable the art 
institution for living up to its modernist promises, or attempt to articulate in 
a synthesis the relation between institution and critique. Dave Beech 
pointed out the fact that, although Alberro's argument is 'philosophically 
satisfying', like Blake Stimson's 'somewhat Adornian version of the same 
argument' (Beech, 2013, webpage), their accounts are difficult to confirm 
empirically: many institutional critics don't seem to fit in this description. 
'Michael Asher, for instance, does not move walls and other things with 
any specific social group in mind. And [Graciela] Carnevale’s Lock Up 
Action used the gallery as a stand-in for the invisible constraints, 
discomfort and anxiety of everyday life’ (Beech, 2013, webpage).  
 To this I want to add another aspect. I already discussed, in 
Buchloh's case, how important the concept of dialectics is, just like it 
seems to be important for Alberro and Stimson. What I tried to suggest in 
section two is that Buchloh's own acceptance of publishing in the pages of 
Artforum refers to a logic of being, at the same time, partner and adversary 
of the Artforum institution; partner inasmuch as he publishes in its pages, 
adversary inasmuch as he recognizes Artforum as being responsible for 
the demise of types of critical practice that he had previously supported. 
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Buchloh's performance of his speech act, however, seems to depart from 
dialectics. It reveals an ambivalent positioning which remains undecidable 
and unresolvable in a synthesis. And I want to suggest that this is the 
proper place to start thinking about the possibilities we have at hand for re-
conceptualizing institutional critique. What I want to do next is to refer to 
those positions that take institutional critique's canon into account only in 
order to reshape its tasks and aims. I locate my own research within this 
specific space of reflection.  
3.2.3. The Present of Institutional Critique 
 
After I have reviewed, in the previous sections, attempts of circumscribing 
the definition and canons of institutional critique, I concluded with the 
observation that various positions are sympathetic with the idea of a 
connection between institutional critique and the articulation of a public 
sphere. I expressed doubts that such a connection is generalizable to all 
the artists engaged in institutional critique and further arguments will be 
provided in the following chapters. But I want to observe how this idea 
triggers propositions for a 'third phase' of institutional critique that are 
paradoxically built on the recuperation of the values of modernism.  
 Take the example of cultural sociologist Pascal Gielen who recently 
proposed that the function of institutions, including the institution of art, 
has traditionally been that of mediating between the real world and an 
'imagined' fictional reality: change and innovation occur within this process 
of institutional mediation (Gielen, 2013, 12-13). In relation to institutional 
critique he suggests that a common feature of both waves of institutional 
critique was a 'dissatisfaction with claustrophobia' (Gielen, 2013, 14). 
Taken from the register of anxiety disorders, claustrophobia is, to be sure, 
a strong term. It refers to the fear of being in closed or small spaces, and 
more generally, to the uncomfortable feeling of being in a situation that 
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limits or restricts the freedom of thought and action. Gielen follows Brian 
Holmes' account of institutional critique which contended, especially 
referring to Andrea Fraser, that institutional critique has ended in a 
'governmentality of failure': the mere contemplation of 'his or her own 
psychic prison, with a few aesthetic luxuries in compensation' (Holmes, 
2009, 58)8.  
Again, it is arguable whether institutional enclosure is a feature that 
could be generalized to the entire range of practices of what one calls 
institutional critique. But Gielen's position is significant not because he 
repeats the canon of institutional critique, but because he makes the 
interesting proposition that one of the effects of institutional critique was 
that it eroded institutional boundaries, making it impossible for the 
institution to provide a space in which criticism could be exercised. What 
happened is that 'with its call for more democracy and less hierarchy, 
institutional critique has in the meantime opened the door to a flat world in 
the art world' (Gielen, 2013, 15-16). By breaking institutional frames and 
boundaries, institutional critique has 'flattened' the structures of the art 
institution by inviting 'other value regimes that have eroded not only its 
hierarchy but also its own dignity' (Gielen, 2013a, 16). What is at stake, 
Gielen implies, is the very existence of the imaginary realm from which 
change and innovation occurs. This is why 'if there were to be a third wave 
of institutional critique nowadays, it could only succeed by making the 
time-honoured values of art institution its ally' (Gielen, 2013, 15). This 
amounts to institutional critique reinstating that 'modern truth of art', and 
namely, the maintaining of the distinction between reality and imagination; 
it should, at the same time, make the art institution its ally, an art institution 
that has to become 'a value regime and keeper of an imagined ideal' 
(Gielen, 2013, 29). In order to do this, institutional critique should 'imagine 
                                            
8
 In chapter four I will analyse in more detail Holmes' allegations against Fraser. 
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its own values according to its own logic – so, no longer via the 
imagination demanded by auditors and other accreditors or the mass 
media' (Gielen, 2013, 30).  
 It is interesting to ask what exactly the 'dignity' of the institution of 
art is when in fact, as I will show in chapter two, any institution is haunted 
by an irreducible violence? How can one describe the logic of institutional 
critique that would keep itself apart from the mechanisms of network-
based 'late capitalism'? (Gielen, 2013, 21). What we are offered instead is 
the suggestion that we should go back to the values of modernism, with 
the provision that we need to pay more attention to the dangers of 
imagination and utopian thinking. But Gielen says nothing about how one 
could, in this manoeuvre, avoid reinstating the hierarchies and violence 
that triggered responses of institutional critique. In other words: how are 
we to avoid new regimes of domination and repression, precisely when, 
Gielen tells us, the art institution will no longer lure its audience through 
market strategies in which it asks what it wants, but 'will start to tell its 
audience, in the public domain, what it should want, if that audience wants 
to preserve its imaginative powers'? (Gielen, 2013, 30) Implicit in Gielen's 
position is a negative evaluation of the institutional 'flatness' which he 
partly identifies with 'mobility and networking', and 'artistic internationalism 
and connexionism' (Gielen, 2013, 21). What I want to suggest is that the 
risk of inviting new hierarchical regimes of power to which the critic will be 
asked to submit is constitutive to such a manoeuvre. Taking this aspect 
into account, my own research situates itself close to those positions that 
praise the virtues of critical flatness and horizontality against institutional 
verticality. 
 My investigation is, to put it differently, sympathetic with the efforts 
of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies to articulate a 
'third phase' of institutional critique that, against canonization and 
historicization, expand critical reflection by incorporating elements of the 
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'horizontalist' philosophies of French poststructuralism (Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault), and Italian postoperaism (Antonio Negri) 
among others. The virtue of this move is that, by concatenating art and 
recent philosophical thinking, it pushes the debate towards a 
reconceptualization of what one understands by art practice, art institution, 
resistance, and critique. These authors, in other words, attempt to 
articulate a '“non-dialectical” concept of resistance and critique, one 
seeking above all to establish a different conceptualization of 
contradiction, negation, and reaction' (Raunig and Ray, 2009, xvi). This 
research was motivated, in fact, by one of Gerald Raunig's texts in which 
he suggests that the thesis referring to a new phase of institutional critique 
is 'based less on empirical evidence than on a political and theoretical 
necessity to be found in the logic of institutional critique itself' (Raunig, 
2009, 3). This thesis asks precisely what does this logic of institutional 
critique amount to?  
 The European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies has 
advanced a conceptual apparatus to think through this phase change. It is 
articulated by such concepts as 'instituent practices' and 'monster 
institutions'. 'Instituent practices' is a concept that refers to strategies and 
processes that 'take their bearings from traditions of institutional critique, 
even as in other respects they go beyond anything recognizable in the 
movement now canonized as part of art history' (Raunig and Ray, 2009, 
xv). The concept is derived from Antonio Negri's concept of 'constituent 
power' and refers to a permanent process of constitution; therefore, 
instituent practices imply permanent processes of instituting and of linking 
instituting events. Permanent instituting attempts to avoid institutional 
enclosure and marks 'the site of a productive tension between a new 
articulation of critique and the attempt to arrive at a notion of “instituting” 
after traditional understandings of institutions have begun to break down 
and mutate' (Raunig and Ray, 2009, xvii). The concept aims at exceeding 
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the strategy of merely opposing the institution: 'it does not oppose the 
institution, but it does flee from institutionalization and structuration' 
(Raunig and Ray, 2009, xvii).  
Instituent practices draw much inspiration from the figures of flight, 
nomadism, desertion, withdrawal, exodus and treason, which have been 
theoretically developed by Deleuze, Guattari, Butler, Negri, and Virno. 
Raunig and Ray suggest that the process of concatenating different 
instituting moments among themselves but also of forming alliances with 
various social movements leads to what they call 'monster institutions': 
forms of floating, temporary institutionality that insert themselves within the 
structural fibre of societal petrified institutions (Raunig and Ray, 2009, xvii). 
In Raunig's and Ray's account, the Spanish Universidad Nómada is one 
such example (Universidad Nómada, 2009, 237-246).  
 My own work assumes its theoretical indebtedness to that of the 
European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies; but it argues that the 
latter is incomplete. What strikes me is that, whereas drawing massively 
on the heritage of French poststructuralism, it ignored completely an 
author whose theoretical apparatus could have contributed significantly to 
the analyses of the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique. I am 
referring here at the fact that both the dossiers published on the transform 
and republicart web journals and the texts that Raunig and Ray included in 
Art and Contemporary Practice. Reinventing Institutional Critique (2009) 
have virtually no recognition of Jacques Derrida's work. I believe that this 
is a consequence of a still prevalent aversion against Derrida's theoretical 
apparatus, which is often reduced to a philosophy of political non-
involvement9. On the contrary, in this thesis I try to demonstrate that we 
can think through concepts such as 'undecidability', 'supplementary, 
impure logic', and 'deconstruction' among others, not only the canon of 
                                            
9
 In chapter six I refute this prevalent view of Derrida's work. 
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institutional critique, but also its future conditions and possibilities. 
4. Conclusions 
 
This chapter began with the observation that in the last decade one can 
observe a constant preoccupation that addresses the manner in which the 
legacies of institutional critique have been received, acknowledged and 
transformed. I have suggested that a strong reason for this concern is 
linked to the profound social, economic, political and cultural 
transformations that the Western capitalist societies have gone through in 
the post-1968 time frame. These shifts, which I identified with what 
Boltanski and Chiapello call the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism, are responsible 
both for the recuperation and instrumentalization of artistic critique, and for 
the corporatization and privatization of the art institution. Much of the 
historical positions of institutional critique mirror these developments in the 
social tissue. In this sense, we have observed a certain melancholia 
among various writers, a certain longing for a public space that institutional 
critique allegedly helped to defend in its initial phase, but which has melted 
down under the pressures of neoliberal ideology. Alexander Alberro and 
Pascal Gielen are exponents of this position. But instead of attempting to 
reinvent an institutional critique that argues for the reinstitution of a lost 
public space (structured hierarchically and vertically) this thesis is 
sympathetic with positions that praise the virtues of horizontality, and 
whose arguments are inspired by poststructuralist and postoperaist 
philosophies. In this sense, I referred to the apparatus articulated by the 
initiators of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. 
 Against this background, I suggested that we can identify already, 
even in what has been coined as the two waves of institutional critique, 
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elements that amount to a deconstructive logic, a logic of accommodating 
undecidability. The contribution of this thesis amounts to a return to 
Jacques Derrida and to the apparatus of deconstruction, which I argue is 
capable of furnishing the tools through which one can rethink institutional 
critique. This argument is unfolded in the next chapters of this work. 
Chapters two and three proceed to a conceptual analysis of the logic of 
instituting and of the logic of critique, whereas chapter four and five 
discuss the possibility of a non-topology of institutional critique which is 
both inside and outside, both 'before and beyond', at the same time, of 
institutional frames. Institutional critique amounts, I suggest, to a logic of 
deconstruction, whose concept and its political substance I develop in 
chapter six.  
56 
 
Chapter II: 
The Critique of Institutional Reason 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I explained, following Boltanski and Chiapello, that 
the 'new spirit' of capitalism generated processes that led to the 
recuperation of artistic critique. I proposed that the latter faces the 
dilemma of either resuscitating old critical paradigms that seem unable to 
respond to actual transformations of capitalism, or embracing a nihilistic 
and self-defeating position. I argued that the recent interest in institutional 
critique represents an attempt to overcome this dilemma and I stated my 
indebtedness to those authors who develop paradigms of institutional 
critique based on poststructuralist and postoperaist theories. My own 
approach proposes to re-evaluate the potential offered by the theoretical 
apparatus of deconstruction. But before I explain how concepts such as 
'undecidability' and 'supplementary logic' could help us in re-articulating 
the tools of institutional critique, I will analyse what constitutes the logic of 
instituting and criticizing. This is the task of the second and third chapters 
of this work. 
 The second chapter, then, proposes an analysis that responds to 
the question: what is the logic of institution making? I begin to answer this 
question by exploring, in the first section, the apparatus of what I call the 
'pure' logic of institution making, by which I understand John Searle's 
singular theory of institutionality, which he has been developing since the 
mid-1990s. There are two important reasons to proceed in this manner. 
The first one relates to the fact that I found references to Searle's theory in 
the recent literature on institutional critique. For example, John C. 
Welchman's Institutional Critique and After (Welchman, 2006) begins with 
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a text written by Searle that includes a summary of his theory. I also found 
references to Searle in texts written by curator Maria Lind (Lind, 2011, 26), 
who is part of a generation of curators responsible for what has been 
known as 'new institutionalism'1. What I observed in the first place is that 
although Searle's efforts have been widely acknowledged – his theory is 
unique because it is one of the few that stresses the primarily semantic 
aspect of institutions – little has been done for developing its 
consequences for what amounts to the possibilities of institutional critique. 
At the same time (and here is the second reason for referring to Searle)  
his theory interests me not only for what it distinguishes in relation to the 
logic of instituting, but also for what it leaves out and excludes. I called his 
theory 'pure' because it offers a 'pure', 'transcendental' theory of 
institutional reasoning based on clear-cut distinctions between the 
constative and the performative aspects of language, on an account of 
intentionality capable of determining exhaustively its context, and on a 
concept of free will that emerges out of social interactions. The second 
section of this chapter proposes a critique whose findings offer a 
necessary supplement to his theory. It is a critique insofar as I show, by 
referring to two of Jacques Derrida's analyses of speech acts, that Searle's 
distinctions are only relative; moreover, there are structural reasons why 
they cannot work but in an 'impure', mixed and undecidable manner. This 
is to say that I am not throwing Searle's account overboard: I am 
supplementing it with an investigation that exposes a fundamental violence 
(both immaterial, conceptual, and material, physical) that haunts the logic 
of instituting. If institutions were capable of determining exhaustively the 
unity of meaning in the contexts of their emergence, this violence would 
remain invisible. But precisely because there is a remainder which, I 
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 Möntmann defines 'new institutionalism' as 'institutions that have internalized the institutional 
critique that was formulated by artists in the 1970s and 1990s and developed an auto-critique that 
is put forward by curators in the first place' (Möntmann, 2009, 155). 
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argue, has to do with the iterability of the sign, with the fact that institutions 
cannot determine in a total and exhaustive manner the meaning of what is 
and what ought to be, critique becomes necessary. In other words, I will 
argue that the semantic dimension of institutions functions according to a 
logic of iteration which entails that the relation of institution and critique 
pertains to a mutual and necessary cohabitation. This takes us back to Luc 
Boltanski's and Eve Chiapello's thesis that I invoked in the first chapter, of 
the interdependence between an institutionally-based 'spirit' of capitalism 
and critique. And indeed, in the third section of this chapter I develop the 
idea of the necessary symbiosis between them by referring to Luc 
Boltanski's latest reflections on critique. Particularly important in this 
section will be to stress the fact that this necessary relationship is 
triggered by the existence of two 'hermeneutical contradictions' in 
institutions. The first one refers to the bodiless existence of an institution 
and its possibilities of expression, through the bodies of its 
representatives. The second one refers precisely to an institution's 
semantic function, that of fixing reference, of saying the 'whatness' of what 
is as if that is all there is, as if there is no remainder and no rest. Critique 
develops, then, by taking hold of what is excluded within these 
contradictions. The findings of this chapter are essential for the economy 
of the thesis: particularly chapters four and five, in which I show that 
institutional critique presupposes the mastering of contradictions 
(inside/outside, work/frame) without solving them in a dialectical synthesis. 
I will conclude by iterating the findings of this chapter and applying them to 
what I call 'the institution of art'. 
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1. A 'Pure' Logic of Instituting 
 
What precisely do we refer to when we use the term 'institution'? We learn 
from the Oxford English Dictionary that the term 'institution' has Latin 
provenance, that the verb 'instituere' refers to the actions of setting up, 
establishing, founding, appointing, ordaining, initiating, arranging, and 
ordering something. But in everyday language we are also referring to 
institutions as to something being introduced or brought into use; as to 
something ordained, something that shall be in a certain way, arranged, or 
put in a peculiar form, set in operation, initiated or started. The same 
source mentions that to institute also means to establish something or 
someone in an office, charge or position, or to appoint: therefore that 
something is granted, or represented as having a certain status. Finally, to 
institute is to ground or establish in principle; to train, educate and instruct.  
(OED online, 'Institute, v.', 2013, webpage). 
 With all these semantic possibilities at hand, perhaps at least this 
could be said with certainty: institutions refer to people, and it is people 
that 'institute', set up, establish found, appoint, initiate, etc. But by refining 
this thought we encounter more complicated issues. It is indeed people 
that institute, but people need to gather themselves in more or less 
structured groups in order to institute collectively; they might also need to 
share the sense of common aims, purposes and values, and the 
mechanisms through which they can be attained. I will refer in this section 
to John Searle, because his approach is among the few interested in 
asking how is all this possible? Or, what are the conditions for the 
possibility of humans making institutions? This is, to be sure, a 
transcendental question, and Searle's project is, indeed, that of offering 
necessary and sufficient conditions for instituting processes. I call his 
theory 'pure' precisely because of its transcendental dimension, because 
of its intention of determining exhaustively the context in which humans 
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are successful in having something like institutions. In this section, 
therefore, I will explore what I described as the 'pure' conditions of 
institution making, only to prepare the ground of the second and third 
sections, in which I show that the logic of instituting is not pure, and that 
this alleged purity hides a fundamental violence that conditions and 
triggers the existence of something like critique.  
1.1. Collective Intentionality, the Imposition of Status Functions and 
Speech Acts 
 
Searle's theory has the merit of insisting that in order to answer the 
question about the possibility of instituting one needs an account of how 
language works, a theory of locution, of speech acts and of intentionality. 
But why is language crucial? Why couldn’t we just begin from the mere 
observation of the empirical self-evidence of institutions, from a description 
of how they work, and then abstract a theory of institutions? For Searle 
language is more than a system of well-formed sentences: it is a system of 
symbols, or otherwise said, a system of representations. (Searle, 2006; 
Searle, 1995). One cannot explore, therefore, institutions, before one 
acknowledges that institutions are representations of something as 
something else. That we are capable of such representations is only made 
possible by the fact that humans master a fundamental apparatus that 
makes representation possible. This is what we call language: because we 
have a language we are capable of representing, and because we 
represent something as something else we have institutions. Once we 
understand this, suggests Searle, then it will become obvious that the 
necessary conditions (what he calls 'theoretical primitives') for instituting 
amount to the fact that language expresses a certain intentionality, that 
through language we assign status functions, and that a part of the 
language has the particularly interesting property of doing what it says it 
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does while saying it. 
 The first primitive relates to the intentionality of the mind, the mind's 
property of having a direction or orientation towards an object: 'that feature 
of the mind by which it is directed at, or about, or of, or concerns, objects 
and states of affairs in the world' (Searle, 2006, 6). We could further break 
down intentional states into their components: the type of intentional state 
and its content. Believing, desiring and promising are intentional states. 
The content is usually of a propositional nature, although it need not be so 
necessarily (Searle, 2010, 27). Searle suggests that there is a structural 
parallelism between intentional states and language. Just like there is a 
distinction between types of intentional states and their content, so in 
language we can discern between types of speech acts and their 
propositional content (Searle, 2010, 28). The analogy goes further: both 
intentional states and speech acts have 'directions of fit' - a concept that 
describes the conditions of possibility of an intentional state or a speech 
act to 'fit or accurately represent the world' (Searle 2010, 28). In other 
words: there must be a series of conditions satisfied if the intentional state 
(e.g. I believe that 's') or a speech act (e.g. I declare you husband and 
wife!) is to be satisfied. Searle calls them conditions of satisfaction.  
 Intentional states do not function as isolated units. Searle explains 
that they are connected with other beliefs, desires, and intentions, some of 
which we are not always presently conscious of. I cannot, for example, 
cross the border between France and England unless I believe that I have 
the proper documents to do so (a passport, a visa, etc.) or, in extreme 
cases, unless I believe that I am a good swimmer, that I have enough 
physical strength to sustain my crossing of the Channel, that I have the 
ability of avoiding the Coast Guards, etc. But besides this network of 
beliefs, Searle suggests that one needs what he calls a background of 
presuppositions or things we take for granted, and which he defines as the 
'abilities, capacities, dispositions, ways of doing things and general know-
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how that enable us to carry out our intentions and apply our intentional 
states generally' (Searle, 2010, 31). 
 I have already suggested that in order for something like institutions 
to exist one needs to account for the cooperation between individuals that 
share common aims, purposes and values, and the mechanisms to 
achieve it. Searle advances the concept of collective intentionality, through 
which he understands that we not only 'engage in cooperative behaviour, 
but (...) share intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions' 
(Searle, 1995, 23). The American author insisted throughout his writings 
that collective intentionality is not reducible to individual intentionality. In 
2010 he argued that 'cooperation implies the existence of common 
knowledge or common belief, but the common knowledge or belief, 
together with individual intentions to achieve a common goal is not by itself 
sufficient for cooperation' (Searle, 2010, 49). He thus implies that 
collective intentionality is a primitive, irreducible phenomenal state of the 
mind (Searle, 1995, 24). You need to have cooperation in order to have 
institutions, and cooperation is explainable through collective intentionality. 
It could be said, then, that the work of collective intentionality determines 
social facts, with institutional facts as their subset.  
 The second theoretical primitive refers to the fact that through 
language we are capable of representing something as something else. 
Thus, we often assign functions to different sorts of entities (Searle, 1995, 
13-23). This refers to the human capacity to impose functions on entities, 
whereas those entities don’t have the respective functions intrinsically, but 
only in virtue of the fact that we assign functions (Searle, 2006, 7). 
Functions are not 'discovered': they exist only because they are 
represented as such. In other words, 'functions are always intentionality-
relative' (Searle, 2010, 59).  For example, I don’t experience the object in 
front of me as a collection of molecules, or as a piece of wood, but as a 
chair which serves a particular function, in this case, it serves as an object 
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one can sit on. Or, to introduce in the discussion the case of collective 
intentionality, it could be imagined that a group of people collectively 
assigned to something like the river Rhine the function of bordering France 
and Germany, whereas the river Rhine does not have intrinsically the 
function of bordering anything.  
 A particular type of imposition of functions is what the American 
philosopher calls the assignment of status. Searle describes status 
functions as the 'glue that holds society together' (Searle, 2006, 9). In this 
case, an object or person to whom the function is assigned cannot perform 
the function just in virtue of its physical structure (like, for example, a piece 
of wood with a particular shape becomes a chair to sit on) but rather 
performs the function 'only in virtue of the fact that there is a collective 
assignment of a certain status, and the object or person performs its 
function only in virtue of collective acceptance by the community that the 
object or person has the requisite status' (Searle, 2006, 7).  
 In The Construction of Social Reality (1995) Searle explained that 
the assignment of status takes the general form X counts as Y in context 
C. The X term identifies certain features of an object or person or state of 
affairs, and the Y term assigns a special status to that person, object, or 
state of affairs. In his latest work, however, Searle seems to abandon this 
argument, by implying that this distinction has only a local significance. In 
2010 he argues that what is essential in the act of 'counting' something as 
something else is that we do so through the speech act of a Declaration:  
 
 
'when we count pieces of paper of a particular sort as twenty-dollar 
bills we are making them twenty-dollar bills by Declaration. The 
Declaration makes something the case by counting it as, that is, by 
declaring it to be, the case' (Searle, 2010, 101).  
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Mentioning declarative speech acts has the role of introducing us to the 
third theoretical primitive: it refers to those features of language – 
declarative speech acts – which enable the creation of status function. A 
declaration is a type of speech act which 'creates the very state of affairs 
that it represents' (Searle, 1995, 34). Searle suggests that, in fact, and with 
the exception of language itself, 'all of institutional reality, and therefore, in 
a sense, all of human civilisation, is created by speech acts that have the 
same logical form as Declarations' (Searle, 2010, 12-13). In the case of 
such speech acts, the state of affairs represented in the propositional 
content is brought into existence by the 'successful' performance of the 
speech act. 'Successful' refers, in this case, to the conditions that satisfy 
the speech act's direction of fit, the idea that something (an intentional 
state, a speech act) can represent a state of affairs 'accurately'.  
 I want to insist on the notion of an 'accurate representation' of states 
of affairs because it will determine the critique that I will construct in the 
second section of this chapter. I want to suggest that the idea that one 
could determine a performative speech act's conditions of success has to 
be understood in the context of J. L. Austin's attempts to distinguish those 
cases in which performative speech acts succeed from those in which 
'something goes wrong' (Austin, 1962, 14). Both Austin and Searle argued 
that a declaration does not work simply by uttering words like 'I pronounce 
you husband and wife!'; there are other conditions which need to be 
fulfilled in order for this sentence to bring about a state of affairs. 
Otherwise declaring war, baptising, christening, etc. are prone to failure. 
Austin called the doctrine of the 'things that can be and go wrong on the 
occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of Infelicities' (Austin, 1962, 14). 
One particularly interesting example of infelicities stems from the 
distinction between what Austin identifies as 'normal' and 'parasitic' uses of 
language. His examples of 'parasitic' language belong to the register of the 
arts – he mentions the actors on stage, or the occurrence of speech acts 
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in poems – or to the register of internal discourse (soliloquy). Austin 
suggested that in such cases performative utterances become 'in a 
peculiar way hollow or void' and that language is not used 'seriously' 
(Austin, 1962, 22). Throughout his investigations, Searle also 
distinguished between 'serious' utterances and cases such as dramatic 
performances, teaching a language, reciting poems, and practising 
pronunciation; he also differentiated 'literal' from metaphorical or sarcastic 
uses of language (Searle, 1969, 57, f.1). In Speech Acts, for example, he 
identified three conditions for success in the case of an order: a 
preparatory condition that refers to the fact that the 'speaker should be in a 
position of authority over the hearer'; a sincerity condition which refers to 
the fact that 'the speaker wants the ordered act done'; and the essential 
condition that refers to 'the fact that the speaker intends the utterance as 
an attempt to get the hearer to do the act' (Searle, 1969, 64). Coming back 
to his theory of institution making, I want to suggest that what he identifies 
as the 'accurateness' of the direction of fit has to be understood as the 
intention of determining exhaustively (successfully) the context of a 
speech act's performance. In section two I will show that this is impossible 
and this fact will ground my critique against his 'pure' theory of institutional 
reason.   
 I explained that subsequent to the idea of a speech act's direction of 
fit, or conditions of success, is the thought that one can determine 
exhaustively the context in which a speech act emerges and, thus, its total 
meaning. It would be impossible, otherwise, to distinguish conditions of 
success from those cases in which speech acts fail. Searle implies that in 
order for speech acts to be successful, it is necessary to recognize the 
primary role of intention and intentionality. Searle argues that not only do 
we utter certain words in speech acts, but we also intend to do what we 
mean in the words we utter. In other words, Searle contends that the 
conditions of success are determined by the presence of a self-conscious 
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intention, which commits the speaker/writer to the fulfilment of what she/he 
says. Declaring war or baptising a ship triggers a deontology, a system of 
obligations, duties, and rights that bind the speaker/writer to what she/he 
speaks of:  
 
You cannot explain what a statement, or a promise, is without 
explaining that a statement commits the maker of the statement to its 
truth and the promise commits the maker of the promise to carrying it 
out. […] By committing myself to the conditions of satisfaction of the 
belief (in making a statement), I am telling him that this is how the 
world is; by telling him about the conditions of satisfaction of my 
intention (in making a promise), I am telling him what I am actually 
going to do (Searle, 2010, 84). 
 
Speech acts are thus binding in the sense that the performance of a 
speech act creates a state of affairs that triggers the coming into existence 
of a series of rights, duties, and obligations. This is to say that, in Searle's 
view, when a group is in the situation of employing an instituting speech 
act, its success is dependent on the intention of committing oneself to the 
'conditions of success'. The result of this type of commitment is that 
powers are assigned (Searle, 2010, 102). For Searle, power is a rather 
concrete concept that refers to a matrix of 'deontic properties' like rights, 
duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, 
requirements, and certifications (Searle, 2006, 10). In section two, 
however, I will show that this deontic commitment can never be fully 
realized; and that, precisely when it comes to instituting, what remains 
outside of the control of a collective instituting intention and therefore, 
outside of its matrix of power generates the possibility of critique. 
 Until now I have explained what, in Searle's view, are the three 
necessary components of institution-making: collective intentionality and 
what appears to be the over-determining intention of a speech act, the 
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assignment of status functions, and a language capable of declarative 
speech acts. In the case of the latter, Searle has proposed that the 
fundamental operator of the logic of instituting has the form 'We make it 
the case by Declaration that the Y status function exists in context C' 
(Searle, 2010, 98). All these are necessary conditions for institution 
making; but by themselves they are not sufficient to have something like 
institutions. In the next subsection I will discuss the fourth element that 
'completes' his project: it amounts to the necessary existence of free will 
and of desire independent reasons for action.  
1.2. Free Will and Desire-Independent Reasons for Action 
 
In his latest book Searle distinguishes his project from previous accounts 
(such as contract theorists) which, he claims, presuppose institutions in 
order to explore questions like: how is government possible? Or how is it 
possible to distinguish just from unjust institutions? Searle states that his 
investigation is only interested in the logic of institution making; therefore, 
he is rather interested in questions like 'granted that institutions have a 
certain logical structure, why should they have that and not some other 
structure?' (Searle, 2010, 134). This project, which at the beginning of this 
section I described as 'transcendental', seeks to identify the formal 
structure of a philosophical problem, that of instituting; there is no surprise, 
then, if Searle constructs his account of institutional reality as if he deals 
with an 'engineering problem', (his own words), as if one had the task of 
designing a society ‘working from scratch' (Searle, 2010, 133). 
 I take it that this is the reason why Searle describes institution 
making as a community's exercise of public reasoning, rationality, and free 
will. From the perspective of a theory of institutionality articulated as if it 
pertained to an 'engineering problem', the condition of a universally shared 
rationality appears for him as unproblematic: 'human institutional reality 
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locks into human rationality. This is what gives it its constitutive power. 
This is how it creates human society, and this is how it distinguishes 
humans from many, perhaps all, other animals' (Searle, 2010, 128).  
 In the previous section I explained how deontic properties and, 
ultimately, power, come into existence, through the intentional commitment 
to the fulfilment of speech acts. But Searle adds that freedom is a 
necessary condition if something like deontic properties are to emerge; 
that we can choose between following or disobeying obligations and duties 
refers to the fact that we ultimately possess free will. In the absence of 
freedom, humans would be rule-following beings (like robots), in which 
case deontic powers would make no sense: we would not be able to 
recognize them (Searle, 2010, 137-139). It is in this sense that Searle 
introduces a distinction that reminds us of Kant's discrimination between 
acting out of duty and acting out of inclination (Kant, 2012). Searle too 
distinguishes between desire-dependent and desire-independent reasons 
for action.  
 For Kant to act out of duty is to follow the laws of practical reason, 
that are universal and necessary, true for all rational beings precisely 
because they are rational. They are laws which free will gives to itself. 
Acting out of inclination (out of habit or desire) is not free, insofar as it is 
determined by something else (exterior objects). Searle's transcendental 
project presupposes that the set of deontic powers that we construct – 
rights, duties, obligations, etc., and by consequence, status functions and 
the entire institutional reality, cannot be explained by the fact that we only 
follow our natural inclinations and desires. When we create status 
functions, we 'give up' the fulfilment of some of our individual desires for 
something that serves better the common aims and purposes of a 
community. It could be said that with status functions we also invent, 
accept, recognize and get motivated by desire-independent reasons for 
action (Searle, 2010, 127-128). To declare war, to construct the institution 
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of property, etc. cannot survive and function as institutions in a society of 
free agents unless they provide such desire-independent reasons for 
action (Searle, 2010, 139).  
 The purpose of institutions, therefore, is to enable possibilities and 
facilitate behaviour that would not be possible otherwise. They enhance 
the powers that humans possess. In Searle's account, institutions seem to 
behave as a sort of rational arbiter that provides agents with desire-
independent reasons for action. Moreover, they also have a protective 
role, for if inclinations are all that agents have, then in the absence of 
institutions the strongest inclination will always prevail (Searle, 2010, 140). 
In other words, institutions provide reasons for not cheating 'and for not 
doing something [an agent] wants to do, as well for doing something even 
when he does not feel like doing it then and there' (Searle, 2010, 141). 
This is, of course, subject to collective recognition, for which reason 
institutions have to constantly take care that they provide desire-
independent reasons for acting. Corrupt institutions, for instance, in which 
individual inclinations prevail, signalize a contradiction between the aims 
of the institution and its actual doings. In this case, because they have free 
will, agents may stop recognizing these institutions and follow their 
individual agenda.  
 To sum up what has been explored until now: John Searle's project 
distinguishes a series of necessary and sufficient conditions that assure 
the 'success' of the act of instituting. They refer to the intention and 
intentionality of the mind, to the assignment of status functions in 
declarative speech acts, and to the exercise of free will and universal 
rationality in social interactions. I want to observe, however, how little has 
Searle to say about the role of contradiction, disputes, and critique. 
Indeed, he is interested in what 'works' in this 'engineering's project' and 
ignores the 'holes', 'gaps' and, let's say it, 'infelicities' which, I will argue, 
structurally determine this logic and make it 'impure'. Consequently, in the 
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next section I want to turn the problem upside down, and proceed 
precisely from observing how contradiction works in the logic of instituting. 
I will show that essential to the logic of instituting is an irreducible violence 
which haunts institutions permanently. The point that I try to make is that if 
Searle's theory offers us a good explanation of how humans constructs 
institutional reality and how they ultimately endorse it with a pacifying role, 
it needs to be supplemented with an account that shows that institutions 
are, at the same time, entities structured by an irreducible violence. 
Ultimately, I will contend, this is the place from which critique emerges. 
2. The Impurity of Institutional Reason 
 
Until now I have explained that Searle's project is that of identifying 'what 
is needed' to have something like an institution. And I think that he is, 
indeed, correct, particularly because he stresses the importance of the 
performativity of language in the logic of instituting. As I maintain in this 
thesis, if we want to reconceptualize the possibilities of critique in relation 
to institutions, we need to acknowledge and properly understand the 
significance of their semantic dimension. What I want to show in this 
section, however, is that the formal type of instituting logic that Searle 
advocates could only function in a mixed and impure manner. And I will, 
indeed, argue that this impurity of the logic of instituting is not accidental 
and marginal, but constitutive and structural to the fact that we have 
something like institutions. The argument is roughly this: to institute 
something is to credit the will or intention of an instituting community with 
the power of determining exhaustively the meaning of what is being 
instituted in the performance of a speech act. Searle's theoretical corpus is 
a good start for understanding how this is possible. What his theory fails to 
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acknowledge, however, is that the exhaustive determination of the 
meaning of what is instituted is impossible; that the conditions of 'success' 
are in fact only relative; and that this has to do with the nature of language, 
and particularly with what I will uncover as the fundamental iterability of the 
sign. Precisely because a total determination of meaning is impossible, 
that is, precisely because the success of the performative effect could only 
be relative to particular circumstances, the instituting act necessarily 
functions in an impure manner and is constantly haunted by the possibility 
of failure. Sometimes this amounts to the blurring of the lines between the 
performative and the constative; other times it invents a collective 
intentionality which did not exist prior to the performance of the speech 
act; and finally, at other times, it also invokes fictional chains of legitimation 
which hide the fact that the act of instituting and the temporal permanence 
of an institution have a fundamental arbitrary and violent character.   
 What I want to suggest, therefore, is that the logic of instituting rests 
on an undecidable tension and contradiction between the totalising 
intention of unequivocally controlling, through the performance of the 
speech act, what Boltanski calls the 'whatness' of what is (what an 
institution says that there is in the performance of its speech act) and the 
structural necessity that this totalisation is impossible: in other words, that 
there is always something that escapes the totalisation of the act of 
instituting. And precisely in this remainder I will locate the possibility of 
critique. In this section I first want to locate the expression of this 
contradiction in the founding act of a Constitution; I do this in order to 
show that we have reasons to doubt whether Searle's pure logic of 
instituting functions in the way he thinks it functions. Secondly, I want to 
tackle this contradiction directly and explain why its existence is not 
accidental or marginal, but underdetermines every act of instituting. 
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2.1. Fabulous Foundations 
 
Let us take into consideration the coming into existence of something like 
a state. As Searle observed, in order for a state to come into existence, it 
needs a collective act of instituting, and this takes place through a 
declaration that 'performs' a state's coming into existence. The declaration 
in question is what we call a 'Constitution'. Jacques de Ville observed that 
Constitutions are usually viewed as a 'written document through which the 
people as sovereign and as the originating source of political power 
(pouvoir constituant) determine the way in which they will govern 
themselves' (de Ville, 2008, 3). In other words, and to use Searle's 
terminology, a constitution is a written declaration in which a community 
assigns, through collective intentionality, a range of status functions that 
modulate how the community functions. De Ville observes that the 
language of a constitution is usually taken for granted, as a mere medium 
to express 'consciously, intentionally or purposively' certain natural or self-
evident ideas, such as the sovereignty of a people or a nation, the 
existence of a state, the protection of human or fundamental rights, the 
granting and (mutual) limitation of a variety of powers (pouvoirs 
constitués), and a certain idea of justice (de Ville, 2008, 4). Now, all these 
bodiless entities are supposed to regularize and control what is possible 
and what is not possible to do within the realm of a state. But if we analyse 
how exactly these entities come into existence, we would observe that the 
pure performativity of the constitution is impossible: that it often mixes that 
which (already) is with that which ought to be; that a collective will and 
intention may not pre-exist the act of constitution, but is constituted, as it 
were, in the very act of declaration; and that, finally, this impure mode of 
coming into existence is necessary in order to legitimize the fundamental 
violent and arbitrary character of instituting.  
 Let us insist on Jacques Derrida's analysis: his question is who 
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exactly signs the declarative act of the independence that founds the new 
state of the U.S.A.? (Derrida, 2002a, 47) The question is important, 
contends Derrida, precisely because whoever signs the Constitution is 
supposed to engage herself/himself, in a way which brings about, or 
accomplishes what the Constitution says it accomplishes in the 
performance of a declarative speech act. In other words: although an 
institution is supposed to be independent of the empirical individuals that 
trigger its coming into existence 'it turns out, precisely by reason of the 
structure of instituting language, that the founding act of an institution [...] 
must maintain within itself the signature' (Derrida, 2002a, 47-48).  
 So who signs the Declaration? We could start with Thomas 
Jefferson, who drafts the Declaration. But Derrida observes that though he 
writes it, he does not sign it, since he is a mere representative of the 
representatives that delegated him to write what they wanted to say. So 
Jefferson is not the person responsible for the Declaration: one should 
look, therefore, at those who have the right to revise, correct, and ratify the 
draft.  But these representatives of the 'United States in General Congress 
assembled' are not the signers either. In fact, notes Derrida, they do sign 
it, but in principle they sign for themselves as well as for others that have 
delegated them the authority and power to sign: the signer by right is the 
'good' people of the Colonies. But observe that the 'people' do not exist 
yet: 'they do not exist as an entity, the entity does not exist before this 
declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent 
subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in the act of the signature' 
(Derrida, 2002a, 49). We are entitled to ask, therefore, whom do the 
representatives in the congress really represent? Instead of the people, 
one finds a radical absence, and Derrida is correct to conclude that 'the 
signature invents the signer' (Derrida, 2002a, 49). But this is not the whole 
story; because in the enacting clause of the Constitution, besides the 
signature of the people who constitute themselves in the act of signing, 
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there are many counter-signatures that arrive to legitimize the people's act 
of signing. The people of America sign in 'the name of the laws of nature 
and in the name of God' (Derrida, 2002a, 51). In other words, this 
fundamental act founds itself on natural and spiritual laws.  
 Derrida describes this mechanism of the Declaration as 'fabulous', 
in the sense that from the onset it is enacting 'a fable' (Derrida, 2002a, 50). 
And it could be added that this is as fabulous as Searle's example in which 
corporations seem to come into existence out of nothing, as if their 
foundational speech acts have by themselves all the power to ground the 
new institution (Searle, 2010, 97-99). But this is to say that it will be in vain 
to look for the legitimate foundational grounds of an institution. They are 
invented and therefore arbitrary. The Declaration rests on 'a hypocrisy 
indispensable to a political-military-economic, etc. “coup de force”' 
(Derrida, 2002a, 52). The hypocrisy is to put God, a fiction, as the ultimate 
ground of legitimation. God is, says Derrida, 'the best proper name' that 
could sign a Declaration, because there is no further ground besides God. 
Because there is no ground and no rationale for the foundational act, the 
act of institution making is an act of violence. This is the reason why 
Derrida describes the Declaration as a 'coup de force', or as a stroke of 
writing: 'the “coup de force” makes right, founds right or law, gives right, 
brings the law to the light of day, gives both birth and day to the law' 
(Derrida, 2002a, 50). 
 Let us now focus on a second aspect. When he turns to the 'good 
people' of the United States to discover the possible ground of the 
Declaration, Derrida observes what could be described as a vicious circle. 
For the people delegate representatives to sign the Declaration, and thus 
they appear to have the power and authority to delegate; but at the same 
time it appears that they receive the power, authority and ability to sign 
only through the intervention of their representatives, that is, only when 
they sign the act of the Declaration. The Declaration, therefore, founds the 
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power and authority of the people with which they delegate 
representatives to sign the Declaration (Derrida, 2002a, 49-50). This 
viciousness is to be found again in the relation with the colonial country 
(Derrida, 2002a, 50), in the sense that the cutting of 'paternal or maternal' 
ties triggers the ambiguity between the already accomplished fact and the 
act of accomplishing it. Derrida describes this viciousness as unsolvable 
and ultimately, undecidable:  
 
one cannot decide [...] whether independence is stated or produced 
by this utterance. Is it that the good people have already freed 
themselves in fact and are only stating the fact of this emancipation in 
[par] the Declaration? Or is it rather that they free themselves at the 
instant of and by [par] the signature of this Declaration? (Derrida, 
2002a, 49).  
 
The obscurity in question amounts to the impossibility of deciding between 
the constative and the performative dimensions of the Declaration. For if it 
is true that the 'people' are independent already, they would not require a 
Declaration of Independence. And if it were not true that they are 
independent already, what grounds would they have to declare themselves 
as independent? The fundamental instability between the constative and 
the performative is to be found in the enacting clause of the Declaration: 
we [a long chain of representatives up to God] 'solemnly publish and 
declare, that these united Colonies are and of right ought to be free and 
independent states' (Derrida, 2002a, 51). 'Are and ought to be', writes 
Derrida, conjoins two discursive modalities, the constation and the 
prescription, the fact and the right (Derrida, 2002a, 51-52). But the 
impossibility to draw a clear-cut distinction between the constative and the 
performative aspect of this document is not marginal or accidental: it is 
essential to the performative effect of the Declaration. This ambiguity is 
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'required to produce the sought-after effect' (Derrida, 2002a, 49). 
 How does this stand out in relation to the pure logic of institution 
making? I want to suggest that Derrida's small essay places doubts on 
whether Searle's logic of instituting functions in the way he thinks it 
functions. It shows precisely that the blurring of distinctions between the 
performative and the constative, between what is and what ought to be, is 
necessary if the performative of a Declaration is to occur. And this 
happens because every instituting act presupposes an irreducible violence 
that the act itself tries to mask. In the next section I want to explain why 
this is not an accidental feature – that is, proper to only a determinate 
context like that of the Declaration of Independence of the Unites States of 
America, but a necessary condition if something like institutions is to 
occur. What I will show is that this undecidability between the performative 
and the constative, between an already constituted community and a 
community that constitutes itself through the act of the Declaration, derives 
from a fundamental aspect of language: namely, that performative speech 
acts are always haunted by the possibility of their failure, that they, in the 
last instance, are unable to determine exhaustively the meaning of what 
they say, and that what they bring into existence is always troubled by the 
possibility of its unmaking. This possibility is not accidental, but structural.  
2.2. Iterability of the Sign 
 
The main problem with Searle's view, I want to suggest, is that his pure 
theory of instituting does not take into account that the possibility of failure 
is inscribed in the very logic of instituting. This is connected to a 
fundamental property of language, an essential building block of 
institutions. This property refers to the fact that no intention and 
intentionality present in the speech act can control in an exhaustive 
manner an institution's domain of reference; or, to put it in other words, 
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that institutions cannnot determine, once and for all, the 'whatness' of what 
is. In the following paragraphs I will explain why this is so. 
 I will focus on Derrida's Signature, Event, Context that gave birth to 
a famous exchange with John Searle in the 1970s. In this text, Derrida 
challenges the traditional meaning of the concept of 'communication' as a 
medium in which an exhaustively determinable 'content' is displaced, 
transported, or propagated. This view is modelled by oral communication: 
the speaker and the hearer are both present in the act of communication, 
and their presence is supposed to assure that the act of communication 
records the intentions of the speaker and that it has no role in the 
articulation of the meaning of what is being communicated. Interior to this 
view, Derrida shows, is the presupposition that writing is a mere extension 
or supplement of locutory communication; it does, indeed, extend the 
domain of oral communication, it is indeed technically more adequate to 
transport meaning, but writing is always in a subordinate position. This 
means that if the aims of oral communication are to record the speaker's 
intentions which is assured by her/his presence, and if writing is only an 
advanced means to record spoken sentences, then writing as well will 
have to be defined as a homogenous space of presence which records the 
speaker-writer's intentions. According to this model, the unity of meaning is 
not affected by writing. The fact that the sender or the receiver of writing 
may be absent does not constitute a problem according to this theory, 
because their absence is interpreted as a delayed or modified presence 
or, in other words, as representation (Derrida, 1988a, 5). In this view, it 
could be said that writing is for absent people, and its purpose is to 
represent the ideas of one person to another.  
 But Derrida asks what exactly does this absence presuppose? 
What he essentially observes is that the absence of writing is not a 
delayed presence, because it may survive the death of both the sender 
and the receiver. Therefore, in order to understand how writing functions, 
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its structural possibility, one has to presuppose the radical absence of any 
sender or receiver. In this extreme case, writing must not cease its 
function; it must still be readable and understandable. In other words, in 
order for writing to be what it is, it has to function in the absence of any 
determinate empirical subject. What assures this feature is the essential 
characteristic that the written sign is iterable. As Derrida writes in his 
response to John Searle,  
 
the structure of iteration […] implies both identity and difference. 
Iteration in its 'purest' form – and it is always impure – contains in 
itself the discrepancy of a difference that constitutes it as iteration. 
The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even 
without taking into account the fact that this identity can only 
determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other 
elements and that it hence bears the mark of this difference (Derrida, 
1988b, 54).  
 
Iterability is repetition; but it is repetition that incorporates difference. The 
identity of a sign is granted by repetition: there is no sign that is not 
repeated and recognized, in each instance, as a sign. But every instance 
of the repeated sign presupposes both the identity of the sign (as it is the 
same sign) and the difference of that particular repetition (iteration). So 
from this point of view, there is no 'first-time' of the sign, as it is already 
structured by repetition: this is what Derrida means when he says that the 
iterability of an element divides its own identity a-priori. Because there is 
no 'first-time' of the sign, the notion of a sign's origin becomes problematic: 
there is no origin of the sign as the sign is a-priori structured by an 
irreducible difference.  
 Derrida proposed that 'a writing that is not structurally readable-
iterable beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing' (Derrida, 
1988a, 7). This has two consequences. The first one is that if writing 
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operates in the radical absence of any empirical subject, then there could 
be no private writing or secret code. Writing is structurally public. The 
second consequence is that written communication can no longer be seen 
as a homogenous space of continued presence, but as a space in which 
the iterable sign operates a radical rupture. To write, explains Derrida, 'is 
to produce a mark that will constitute a sort of machine which is productive 
in turn, and which my future disappearance will not, in principle, hinder in 
its functioning, offering things and itself to be read and to be rewritten' 
(Derrida, 1988a, 8). This cut-off of writing represents a radical rupture with 
'all absolute responsibility and consciousness as the ultimate authority' 
(Derrida, 1988a, 8), a break from the concept of 'communication as 
communication of consciousnesses or of presences and as linguistical  or 
semantic transport of the desire to mean what one says' (Derrida, 1988a, 
8), but also a disengagement from any possible context defined as the 
'collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its inscription' (Derrida, 
1988a, 9). In other words, intention and intentionality, either individual or 
collective, are part of what is being communicated, but they are incapable 
of controlling exhaustively its meaning. The sign has a rupturing force, 
which enables it to detach itself, to separate, and 'space' itself from any 
contextual chain in which it occurs. Finally, this is what grants the sign the 
possibility of grafting itself onto new contexts. 
 Derrida's next move is to show that the arguments that were applied 
to the graphemes (basic units of writing) are equally valid for phonic signs. 
Derrida explains that 'through empirical variation of tone, voice, etc., 
possibly of a certain accent, for example, we must be able to recognize the 
identity, roughly speaking, of a signifying form' (Derrida, 1988a, 10). In 
other words, just like the case of the elements of writing, elements of oral 
speech must as well be iterable. The same element of speech could be 
used in different contexts and have different referents, different signifieds, 
and even record different intentions (Derrida, 1988a, 10). Every possible 
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mark has a graphematic structure, presupposing 'the nonpresent 
remainder [restance] of a differential mark cut off from its putative 
“production” or origin' (Derrida, 1988a, 10). This implies that speech 
functions, it is intelligible, even if the speaker and the hearer use the same 
word to refer to different things or even if the referent is absent. It functions 
even in the absence of a determinable signified – such is the case of 
highly abstract mathematical notation. And finally, something that has no 
meaning from the point of view of what Searle calls 'the intentionality of 
conscience' - something like the word 'abracadabra' - can have meaning 
once it grafts itself in a certain context, like in the sentence 'The magician 
said “abracadrabra” and pulled a rabbit out of his hat'. Derrida notes that 
this possibility of citing–iterating what from the point of view of the 
intentionality is meaningless, and which can break with every given 
context and generate an infinity of new contexts, has the following 
consequence: 'there are only contexts without any centre or absolute 
anchorage' (Derrida, 1988a, 12). In other words, there is no privileged 
context that would function as an 'anchorage' for other contexts in 
determining the meaning of a sign. 
 Applied to the pure logic of instituting, this shows that no collective 
intentionality could ever be the last authority to control the domain of 
reference of what is instituted; as I suggested, however, Searle's theory 
seeks to distinguish conditions of success for performative speech acts, 
which presupposes that one is able to exhaustively determine the 
contextual conditions in which the performance is successful. I suggested 
that by doing this, Searle is following Austin. In Signature, Event, Context 
Derrida criticized Austin precisely because he had not taken into 
consideration the graphematic nature of the sign (Derrida, 1988a, 13). 
Austin's analyses require the value of a context that is exhaustively 
determined (Derrida, 1988a, 14). Precisely on these grounds does the 
doctrine of infelicities emerge. In order for the performance of a speech act 
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to be successful one needs to be able to determine the total context of 
success. One of the most important elements of a totally determinable 
context is consciousness, or 'the conscious presence of the intention of 
the speaking subject in the totality of his speech act' (Derrida, 1988a, 14). 
A conscious presence would mean that the intention of the speaker 
controls the exhaustive determination of the context of speech, and hence 
of the meaning of what is said. This would presuppose that there would be 
no residue 'either in the definition of the requisite conventions, or in the 
internal and linguistic context, or in the grammatical form, or in the 
semantic determination of the words employed' that would escape 'the 
horizon of the unity of meaning' (Derrida, 1988a, 14).  
 I have already explained why for Derrida the notion of a context 
exhaustively determined, or of a privileged context in which a sign 
emerges and which acts as an 'anchorage' to other possible occurrences 
of the sign, is impossible. In which case, Derrida argues, Austin and his 
attempts to define necessary conditions of success for performative 
speech acts, is wrong. And not only is he wrong, but by holding that 
intention controls the meaning of what is said, Austin remains a 
representative of the doctrine of communication as transmission of 
cognitive content, which Derrida showed as masking philosophical 
presuppositions. If this is true, than Austin's and Searle are wrong to 
maintain that the success of a performative speech act is explainable by 
the fact that they enact 'datable singular events in particular historical 
contexts' (Searle, 1988, 27). Derrida shows that the success of a 
performative speech act is not accountable by a totally determinable 
context; on the contrary, if it succeeds, a performance has to  
 
 
repeat a 'coded' or iterable utterance, or in other words, […] the 
formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a 
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marriage [should be] identifiable as conforming with an iterable 
model, [...or] as a 'citation' (Derrida, 1988a, 17).  
 
In his reply to Signature, Event, Context, Searle mistakenly holds Derrida 
responsible for the claim that written discourse presupposes 'a break with 
the author's intentions in particular or with intentionality in general' (Searle 
1988, 26); he proposed that 'to the extent that the author says what he 
means the text is the expression of his intentions' (Searle, 1988, 26). 
Derrida never claimed that intention is absent from the determination of 
the context of the speech act or that his view implies that the factor of 
iterability marks a break with intentionality in general. He only holds the 
view that intention and intentionality are part of the context in which the 
mark occurs, but they are never fully actualized. What Signature, Event, 
Context questions is  
 
not intention or intentionality, but their telos, which orients and 
organizes the movement and the possibility of a fulfilment, realization, 
and actualization in a plenitude that would be present to and identical 
with itself (Derrida 1988b, 56).  
 
 
In other words, Derrida does not exclude that there are effects of 
consciousness, or of speech, that there is no performative effect of 
presence (Derrida, 1988a, 19). What he claims is that these effects do not 
manage to exclude what they cannot control, the polysemy and 
dissemination of language, and what Derrida famously calls 'différance', 
'the irreducible absence of intention or attendance to the performative 
utterance' (Derrida, 1988a, 18-19). Or, to explain it differently, Derrida 
questions the aims, purposes and 'intentions' of intentionality, of 
determining, securing and controlling the meaning of what is said in an 
absolute fulfilment and actualization. If it were to be realised, conscious 
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intention would have to be totally present and immediately transparent to 
itself and to others as a 'determining centre [foyer] of context' (Derrida 
1988a, 18); but for reasons shown above, this 'anchorage' is impossible.  
 Derrida shows that, because all signs have a graphematic structure, 
which implies that they function as signs only because they are iterable, 
the possibility of risk, infelicity or failure is not accidental, but necessary 
and internal to the structure of speech acts. This possibility is structural 
both for performative and constative speech acts; at the same time, this 
distinction itself would need to be revisited. For this reason I explained, in 
the case of the Declaration of Independence of the U.S.A., that once we 
grasp the performative dimension of the speech act of declaration the 
constative emerges, as it were, unannounced.  The cohabitation between 
the constative and the performative is necessary: it shows that their logic 
is impure. This implies that it is impossible to say at a definite time that the 
speech act has been a success, because it will always be possible for it to 
fail. 
 What I did in the first two sections of this chapter was to 'graft' 
Derrida's analysis of speech acts onto Searle's theory of instituting. I did 
so in order to show that the 'pure' theory of institution making could 
function only in an 'impure' way, in a manner which shows that the 
distinctions that Searle proposes have in fact blurred demarcations. 
Associating Derrida to Searle does not amount to contending that 
instituting speech acts don't succeed in performing what they say they 
perform; on the contrary, most of the times they do and institutions do 
come into existence. My argument is, however, that their coming into 
existence has to take into account another factor: precisely power, the 
imposition of will, of intention and intentionality whose aims are to 
determine reference and control in an exhaustive manner the meaning of 
what is instituted, a 'tyranny' of intention that violently imposes its will in 
the act of instituting. If my argument is correct, then there are a number of 
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interesting consequences that follow: 
 (1) Because there is a remainder of the sign whose meaning a 
speech act cannot exhaustively determine and, therefore, because there is 
a remainder which always escapes the performative act of instituting, what 
Searle takes as the 'peaceful' and free cooperation of individuals in 
institution-making has always a violent underside. This is the violence of 
imposing an arbitrary intention and will, the exercising of an arbitrary force 
to bring into existence what one says already exists (constative) and ought 
to exist (performative) in the performance of a speech act. 
 (2) For this reason institutions are structured by a fundamental 
undecidability. They amount to both 'positive' and 'negative' effects: 
positive inasmuch as they enrich our existence and negative inasmuch as 
they transform an arbitrary will and intention into general rule and law. On 
the one hand they are, as Searle lets us understand, arbiters among 
different individual desires and interests, and enhance our powers by 
providing desire independent reasons for action. But on the other hand 
and at the same time, the achievement of such a feat presupposes a 
fundamental violence of imposing an arbitrary will and intention, of 
assuring and controlling the meaning of an institution's domain of 
reference against all difference of interpretation, a violence that 
necessarily excludes that which it cannot control. And difference of 
interpretation is not only conceivable, but also structurally possible. This is 
to say that the act of instituting is always marked by the possibility of 
failure, or of infelicities. It follows that in order to maintain their temporal 
permanence, institutions always need to 're-institute' themselves: this 
implies redetermining and respecifying the meaning of what they bring into 
existence through the performance of speech acts.  
 (3) One way to prevent failure is to safeguard their domain of 
reference by appealing to forms of coercion: governmentality and the 
existence of the police are consequences of an institution's violent 
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character. To 'police' something is to 'to maintain order; to clean, 
administer, to organize or regulate; to control or keep in order; to guard or 
protect with or as with a police force' (OED online, 'police, v.', 2013, 
webpage). The police force assures that the instituting speech act that 
becomes law is obeyed. We will not expand here on the proposition that 
already what we call 'the spirit of the law' indicates that something escapes 
the totalisation of the 'letter of the law'; and that the more totalitarian a 
political regime is, the more police it needs to make sure that the 'letter of 
the law' is obeyed. The police protect, guard, and administer what an 
institution says that there is, as if that is all that there is, without rest and 
remainder. It safeguards, in other words, the unity of meaning articulated 
in a speech act by the arbitrary imposition of will and intention. But 
because the nature of the sign makes it impossible to exhaustively control 
its meaning, the police force cannot prevent that there is a remainder and 
rest that escapes.  
 (4) If the nature of the sign is, as Derrida puts it, divided a-priori, if 
the sign is always identity and difference in all its possible iterations, then 
this triggers the following consequence: all 'recuperation' of the sign by an 
arbitrary instituting will and intention is never total and exhaustive. My 
suggestion is that the remainder, the rest, the difference which escapes 
the totalisation of the speech act becomes critical: it always haunts speech 
acts, law, and institutions with the possibility of their 'unmaking'. If critique 
is to occur, it does so by taking into account precisely what escapes the 
total actualization of intention in a given context. 
 In an unexpected turn of the narrative thread, then, it could be said 
that between the logic of instituting and critique there is an intimate 
connection. What I want to do next is to explain how this relation is 
possible. 
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3. The Intimacy between Institution and Critique 
 
To be sure, the statement that, between an institution and critique there is 
an irreducible relation, is only the general form of a thesis whose particular 
application I have already investigated in the first chapter. Now we can 
understand why there is a symbiosis between the 'spirit' of capitalism and 
critique; as ideology that justifies action, the 'spirit' of capitalism 
necessarily grounds itself on an institutional order that enacts and protects 
by law (which, I showed, blends the constative and the performative), its 
domain of reference, the relations of production, distribution and 
consumption that one calls 'capitalist'. I suggested, in the previous chapter, 
that the relation between the 'new spirit' of capitalism and artistic critique 
led to the latter's recuperation. What has been said in this chapter allows 
me to establish that this recuperation is not total. In this section I want to 
investigate how the relation between institution and critique appears in the 
account of the theorist whose thesis I followed in the first chapter when I 
explicated that the recent interest in institutional critique represents a 
response to the recuperation of artistic critique by the new 'spirit' of 
capitalism. 
 In a book that he published in 2011, Luc Boltanski also looks at the 
logic of instituting, from the perspective of pragmatic sociology2. Boltanski 
observes that social activity is not and cannot be constantly critical; he 
asks, therefore, how is it possible that critique nevertheless exists? 
                                            
2
 Luc Boltanski is in fact one of the main representatives of pragmatic sociology, that often takes the 
name of 'sociology of critique'. It could be said that the latter has emerged as an offshoot of critical 
sociology, whose most important figure was Pierre Bourdieu. Pragmatic sociology rejects the thesis 
that social order is preserved through illusion or self delusion; 'the actions of persons are 
understood neither as a realization of possibilities within certain structures, nor as an expression of 
the execution of a pre-determined program, as is the case in the foundation of a disposition term 
such as the habitus' (Wuggenig, 2008, webpage). Pragmatic sociology, therefore, defends the idea 
that 'common people' or 'actors' are capable of practising critique, through disagreements and 
disputes, and that their critique is integral to the social order. For a comparison of the two schools of 
sociology see also Bénatouïl (1999). 
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Pragmatic sociology discovers a fundamental uncertainty that threatens 
social arrangements and exposes that what we call 'reality' is in fact a 
fragile social construction. Uncertainty is most visible in situations of 
dispute and disagreement which are always 'both semantic and deontic' in 
kind (Boltanski, 2011, 56). But at the same time, pragmatic sociology often 
places too much confidence in the ability of actors to reduce this 
uncertainty and to restore ties of sociality and meaning. The expression of 
this overconfidence is to be identified in the excessive significance 
attributed to the concept of common sense. By common sense one should 
understand a notion of social agreement that allegedly emerges through 
social interaction  
 
either because the participants share the same experience of 
meanings, or because they have the same recourse to reason, or 
because they are immersed in the same linguistic universe, or finally 
because their imaginative capacities are structured by the same 
resources (Boltanski 2011, 54–55).  
 
 
Without characterising him as a pragmatic sociologist, it could be inferred 
that Searle's pure logic of instituting is marked by what Boltanski describes 
as the 'presupposition of common sense' and the 'absolutism of 
agreement' (Boltanski, 2011, 56). The French sociologist explains that 
because we give too much credit to this idea we are not able to see how 
something like critique in fact comes into being. A strong argument stands 
out against the concept of implicit agreement. It refers to the fact that each 
human being has a body with different types of experiences, from 
individual desires, likes, dislikes and interests to its particular location in 
time and space and placement in social arrangements. In other words, 
each individual has a point of view, a perspective, and nothing gives him 
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or her the authority and power to say to others the ‘whatness’ of what is 
(Boltanski, 2011, 59).  
 Boltanski advocates a pluralist framework3 which makes it possible 
to account for 'both agreement and dispute, acquiescence and critique, 
and above all the often very rapid shifts that can be observed between 
these two alternatives' (Boltanski, 2011, 56). The object of disputes – 
which reveal the unease and uncertainty of social arrangements – 
concerns 'the whatness of what is and, inextricably, what matters, what 
has value, what it is right to respect and look at twice' (Boltanski, 2011, 
56). Boltanski argues that we cannot understand disputes and, ultimately, 
critique, if analysis takes into account only the coordinate of 'reality'. In 
fact, the sociological tradition that stresses the social construction of 
reality, defined as that which 'tends to coincide with what appears to hang 
together, in a sense by its own strength – that is, with order' (Boltanski, 
2011, 57), suggests that its arbitrary character emerges against a 
background into which it cannot be absorbed. Boltanski calls this 
background 'the world' and defines it, in a Wittgensteinian manner, as 
'everything that is the case' (Boltanski, 2011, 57). The category of 'the 
world' has nothing transcendent about it; the world exists on the same 
plane of immanence as 'reality'. Whereas 'reality' is oriented towards 
permanence and the preservation of order (Boltanski, 2011, 58), the 'world' 
is subject to constant changes that are far from being exclusively 'social' in 
kind and that at times even fail to attain the register of speech. The 
permanent connection between reality and world makes it the case that 
reality is only relatively stable.  
 
                                            
3
 Boltanski admits that he has been much influenced by the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Max 
Weber. He openly rejects the hypothesis of '“collective intentionality” treated as a “primitive 
phenomenon”' in the manner of John Searle who, Boltanski reminds us, argues that the concept 
has a biological foundation (Boltanski, 2011, 57; Searle, 1995, 24). 
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 I want to propose that we can understand this distinction by analogy 
with our previous discussion facilitated by Derrida, on speech acts and 
their incapacity to determine exhaustively the total meaning of what they 
bring into existence. I want to suggest that the differential between 'reality' 
and 'world' pertains to the differential between the relay of instituting 
speech acts that bring into existence the institutional order of reality and 
that which always escapes the exhaustive determination of meaning and 
which haunts these arrangements with the possibility of infelicity, of failure 
and, ultimately, with the possibility of dissolution. Boltanski contends that 
'arrangements, which constitute and organize reality, are fragile because 
critique can always draw events from the world that contradict their logic 
and furnish ingredients for unmasking their “arbitrary” or “hypocritical” 
character, or for “deconstructing” them – something that paves the way for 
making arrangements of a new kind' (Boltanski, 2011, 59).  
 I mentioned already that critique is rather the exception than the 
norm of social activity. Indeed, in a pragmatic register human beings most 
often ignore or tolerate differences of interpretation concerning what is 
happening, and collective action is oriented towards a task to be done 
(Boltanski, 2011, 61). These practical moments that appear as if all action 
could converge allow actors ‘not to linger unduly over not only their 
contradictions, but also the contradictions between reality and the world' 
(Boltanski, 2011, 65). However, there is a threshold of tolerance that, once 
crossed, invites an increased activity of reflecting over what is happening 
and, therefore, triggers the competition of different points of view. In this 
register that Boltanski calls 'metapragmatic' people ask themselves ‘what 
is going on?’ ‘how to characterize what is happening?’ ‘what value does 
this have?’ ‘why is this significant?’ ‘how is this relevant?’ (Boltanski, 2011, 
71-72); what is questioned, therefore, are the conditions of possibility of 
action. Consequently, various descriptions and qualifications of the 
'whatness' of what is enter into competition. It involves a comparison 
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between the description and evaluation (that is, the ascription of value and 
deontic properties) of how the situation is (the token situation) and a 
description and evaluation of how it ought to be (the type situation)4. The 
metapragmatic register, therefore, involves looking at states of affairs from 
the point of view of their symbolic dimension.  
 Now, because all difference of interpretation is irreducible, it follows 
that nobody has the authority and power to impose a description of the 
'whatness' of what is. The only conceivable solution is therefore to 
delegate the task of saying the 'whatness' of what is to a bodiless being 
(Boltanski, 2011, 75). If this third entity had a body, it would have no 
authority of being the last instance saying or confirming the 'whatness' of 
what is. This bodiless entity is obviously, the institution. 
 
An institution is a bodiless being to which is delegated the task of 
stating the whatness of what is. It is therefore first of all in its semantic 
functions that the institution must be considered (Boltanski, 2011, 75).  
 
The whole argument, so far, was that institutions must be considered, first 
of all, in their semantic dimension, and that something pertaining to their 
semantics, and namely, the iterability of the sign, makes it the case that 
the relation between institutions and critique is irreducible. Institutions sort 
out what needs to be respected from what cannot be; their main task is to 
establish types that are available to qualify states of affairs when 
uncertainty arises. Thus, it could be said that institutions are granted with 
the task of fixing reference. But fixing reference does not amount only to 
what in Searle's vocabulary would be the imposition of status functions: it 
also implies the labour of defining the properties of things, thus assuring 
                                            
4
 Let us remember, in Derrida's analysis of the Constitution of the U.S.A., this is the distinction 
between fact and right; there is an undecidability between what is already fact and what ought to be 
established as fact, by right.  
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their identity and allowing them circulation in the social economy 
(Boltanski, 2011, 77). Like Derrida, Boltanski acknowledges that the logic 
of instituting and the labour of fixing reference and defining properties 
implied an arbitrary violence. And he makes a similar argument to the one 
developed in this chapter, when I tackled the logic of speech acts: 
'Following Austin, one will then latch on to the performative character of 
institutional acts which, by means of declarative sentences, create reality, 
but while stressing the link between illocutionary force and the force, of a 
quite different order, supplied by the availability of policing instruments 
and, as a result, the arbitrary character of constitutive acts' (Boltanski, 
2011, 78).  
 Boltanski maintains that there are two sorts of problems that 
institutions encounter and that exhibits their fragility. The first one amounts 
to the arbitrariness of their ultimate foundation, which I have already 
investigated in the previous section, when I discussed the case of the 
Declaration of Independence of the U.S.A. The second one regards two 
types of contradiction that Boltanski describes as 'hermeneutical'. The first 
one could be formulated as following: because they are bodiless entities, 
institutions cannot express themselves unless they delegate this task to 
representatives or spokespersons; the latter are situated corporeal beings 
with their own perspective, interests and desires, and therefore, one will 
never know with certainty whether institutional statements express the will 
of the incorporeal being of the institution or the subjective will of the 
corporeal beings which act as its representatives. People do know that 
institutions are fictional entities, that they are ultimately made of people 
with individual interests and desires, and that nothing authorizes them to 
ascertain the 'whatness' of what is. But at the same time people 
nevertheless place their trust in institutions, because not delegating the 
task of stating the 'whatness' of what is entails the risk of never achieving 
a closure of the exchange of points of view.  
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This difficulty is in fact a product of a deeper 'hermeneutical' 
contradiction, which regards the relationship between language and its 
actualization in situations of enunciation. Boltanski puts it like this: 
institutions behave as if 
 
[their] semantic function [...] genuinely had the power wholly to cover 
the field of experience and, as a result, abolish the multiplicity of 
points of view in favour of a single perspective that would end up 
saturating the field of significations. But this presupposes that the 
diversity of concrete situations could be surmounted, in such a way 
as to dissolve them all into a continuous, seamless situational web 
(Boltanski, 2011, 87). 
 
This contradiction refers to the impossibility of an institution's semantic 
function to determine exhaustively the meaning of what it institutes, the 
reference, definition and description of the 'whatness' of what is as if that is 
all that there is. And I want to suggest that this confirms the findings of the 
second section of this chapter, related to the insurmountable irreducibility 
of iteration and to the differential that escapes the act of instituting. It is 
essential for institutions, explains Boltanski, that they present themselves 
in the place of the 'whole of reality' because only in this way can they 
defend it 'against the forces which aim to relativize it – that is, challenge it' 
(Boltanski, 2011, 91). This is performed through specific operations of 
language that use 'vocabulary and syntax in formulas that are correctly 
called stereotyped [...] because they operate as if it was possible to 
stabilize reference once and for all, whatever the context in which the 
words are used' (Boltanski, 2011, 92). An institution's bodiless being can 
exist in the world of bodies only if it operates a reduction of the differential 
between the 'world' and 'reality': it assures its presence only by operating a 
series of adjustments in a context which is permanently changing.  
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But, as I suggested already, institutional domination is not total: 
there is always something that escapes them. In fact, the distinction 
between 'world' and 'reality' is already made from a critical optic. Its 
possibility is granted by the fact that 'the slightest gap, even the most 
contingent, is the equivalent of a critique' (Boltanski, 2011, 88). This is to 
reveal that the connection between institution and critique is logically 
necessary: otherwise, a reality in which what the institution says what 
there is, is all that there is, is a reality 'offering no purchase to 
interpretation' (Boltanski, 2011, 92). A reality entirely stabilized by 
institutional semantics would be impossible because it would simply 
restrict the possibilities of the very logic with which language works. In 
such a reality, the conformity of conduct would be total. And in fact, that 
something like critique exists is assured by the fact that 'the power 
institutional language is invested with cannot itself be manifested without 
also betraying the violence that inhabits it' (Boltanski, 2011, 93).  
 We have seen, in the second section, that the invention of a chain 
of fictive authorizations has the role of denying and hiding this violence. 
Precisely because their semantic function is not able to secure, by itself, 
conformity of conduct, institutions will rely on constrains and physical 
violence. This is why there is, I suggested already, something like 
governmentality and police. Their task is to assure 'a horizon of 
pacification without residues' by depriving the malcontents, through an 
action on bodies, of speech, or […] by obstructing their efforts to 
coordinate themselves' (Boltanski, 2011, 95). 
 If critique is to appear, therefore, it appears precisely at the point 
that articulates the differential between the institutional determination of 
the 'whatness' of what is and that which escapes it. In other words, critique 
appears by grasping an institution's 'hermeneutical contradictions' and by 
working on what appears as institutions' fundamental violence. But I am 
aware of the risks involved when making such a statement, because 
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critique is not disingenuous: critique also has a purchase on 'reality' and 
employs language in contesting and stating the 'whatness' of what is. 
Critique itself cannot escape functioning in a logic of violence: 
'denunciation of injustice is accompanied by rhetorical means geared to a 
rise towards generality, in such a way that the accuser can base her act, 
including in her own eyes, on defence of the common good – as if she 
were herself the spokesperson for a potential institution – and not on that 
of specific interests' (Boltanski, 2011, 97). This implies a fundamental 
conclusion: just as institutions not only state the 'whatness' of what is but 
permanently reconfirm it by 'reinstituting' themselves, in the same manner 
critique has to reconfirm itself, refusing to allow its own transformation in 
that which it criticizes, an instance of an imposition of will, of saying the 
'whatness' of what is as if that is all that there is. In other words, critique, if 
it is to remain critique, has to doubt itself constantly, defending itself from 
itself, from the totalising effects of its operations. Critique needs to remain 
self-critical. 
4. Conclusions 
 
The general question that this chapter attempted to respond is: what is the 
logic of instituting? Following John Searle, Jacques Derrida and Luc 
Boltanski, I proposed that institutions come into existence because we 
have the possibility of representing something as something else, and this 
possibility is provided by language, particularly by speech acts. John 
Searle has been developing a unique theory of instituting, which I 
described as 'pure' and transcendental because it seeks necessary and 
sufficient conditions for instituting: he finds these in the theoretical 
primitives of collective intentionality, the imposition of status functions, 
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performative speech acts and free will. In section two I demonstrated, 
following Jacques Derrida's analyses of speech acts and of the concept of 
'communication', that the logic of instituting functions, in fact, in a mixed 
and 'impure' manner. The borders between the constative and the 
performative are blurred, and what we discovered as a chain of 
legitimations that are grounded, ultimately, on fictions, exposes a 
fundamental violence that every act of instituting enacts. It could not be 
otherwise, since the intention invested in every act of instituting attempts 
to determine in an exhaustive and total manner, through the labour of 
definition and description, the 'whatness' of what it brings into existence, 
as if that is all that there is. But because the logic of the sign is 
fundamentally a logic of iteration, there is always something that escapes 
the totalising determination of meaning within the instituting speech act.  I 
enhanced my argument in section three by describing this undecidable 
and unsolvable tension as the 'hermeneutical contradiction' that haunts all 
institutions. But by paying close attention to this contradiction I discovered 
something else: that it is part of the conditions that makes it possible for 
something like critique to appear.  
 If my argument is sound, then it will be applicable to different types 
of institutions; particularly, it will be applicable to what one calls the 
'institution of art'. This is to say that, essentially, the institution of art's role 
is that of fixing reference, stabilizing interpretation, and granting constant 
properties – and it does this in relation to that which we call 'art'. If we 
accept this idea then the art institution could be described as the bodiless 
entity that states the 'whatness' of what art is. This implies that there is a 
relation of logical dependence between the 'institution of art' and 'art'. To 
prevent a foreseeable argument, allow me to say that the emphasis of this 
description does not fall on the 'is' of art, but on the 'whatness' of art. If the 
analysis of this chapter stands, then we will understand that we search in 
vain for the originary foundation of the 'art institution'; likewise, we would 
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understand that the problem whether the concept of 'art' preceded the 'art 
institution' or whether it was the other way around, is in fact an impossible 
problem. This is confirmed by the founding acts of something like the 
nineteenth century art institution (Siegel, 2008): if we look precisely at how 
the project of civilizing the working class was merged within the debates 
that concluded in the emergence of the nineteenth century museums, 
debates that concerned such issues like 'national culture', 'cultural 
heritage', and what is 'valuable' to keep, preserve, and collect, then it 
becomes clear that 'art' is not a ready-made concept that the art institution 
consecrates, but that  'art' and the 'art institution' emerge hand-in-hand, 
within an instituting process which often blends the constative and the 
performative, the 'is' with the 'ought to be' of art. If anything, the nineteenth 
century art institution exhibits the violence, both symbolic and material, 
both semantic and deontic, of imposing a collective will and intention: 
perhaps the intention and the will of a ruling class and of a certain concept 
of art and of the public sphere. And this, I want to suggest, is what has 
been shown already by Tony Bennett's analysis of the generalization of 
Bentham's panopticon in the exhibitionary complex of the World Fair and 
its adoption in the museum, where everybody watches and is being 
watched, disciplines and is being disciplined (Bennett, 1995); or by Carol 
Duncan's study of the museum as ceremonial sites in which visitors 
themselves perform rituals that allegedly serve a civilizing and 
emancipatory transformation of the subject (Duncan, 1995). 
 To say that the art institution is the bodiless entity that states the 
'whatness' of what art is, is simply to say that whatever art is, its concept 
will be always determined by the art institution. But note, this does not 
imply that whatever the art institution says that art is or ought to be, is all 
that art is or ought to be. In other words, this does not repeat the thesis of 
the institutional theory of art that argues that art is what an historical art 
context or an 'art world' sanction as art (see Dickie 1974; Dickie 1984; 
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Danto, 1964; Danto, 1981)5. In this chapter I explained that the logic of 
instituting amounts to the will and intention to determine exhaustively the 
meaning of what is instituted, the reference and description of the 
'whatness' of what is as if that is all that there is. But at the same time, I 
showed that precisely because the sign is irreducibly iterable, the total or 
exhaustive determination of its meaning is never possible. Something 
always escapes the act of instituting: and this is equally valid for the 
meaning of the sign 'art'. Because there is always something that escapes 
the intention of determining in an exhaustive manner the meaning of 'art', 
art is not reducible to only what the art institution says, declares, and does 
what it says it does in relation to art. If critique starts precisely where 
difference emerges, where something escapes and evades a totalising 
intention, then we will be entitled to say that whatever art is, the 'whatness' 
of what art is, is a matter of debate, controversy, and dispute. If the art 
institution fulfilled its totalising intention, of specifying the unity of meaning 
of what art is, in other words, if there would be no doubt, no questioning, 
and no contesting, then art would simply disappear, or transform itself into 
something unrecognisable. Ultimately, this implies that critique is internal 
to the meaning of the concept of art. 
 This chapter found that there is a necessary relation between 
institution and critique. Particularly for our interests, this implies that there 
is a necessary relation, a necessary cohabitation and symbiosis between 
the art institution and institutional critique. If this is true, then it could be 
said that both the art institution and institutional critique have a purchase 
on the 'whatness' of what art is, on what art is and ought to be, on what art 
does and ought to do. If this argument is valid, and if indeed there is a 
relation of cohabitation and symbiosis between institution and critique, 
then it will be necessary to ask, in the next chapter, how does critique 
                                            
5
 I will further elaborate this idea in chapter five. 
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function, and in what logic, if this relation is indeed irreducible? 
  
Chapter III: 
Critique: from Separation to Undecidability 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis I advanced the proposition that artistic 
critique is confronted with the dilemma of either going back to old critical 
paradigms that don't seem to be adequate to respond to current 
transformations of capitalism, or adopt a nihilistic and self-defeating 
position. The recent interest in institutional critique represents an effort to 
avoid the two horns of this dilemma. In the second chapter I proceeded to 
an investigation of the logic of instituting. I proposed to look at institutions 
as semantic and deontic entities, and I argued that structural to all 
institutions, including the institution of art, is a violence which is both 
symbolic and material, the violence of an arbitrary will and intention of 
defining and describing the 'whatness' of what institutions bring into 
existence as if that is all that there is. I explained, however, that this 
totalising act that invents rule and law is never entirely fulfilled; something 
always escapes and evades it, a differential 'rest' stemming from the 
fundamental iterability of the sign. This implies that the logic of instituting is 
structured by 'hermeneutical contradictions' the grasping of which triggers 
the occurrence of critique. I proposed that between institutions and critique 
there is a necessary relation of symbiosis and cohabitation. 
 My suggestion is that any future articulation of the conditions and 
possibilities of institutional critique will have to take into account this 
fundamental relation between institution and critique. But I want to 
emphasize that we cannot understand this necessary relationship if we 
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employ precisely those old paradigms of critique that only reproduce the 
dilemma which artistic critique faces. In this chapter I will argue that these 
old paradigms refer to the modern concept of critique that was based on a 
binary logic of exclusion and repression. I suggest that if we want to 
understand the concept of the necessary relation between institution and 
critique, then we need to articulate a logic that allows and acknowledges 
singularity and difference. In other words: instead of limiting itself to the 
possibilities given by a binary logic of the type either/or  (e.g. institutional 
critique places itself either inside the art institution or outside of it), which, I 
argue, constitutes an essential part of the modern concept of critique, 
institutional critique operates with a differential type of logic of the type 
neither/nor or both/and (e.g. institutional critique is located neither in the 
institution nor outside of it; or both in the institution and outside of the 
institution).  
 In this chapter therefore I explore the rationale that allows us to 
arrive at this logic; I also attempt to explain precisely what this logic 
presupposes. In section one I consider the religious context in which the 
concept of critique was articulated as a just conscience able to operate 
self-differentiation, distinction and separation. In the second section I show 
that this meaning of critique survived in the Enlightenment, though 
stripped of its religious connotations. I will refer to the manner in which the 
concept of critique was articulated in modernity: in Kant's epistemology, as 
the inquiry of the limits of knowledge and of the legitimate uses of reason; 
in Marx's politico-economic theory, as the 'critique of everything existing' 
which describes an act of courage, of conducting criticism to its last limits, 
in abeyance of all that might impede its exercise; and in the Frankfurt 
School's critical theory, that develops an immanent concept of critique. The 
narrative of these two sections explains that the modern concept of 
critique is following a binary logic of the type either/or; in my 
understanding, the Frankfurt school has recognized that this logic 
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fundamentally operates with exclusions of difference, and that the 
catastrophes of the twentieth century are to be understood as a 
consequence of the Enlightenment's failure to acknowledge otherness. On 
this conclusion I base my approach in section three, which explicates the 
distrust directed against grand narratives that legitimized the binary 
concept of criticism. This is also the place where I will argue for the 
necessity of a new type of logic that takes into consideration singularity 
and difference. I show that this logic is of the type neither/nor or both/and, 
and I locate the identity of this new type of critique in what Michel Foucault 
calls 'the critical attitude' (Foucault, 1997): being both partner and 
adversary, at the same time, of the powers that be.  In my understanding, 
this description responds to what I revealed in chapter two as the 
necessary relation of cohabitation and symbiosis between institution and 
critique. 
1. Critique: How to Read the Bible 
 
What does it mean to offer a critique? The term critique comes from the 
classical Greek, where one finds it either in the form of the adjective 
kritikos or as the verb krinein: the critical indicated the actions of 
separating, distinguishing, choosing among alternatives, deciding, judging, 
or incriminating. In the modern English it also has the sense of fault-
finding. The word has a vast array of applications: from epistemology (to 
decide what is true and what is false), to ethics (to distinguish the good 
from the bad), to jurisdiction (to judge, to asses) and even to medical use, 
as in the crisis of a body's physiology, a critical point of an illness, that 
leads either to a restoration of health or to death. The most notorious 
'critical' image is, undoubtedly, a religious one: I am referring to the 
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announcement of the Judgement Day, the peak of a crisis which is 
organized as a trial (Mathew, 25:31) of every single being (Romans, 
14:10), where God is portrayed as the highest possible authority who has 
the power to distinguish the good from the bad, the true prophets from the 
false prophets, and who judges and decides who is to receive eternal life 
and who is to be thrown into the fires of Hell (see also Koselleck, 2006, 
359–360). The Book of Revelations, in particular chapters nineteen and 
twenty, has inspired much of the Christian iconography depicting the end 
of the world.  
 I would like to insist on this religious register of distinguishing and 
justice: for it is often emphasized that the 'art of critique' was developed in 
close connection to what has come down to us as exegesis or 
hermeneutics (see for example Gürses, 2006, webpage; Foucault, 1997, 
42–45). Indeed, kritike techne (Greek version) or ars critica (Latin Version) 
referred to a manner of dealing with the problems raised by the readings 
of the Holy Scriptures. In the third century A.D. Origen proposed that 'just 
as a human being is said to be made up of body, soul, and spirit, so also is 
sacred Scripture, which has been granted by God's gracious dispensation 
for man's salvation' (in Szondi, 1995, 9). This analogy between body and 
Scripture would initiate a centuries long tradition of a threefold textual 
reading of the Scripture, according to the somatic meaning (historical-
grammatical), the psychic meaning (moral) and the pneumatic (allegorical 
– symbolic) (Szondi, 1995, 10). St. Augustine would later add a fourth level 
of exegesis: the anagogical (mystical). 
 Gürses proposes that the meaning of critique as crisis or what he 
calls the 'agonistic' facet of critique (Gürses, 2006, webpage), emerges 
during the Reformation, when Martin Luther will reject the thesis that one 
needs the guidance of the fathers of the Church in order to read the 
Scriptures: it is here that Gürses locates an insurrectionist aspect of 
critique. It should be noted that what is at stake in Luther's scriptural 
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principle, sola scriptura – which proposed that the Bible should be read 
and understood by the simple layman as well as the clergy – is the 
struggle against the principle of tradition established by the Holy Fathers of 
the Christian Church. Wriedt suggests that Luther's reformation discovery 
was a hermeneutical insight that he gained from reading St. Paul’s 
commentary on justification and particularly the analysis of the term 'justice 
of God'. But with this discovery came along the necessity of a 'new 
method' for grasping the meaning of the Holy Scriptures. 'This is all about 
a new or, as Luther would say, different way of reading Scripture through 
the gospel, which remains uninfluenced by human influence or, to put it in 
modern words, free from pre-understanding and anticipated results being 
read into the text.' (Wriedt, 2003, 91). Thus, the meaning of the Scriptures 
is to be found in the Scriptures alone, independent of any human 
guidance. Luther's criticism is consequently directed against the authority 
of tradition, whose unwritten norms implied that the Holy Fathers of the 
Church were the only legitimate source of a proper, 'truthful' reading and 
exegesis. This, as I explained, had a centuries-old tradition related to the 
doctrine of the four interpretations of the Scriptures. 
 Both Foucault (1997) and Gürses (2006) show that traces of this 
agonistic aspect of critique, articulated in the religious sphere, will survive 
in the secularist world of the Enlightenment. Critique, understood as the 
turning point of a crisis, has two important realms of application. The first 
one could be called epistemological. It refers to a radical questioning of 
what knowledge is (in this case, knowledge of the Scriptures), and invites 
the reader to explore beyond received ideas and paths of interpretation. It 
is the aspect that, taken out of a religious context, will survive in Immanuel 
Kant's project of the Critiques. The second one could be called ethical-
political. The 'protest' of the reformed churches targeted what they 
perceived as false doctrines and ecclesiastical malpractice; the corrupted 
figure of the Pope and his authority to absolve sin; and the activity of 
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selling indulgences. Wriedt observes that 'He (Luther) lays emphasis on 
the free, absolute sovereignty of God and his merciful acts of grace toward 
creatures full of sin and separated from him' (Wriedt, 2003, 90). The power 
to absolve, then, belongs to God alone, and men can attain salvation only 
through their faith in Jesus Christ. Luther's critique is, therefore, an 
institutional critique, inasmuch as it addresses the corruption and 
decadence in the institution of the Church. Luther did not want the 
destruction of the Catholic Church 'but rather its basic Christian renewal. 
Yet Luther hit the vital nerve of current church practices. Erasmus 
commented on this writing with the laconic remark that the break with 
Rome could hardly be healed any more' (Beutel, 2003, 10). Erasmus's 
comment certainly points to an irreparable break, which is twofold: first it 
refers to an earth-shattering effect upon the meaning of Christian faith; 
second, it refers to a break in the norms and rules of ecclesiastic practice, 
in that during the Reformation critique exhibits its ethical and political 
relevance. This break would soon be translated in religious and civil 
warfare, which later culminated in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The 
relation between the epistemological and the ethical-political sense of 
critique will survive, though not always in an overt manner, in much of the 
social and political upheavals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
time of revolutions and of an acute sense of crisis. 
2. The Modern Concept of Critique 
 
The question of how to read the Holy Scriptures led, towards the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, to a certain radicalization of thought. 
Its epitome was reached in the writings of Martin Luther, whose solution for 
the moral-religious crisis of the Catholic Church was the return to the 
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simplicity of the Christian Gospel. Either that or remain in the scope of the 
Pope's power, which Luther saw as the personification of the Anti-Christ. 
 The modern concept of critique was articulated in the period of what 
is known as the Enlightenment, when many of the concept's religious 
connotations were translated in various philosophies of history (Koselleck 
makes this point both in Koselleck, 1988; and in Koselleck, 2006). It 
retains, however, something of the previous historical formations 
dominated by religious strife: the sense of a just conscience able to 
operate self-differentiation and separation. This is what the first chapter of 
Adorno's and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002) suggests, by 
focusing on the processes following which the human subject is 
progressively installed as master of the world. Significantly, what this part 
of the book shows is that the Enlightened conscience is binary and 
operates in the register of the either/or. In the Enlightenment, reason is set 
against irrationality and myth, and science is developed in order to combat 
superstition; the acquisition of knowledge leads towards a disenchanted 
world that has no place for animist nature; classificatory systems and the 
power of calculation are enhanced in order to reduce difference to the 
same. This is a time when man discovers laws of nature which take the 
place of magic; a time which prizes mathematics, abstract quantities and 
the laws of equivalence of commodity value over quality. Finally, the 
human subject of the Enlightenment appears as world dominator: power 
will define human relationships, a notion of power that rests on the 
changing economic relations expressed through the division of labour. The 
dawning of new social and economic structures held the promise of 
granting cohesion on the social whole (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002, 16).  
 I want to insist on this idea of a binary structure of Enlightened 
thinking, accompanied by the suggestion that it is supported by an 
economic and social basis, which carries with itself the ferment of political 
change. This is, to put it simply, the context that informs the articulation of 
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the concept of critique. It is also the theme of Reinhart Koselleck's widely 
read Critique and Crisis (Koselleck, 1988). Here the author contended that 
'criticism [...] is the basis of the dualistic world-view that marked that era. 
The mutual polarization of all eighteenth-century concepts is given 
meaning and inner cohesion by the critical function inherent in all dualisms 
as, conversely, the political criticism could be based only on an historical 
reality in which morality and politics were separated' (Koselleck, 1988, 
103). Koselleck's intention was to explain the Utopian ideas of the 
twentieth century by looking at their origins in the eighteenth century 
(Koselleck, 1988, 1); consequently, his book focuses on the time from the 
end of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) to the French Revolution of 1789. 
His main thesis states that during this period, a new social-economic 
class, the bourgeoisie, progressively masters innovative means of 
production that puts it in the position to challenge (critique) the socio-
economic status of the old aristocracy. The latter remained faithful to the 
Absolutist state because it supported its social and economic position. 
What is particularly interesting in this process is the fact that the bourgeois 
subject claims the absolute right to utter the moral verdict which condemns 
the old world; it conceals, at the same time, the political significance of 
her/his act by translating it in the practice of the philosophy of history. As a 
critical technique, proposing a philosophy of history in the Enlightenment is 
an act of refusal of the current world, but at the same time postpones 
political intervention in view of a better world to come. 'Concealing this 
concealment was the historical function of the Utopian philosophy of 
history. It was responsible for the further intensification of the crisis 
because it made evident that the decision yet to come would take the form 
of a moral judgement' (Koselleck, 1988, 174).  
 To put it in other words, the bourgeois thinkers abstain from the 
open criticism of the Absolutist order. They would rather invoke categories 
of reason, morality, nature, etc. in the name of which they perform the 
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criticism of the current world, but essentially perceive their critique as non-
political. In Koselleck's understanding, this non-political form of 
engagement remains, nevertheless, deeply political (Koselleck, 1988, 
147). It led to the schism between State and society, and between politics 
and ethics, which eventually triggered a state of crisis and revolutionary 
political dissolution: 'the critical process of Enlightenment conjured up the 
crisis in the same measure in which the political significance of that crisis 
remained hidden from it' (Koselleck, 1988, 9). Perhaps amongst the few 
sincere thinkers of the Enlightenment, Rousseau nevertheless wrote that 
'Nous approchons de l’état de crise et du siècle des revolutions' (We are 
approaching the state of crisis and the century of revolutions) (Koselleck, 
1988, 159). Acknowledging the dualistic worldview of the Enlightenment, 
Koselleck offers us the following definition of criticism: 
 
[it] is the art of judging; its function calls for testing a given 
circumstance for its validity or truth, its rightness or beauty, so as to 
arrive at a judgement based on the insight won, a judgement that 
extends to persons as well. In the course of criticism, the true is 
separated from the false, the genuine from the spurious, the beautiful 
from the ugly, right from wrong (Koselleck, 1988, 103-104).  
 
What I have established until now is that there is a certain contiguity and 
intensification of two critical tendencies from the religious Reformation to 
the French Revolution. One of them praises the use of reason which has 
its own laws and norms, and becomes master of the world in a process 
that expels everything that cannot be known. The other constructs a field 
of moral opposition and dissent against earthly powers having as ally a 
rapidly shifting economic base. Enlightenment thinkers articulated these 
two tendencies as separate realms; the task of connecting them on the 
field of politics was delayed and delegated to the philosophy of history that 
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predicted a world to come. My argument is that this relation between 
epistemology, ethics and politics structures the development of the binary 
concept of critique throughout modernity. In the next subsections I want to 
explore how this relation unfolds in what I take to be three paradigmatic 
moments or 'venues' of modern critique: the philosophies of Immanuel 
Kant, Karl Marx, and the Frankfurt School. 
2.1. Venues of Critique: Immanuel Kant 
 
The epistemological meaning of critique derives from Kant's analyses of 
the categories of 'pure reason'. But what I want to do in this subsection is 
to show that the German philosopher's transcendental project illustrates 
precisely the argument which has been advanced above, that the meeting 
between reason and ethics in the field of politics is delayed and deferred; 
Kant's rational subject is the bourgeois subject, who masters the tools of 
critique but who, at the same time, fails to see that these are lethal 
weapons that throw the political order into a state of crisis. 
 Critique for Kant is the tool that establishes the conditions and 
possibilities of knowledge, meaning, at the same time, the limits of 
knowledge, what can be safely known and the border beyond which the 
reason falls into antinomies. Although the basic themes are there from the 
first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's notion of critique 
undergoes a certain refinement, which is visible when comparing the 
Prefaces of the 1781 and 1787 editions. Kant's declared aim is to submit 
to re-examination the legitimate use of reason in what constitutes the 
realm of metaphysics. Indeed, what he finds here is 'a battlefield of 
endless controversies' (Kant, 1998, AVIII, 99): dogmatism (the rationalist 
metaphysics of Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten), scepticism (Hume's 
criticism of the metaphysics of causality), empiricism (Locke) and the worst 
of all, 'indifferentism' had not been able to save reason from falling into 
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contradictions and obscurantism. But Kant sees his age as an epoch in 
which the power of judgement has ripened enough to be able to examine 
itself (Kant, 1998, AXII, 101). It is here where Kant articulates the first 
meaning of critique: critique as a tribunal, as a court of justice that 
examines the arguments of all the concerned metaphysical parties and 
draws an agreement. A court of justice, therefore, 'by which reason may 
secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, 
and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and 
unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure 
reason itself' (Kant, 1998, AXII, 101).  
 Perhaps in relation to what critique used to be for centuries, an 
appendix of hermeneutics and exegesis, Kant explains that by critique he 
does not understand a literary critique, a critique of 'books and systems', 
but a critique of the faculty of reason in general 'in respect of all the 
cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience, 
and hence the decision about the possibility or impossibility of a 
metaphysics in general' (Kant, 1998, AXII, 101). Pursuing the question 
'what and how much can understanding and reason cognize free of all 
experience' (Kant, 1998, AXVII, 103), Kant is preoccupied with the 
requirement that his investigation should take a scientific form (Kant, 1998, 
AXV, 102 – AXX, 104). Therefore, it eliminates everything that is a matter 
of hypothesis and opinion, and proceeds from certainty to certainty; it has 
discursive (logical) clarity and attempts to be a complete and 
comprehensive endeavour. Kant, indeed, hopes to have reworked 
metaphysics enough to have given it the structure of a science: 'it is 
nothing but the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered 
systematically. Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings 
forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason 
itself as soon as reason's common principle has been discovered' (Kant, 
1998,  AXX, 104).  
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 The scientificity of metaphysics is a theme that emerges in the 
second preface, which begins with an overview of the history of logic, 
mathematics and physics. The order of exposition is also the order of the 
sciences' degree of completeness. Through its clearly delimited 
boundaries, so that it can take no step backwards or forwards without 
damaging it, logic is the most complete of all. But it is so because in logic 
reason has to do only with itself, unlike mathematics and physics. But what 
is particularly interesting, for both of these, is that they could not have 
walked 'the secure path of science' without a certain revolution: Thales in 
mathematics and Bacon, Galileo, Toricelli and Stahl understood that 
'reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own 
design' (Kant, 1998, BXIII, 109), therefore, that reason has an active role 
in constituting its objects. Metaphysics, though older than logic, 
mathematics and physics, has not been able to follow the secure path of 
science. Building on the model of the sciences, Kant asks whether what 
metaphysics needs is not a certain revolution of its own. Indeed, an entire 
Copernican revolution – the second meaning of critique – may be needed: 
for just as Copernicus proposed that one needs to change the model when 
explaining celestial motion, assuming that the observer revolves while the 
stars were left at rest, so Kant would propose that the problems of 
metaphysics become easier if we assume that objects must conform to our 
cognition: 'If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then 
I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object 
(as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of 
intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself' (Kant, 
1998,  BXVI-XVII, 110). The ground of critique is, then, a radical break, an 
inversion of received models of viewing and thinking about the world.  
 Kant proceeds to show that the critique of pure reason with its 
outcome – that of specifying the limits of pure reason – does not have only 
a negative utility. It also has a positive utility: 
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when we become aware that the principles with which speculative 
reason ventures beyond its boundaries do not in fact result in 
extending our use of reason, but rather, if one considers them more 
closely, inevitably result in narrowing it by threatening to extend the 
boundaries of sensibility, to which these principles really belong, 
beyond everything, and so even to dislodge the use of pure (practical) 
reason (Kant, 1998, BXXIV-BXXV, 114).  
 
The positive utility of critique, then, is that it adds to the articulation, on 
secure foundations, of the realm of the ethical (practical reason). But when 
attempting to shape the bridge between scientific and ethical-political 
forms of thought, Kant explains this double sidedness of critique using a 
strange analogy. And perhaps a third meaning of critique can be identified 
here: critique as policing. Kant explains that 'to deny that this service of 
criticism is of any positive utility would be as much as to say that police are 
of no positive utility because their chief business is to put a stop to the 
violence that citizens have to fear from other citizens, so that each can 
carry on his own affairs in peace and safety' (Kant, 1998,  BXXV, 115). The 
theme of critique as police will return in the last section of this chapter, 
when I will comment on Michel Foucault's answers to the question 'What is 
Critique?' To anticipate, let us just observe how this modifies our 
perception of critique: the latter is not only the exercise of reason that 
frees itself from any guidance, but enacts a certain violence upon the 
object of its inquiry. 
 I have established, until now, what are the three meanings of 
critique in the Kantian project: critique as tribunal, critique as a revolution 
of our ways of viewing and thinking about the world, and critique as 
'policing' the correct uses of reason. The tools that critique offers, then, 
assures the consistency with which reason will submit everything to 
examination. It is true that religion 'through its holiness' and legislation 
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'through its majesty' seek to evade its inquiry. 'But in this way they excite a 
just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned 
respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its 
free and public examination'  (Kant, 1998, AXI, 100–101).  
 But what exactly is it that 'has been able to withstand [reason's] free 
and public examination?' I want to suggest that a particular reading of the 
last line of this Kantian fragment will give us an idea about how ambiguous 
and unresolved remains, for Kant, the relation between epistemology, 
ethics, and politics1. I want to connect, thus, Kant's exploration of the 
categories of pure reason with his small essay that addresses the question 
Was Ist Aufklärung? (What is Enlightenment?), which he published in 1784 
in the newspaper Berlinische Monatsschrift. As we have already observed, 
analysing the extent to which reason can be safely used has ethical 
consequences: the critique of pure reason will unfold principles that will be 
equally valid for practical reason (ethics). But Kant is particularly blind to 
the fact that once this critical pursuit is initiated, it would be difficult not to 
transform itself into political subversion and dissolution of the political 
order.  
 Kant answers that Enlightenment is 'man's release from his self-
incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his 
understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage 
when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and 
courage to use it without direction from another' (Kant, 1997, 29). The 
German philosopher argues that if each one of us has the ability to use 
reason, then the capacity to reason freely, without instruction or guidance, 
is not inherent in every human being. He points, therefore, to a certain 
pedagogy of understanding, structured by a hierarchical relation of power. 
On the contrary, he implies, freedom necessitates an act of courage; even 
                                            
1
 A similar argument is made by Foucault (1997, 47-49). 
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more, it needs a decision to untie the relationship of tutelage, and I 
assume that it is only through criticism (resolution) and self-criticism (of 
one's voluntary submission to a certain relation of power-knowledge) that 
one arrives at this decision. Enlightenment is then the exercise of freedom, 
'the freedom to make public one's use of reason at every point' (Kant, 
1997, 29). But how to solve this self-imposed task of freeing oneself and 
the fact that one needs to perform one's public duties as well? (e.g. serve 
the in the military, pay taxes, and even follow the Church). At this moment, 
Kant declares that he hears only one prince in the world saying 'Argue as 
much as you will and about what you will, but obey!' (Kant, 1997, 29). He 
was referring, of course, to Frederick II of Prussia. Kant would solve this 
dilemma by explaining that the public use of reason must always be free, 
whereas its private use may be restricted, without any loss to the progress 
of Enlightenment. But Kant here operates a strange choice of words:  
 
By the public use of one's reason I understand the use which a 
person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use 
I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office 
which is entrusted to him (Kant, 1997, 31).  
 
In other words, public criticism may be used in such a way and as long as 
it doesn't intervene in the daily affairs and structures of political power. 
This will allow Kant to formulate a concept of freedom apparently remote 
from any political application. For Kant, freedom is freedom from the 
causality of natural laws, and is governed by its own set of (rational) rules: 
it stems from the will’s capacity to give laws to itself. Therefore, the 
subject's autonomy is not contradictory to obeying the sovereign. It is thus 
no surprise that in politics the subject ends up by necessarily obeying the 
law of the ruler (with the provision that the latter needs, as well, to follow 
the principles of reason), whereas the pursuit of freedom remains an 
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entirely individual affair.  
 I explained, in this subsection, what meaning critique had for Kant. 
Critique as tribunal, as Copernican revolution and as police are part of the 
binary structure of Enlightened reasoning which separates that which it 
can and that which it cannot know. I also suggested that particularly Kant's 
project exposes what Koselleck describes as the hypocrisy of the 
bourgeois subject, which fails to acknowledge the political implications of 
critique, the fact that, once the powers of critique have been summoned, it 
became impossible to place limits on its dissolving effect of the political 
order. In the next subsection I want to investigate how Karl Marx 
articulates the intersection between epistemology, ethics and politics. 
2.2. Venues of Critique: Karl Marx 
 
If for Kant critique presupposed reason taking itself as the object of 
analysis, in order to reveal and separate its legitimate from its illegitimate 
uses, it could be said that with Karl Marx the political significance of 
critique is acknowledged and assumed. Critique's role in Marx's work is to 
direct reason's weapons towards the socio-economic and political reality, 
with the aim of revealing forms of exploitation and domination and the 
manner in which social-economic forces shape thought. 
 Critique and criticism were the words of the day during the period of 
Marx's philosophical education which passed through Hegel, Feuerbach, 
and the French socialists. Although the theme of criticism unifies Marx's 
youthful texts and his mature writings, (see the Introduction of Marx, 1978, 
XXIX) and although Marx wrote several 'critiques', few of them take 
critique itself as object of analysis with the clarity and concision of the 
September 1844 Letter to Arnold Ruge, later known under the title For a 
Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing. This was an open letter 
published in the Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbücher which Marx and Ruge 
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were editing at the time.  
 Marx's text begins by offering a diagnosis of the political climate of 
the time: repression, 'anarchy of the spirit', stupidity and political 
obedience characterize Germany, a situation which had become 
unbearable for independent minds. In this context, Marx launched a 
question that would later become symptomatic of the Marxian tradition: 
what is to be done? (Marx, 1978, 13) However, Marx would claim that it is 
not his intention to design the future and provide ready-made solutions: he 
rather emphasises that what needs to be done is precisely 'a ruthless 
criticism of everything existing, ruthless in two senses: the criticism must 
not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be' 
(Marx, 1978, 13). Perhaps this was a reaction against the half-baked 
criticism that the bourgeoisie had performed during the Enlightenment. 
The criticism of the bourgeoisie caused the downfall of the aristocracy; but 
the bourgeoisie itself hypocritically refused to pursue the exercise of 
criticism to its last conclusions. The manner in which Marx articulates his 
'ruthless criticism' already seems to announce the concatenation between 
what would emerge as a scientific method, the method of the critique of 
economy (its epitome would be reached in Capital, and included a reading 
of the classic economists, putting one next to another, in order to show 
their contradictions (Althusser, 2009)) and a political instrument of 
liberation, legitimizing the opposition against the powers that be. If 
anything, Marxian criticism is anti-dogmatic and takes into consideration 
two aspects: the reality of the social existence of the human being (what 
Marx calls the socialist principle) and the 'theoretical existence of men', 
which implied that religion, science, and all ideation of the human being 
needed to submit to criticism (Marx, 1978, 13).  
 By dogmatism Marx understood every ready-made project that is 
offered as an alternative to an existing social or theoretical reality. On the 
contrary, what the critic needs to do is 'start out by taking any form of 
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theoretical and practical consciousness and develop from the unique 
forms of existing reality the true reality as its norm and final goal' (Marx, 
1978, 14). In other words, if a new society is to unfold, its principles should 
be grounded in the practice of solving the contradictions and struggles of 
the actual reality one lives in. There are two domains, at least in Germany 
of the nineteenth century, where these struggles are visible: the political 
state and religion. For Marx, the critique of politics and religion is a way of 
identifying and connecting criticism with real struggles. 'Then we shall 
confront the world not as doctrinaires with a new principle: “Here is the 
truth, bow down before it!” We develop new principles to the world out of 
its own principles' (Marx, 1978, 14).  
 The ultimate goal of criticism is, writes Marx (Marx, 1978, 15), the 
reform of consciousness. A process of reform, therefore, which would help 
release consciousness from the traps it fell into. However, criticism does 
not reform consciousness by facing it with the prospects of a better world; 
it rather provides the tools with which consciousness becomes aware of its 
own practical and theoretical condition. The reform of consciousness, 
then, would be performed 'not through dogmas, but through analysing the 
mystical consciousness, the consciousness which is unclear to itself, 
whether it appears in religious or political form' (Marx, 1978, 15). Critique, 
then, discerns and separates 'true reality' from the reality mystified by 
politics and religion. It functions as well in the binary structure of 
Enlightenment's thought, in the logic of either/or. Critique is 
demystification, the revelation of a truth that has only been hidden: 'it is not 
a matter of drawing a great dividing line between past and future, but of 
carrying out the thoughts of the past [...] mankind begins no new work, but 
consciously accomplishes its old work' (Marx, 1978, 15).  
 If critique is to deliver the truth about mankind's existence, then it 
can do so only by clarifying to itself the meaning of its struggles and 
desires. Significantly, Marx designates this as the task of what he will call 
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critical philosophy. The theme will re-emerge a century later, in the 
program of the Frankfurt School, under the heading of critical theory. 
2.3. Venues of Critique: beyond Kantianism and Marxism (The 
Frankfurt School) 
 
With the notion of critical theory, the Frankfurt School attempted to take 
both Kantianism and Marxism one step further. What critical theory is 
emerges in Max Horkheimer's much celebrated text Traditional and Critical 
Theory (Horkheimer, 1972a). As he explains in the shorter 1937 Postscript 
(Horkheimer, 1972b), the difference between traditional theory and critical 
theory pertains to the difference between two ways of knowing: one is 
based on Descartes's Discourse on Method, the other one is based on 
Marx's critique of political economy (Horkheimer, 1972b, 244). They are 
distinguished by the manner in which they situate themselves in the 
particular historical reality from which they emerge. Horkheimer suggest 
that the former is employed by the specialized sciences and generates 
questions which acquire an a-temporal dimension, in that they are 
disengaged from the experience of the present day society. As a result, 
their findings are regarded as external to the manner in which these 
sciences are instrumentalized and put to use by modern industrial 
societies. Critical theory, on the contrary, has as a goal 'man's 
emancipation from slavery' (Horkheimer, 1972b, 246): they take as their 
objects men as producers of their own life and historical reality.  
 Traditional theory is connected to the natural sciences, for which 
'theory' is a corpus of propositions about a subject, the majority of which 
derive from a set of 'given' primary assumptions (Horkheimer, 1972a, 188). 
This corpus is supposed to map empirical facts. With a structure based on 
formal logic, and using procedures of induction and deduction, they 
manifest a tendency of being articulated as mathematical systems of 
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symbols (Horkheimer, 1972a, 190). This formalism is borrowed by the 
'sciences of man', particularly by sociology. But they show their alienation 
from real socio-historical processes as soon as the data they gather is 
manipulated so as to correspond to a set of hypotheses that the 
researcher formulates at the inception of her/his research: this process is 
driven by the demands of industry (Horkheimer, 1972a, 196). 
Methodologies of traditional theory are inseparably linked with the 
advances in modern technology (Horkheimer, 1972a, 194) that manipulate 
nature and society.  But this is hidden by the fact that traditional theory 
does not question the division of labour and the particular mode of 
production in the capitalist society (Horkheimer, 1972a, 197); for the 
bourgeois scientist, what Horkheimer perhaps ironically calls 'the savant', 
the facts of this world are simply given and must be accepted. Therefore, 
traditional theory complies with its designated place and connects to other 
activities of society in only a small degree. Furthermore, the bourgeois 
scientist seems to be blind that her/his activity of constructing hypothesis 
responds to a certain logic of demand and offer, which ultimately refer to 
the money-making machine of capitalism (Horkheimer, 1972a, 206).  
 In a Marxian vein, Horkheimer would contend that 'what is needed 
is a radical reconsideration, not of the scientist alone but of the knowing 
individual as such' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 199). To begin with, critical theory 
that provides the tools of this radical change of perspective tries to pull out 
itself from the complicity with theory's oppression. It does not stop at 
considering individual cases of abuse, but regards them as patterns of 
how the social structure is organized (Horkheimer, 1972a, 207). Again, 
echoing Marx's concept of critique, Horkheimer adds that critical theory 
does not have a project of its own which is established beforehand: on the 
contrary, 'it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, 
appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the 
present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions 
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about which one can do nothing' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 207). In other 
words, the critical attitude is distrustful of everything that takes the 
appearance of common-sense rules and norms of conduct. The principle 
that constitutes the guiding thread of critical theory is that the world is a 
product of the activity of a society as a whole. This has a twofold 
dimension: that facts have a social-historical character, on the one hand, 
and that the perceiving individual has also her/his own historicity, on the 
other (Horkheimer, 1972a, 200): 'the perceived fact is therefore co-
determined by human ideas and concepts, even before its conscious 
theoretical elaboration by the knowing individual' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 
201). This proposition challenges Kant's way of deferring critique's political 
consequences: if Kant highlights the primacy of the agency of human 
reason in establishing what appears as fact, Horkheimer argues that there 
is a mutual interdependence between social-historical reality and 
subjectivity. For the project of criticism, this implies that critique could be 
performed only from within the system it criticizes: it is what one would call 
an immanent critique (Berendzen, 2013, webpage); opposed to traditional 
theory, immanent critique assumes the contiguity of the researching 
subject with the object of her/his research. 
 But this implies, at the same time, surpassing the Cartesian (binary) 
distinction between thought and being (Horkheimer, 1972a, 233) that 
traditional theory still holds to. Indeed, critical theory promises to be the 
dialectical synthesis of theory and practice. But this dialectical process is 
not carried out without tension and contradiction: on the one hand, critical 
theory acknowledges the prevailing interpretation of facts, and its 
categories (work, value, productivity, etc.). But at the same time, this 
recognition is critical, insofar as it questions how these categories can be 
altered and society emancipated (Horkheimer, 1972a, 208). Operating with 
a concept of ‘a man as in conflict with himself’, critical theory condemns 
both the illusory autonomy and freedom of the bourgeois ego and the 
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fascist view of an individual as the expression of an already constituted 
society.  
 The subject of critical thinking, then, is constituted by the conflicts 
and contradictions that stem out of the relations among individuals, 
between individuals and social classes, and, finally, between individuals 
and social totality and nature (Horkheimer, 1972a, 211). It could be said 
that the abstract reason of traditional theory becomes critical reason when 
it acknowledges and assumes social struggle and emancipation. Echoing 
Marx's principles of a theory developing 'from the unique forms of existing 
reality the true reality as its norm and final goal', here is the place where 
the real function of the critical theorist emerges. Their task is to understand 
the meaning of the suffering of the oppressed and create 'a dynamic unity 
with the oppressed class, so that his presentation of societal contradictions 
is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a 
force within it to stimulate change' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 215).  
 Horkheimer is less optimistic than Marx about the oppressed 
classes' ability to perceive and understand their own situation. If for Marx 
the concern of articulating the idea of a 'reasonable organization of society 
that will meet the needs of the whole community' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 
213) emerges with necessity from amidst the ranks of the proletariat, 
Horkheimer suggests that 'the situation of the proletariat is, in this society, 
no guarantee of correct knowledge'. The proletariat might experience 
injustice and oppression; yet this awareness is prevented from becoming a 
social force by the differentiation of social structure and class interests. 
Therefore, if the critical theorist only expresses the feelings and ideas of 
one class (be that of the proletariat) she/he is no different than the 
traditional theorist; the task of the theorist is to elaborate on the 
significance of injustice and oppression, and give a hand to the oppressed 
in acquiring critical consciousness. In this process, the critical theorist 
might even have to oppose views coming from amongst the proletariat 
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(Horkheimer 1972a, 221). It could be said that the task of the critical 
theorist is the elaboration of a 'true reality’ corresponding to a society 
without injustice (Horkheimer, 1972a, 221). This critical elaboration of truth 
implies 'the unfolding of a single existential judgement' (Horkheimer, 
1972a, 227) by which Horkheimer means the grasping of 'the internal and 
external tensions of the modern era' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 227). The 
activity of the critical theoretician, then, becomes the epitome of truth:  
 
This truth becomes clearly evident in the person of the theoretician; 
he exercises an aggressive critique not only against the conscious 
defenders of the status quo but also against distracting, conformist, or 
utopian tendencies within his own household (Horkheimer, 1972a, 
216). 
 
One can observe already a tension in Horkheimer's elaboration of the 
concept of truth. On the one hand, one could identify in his text the 
dualism between 'existing reality' and 'true reality' and it seems that 
Horkheimer remains in the binary logic of either/or. But at the same time, 
Horkheimer emphasizes that the critical theorist does not come with pre-
formatted truths; on the contrary, and in a manner which, I suggest, 
already announces the Foucauldian concept of a 'regime of truth', truth is a 
matter of the production of critical analysis. This is to say that critical 
theory already marks a passageway from the logic of either/or to the logic 
of neither/nor or both/and that becomes possible with the dissolution of 
grand narratives. I will explain this phenomenon in the next section. 
Horkheimer maintains that the critical theorist is not the depository of an 
absolute truth. On the contrary, truth is the result of processes of criticism 
and self-criticism that are shaped by the development of social 
arrangements.  
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 When Horkheimer criticizes the formalistic concept of the mind, he 
would clarify that 'according to this concept there is only one truth, and the 
positive attributes of honesty, internal consistency, reasonableness, and 
striving for peace, freedom and happiness may not be attributed in the 
same sense to any other theory and practice' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 222). 
But every theory of society contains political motivations behind it, and 
therefore even the theory of the formalistic mind has its own political 
motivations. It seems that there is a certain conflict of truths, in which case 
'the truth of these must be decided not in supposedly neutral reflection but 
in personal thought and action, in concrete historical activity' (Horkheimer, 
1972a, 222).  
 This implies that truth is not eternally given, but it is articulated as 
the result of one's own socio-historical experience, critical consciousness 
and struggle for emancipation. At the same time, truth does not have a 
class-origin: Horkheimer would explain that in the eighteenth century truth 
was on the side of the economically developed bourgeoisie. Later, 
however, 'under the conditions of later capitalism and the impotence of the 
workers before the authoritarian state's apparatus of oppression, truth has 
sought refuge among small groups of admirable men' (Horkheimer, 1972a, 
237-238). Truth then has a certain relationship with critique and 
emancipation, in all its economic, social and political aspects. But at the 
same time, truth is a reflexive relation, since it must be exercised even in 
one's own 'household'.  
 In this section, I analysed the three paradigms that, I argue, have 
shaped the modern concept of critique. I was particularly interested in the 
type of logic that they exhibit, which I suggested to be structured by a 
binary operator of the type either/or. I also paid close attention to the 
manner in which this logic incorporates a political content, and I suggested 
that whereas Kant defers the political consequences of critique, Marx's 
project articulates the intersection between epistemology, ethics and 
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politics. At the same time, I identified in Horkheimer's account of critical 
theory a certain tension that regards the binary concept of critique. I 
suggested that critical theory represents a passageway to a type of logic 
that takes into account the singularity and difference of critique's iterations. 
In the next section I will develop an explanation of what exactly this logic 
amounts to. 
3. To Offer a Critique in the Present 
 
What I have done in this chapter, until now, is to explain that those 'old 
critical paradigms' refer to a certain binary concept of critique, which 
functions in the logic of either/or. Because there is an intimate connection 
between the 'spirit' of capitalism and critique and a close relation of 
symbiosis and cohabitation between institutions and critique, a different 
logic of critique is required, which is able to grasp the differential that 
escapes from processes of institutionalization. In other words, I am trying 
to articulate a concept of critique that is able to take into account 
singularity and difference. In this section I want to explore the dimensions 
of this logic. First, I want to explain why it is the case that the binary 
concept of critique is not able to respond properly to current social, 
economical and political displacements, and I will refer to critique's loss of 
foundations and the death of grand narratives. Then, I will refer to the 
poststructuralist philosophies of Foucault and Derrida that, I suggest, 
provide the theoretical elements that will help me shape the type of logic of 
critique that I am looking for. 
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3.1. The Loss of Common Norms 
 
In his history of critical thought, Eagleton (1984) argues that the very 
conditions of production that led to the victory of the bourgeoisie against 
the aristocracy were also responsible for the dissolution of the public 
sphere that it had initially created. Public sphere is a term that Eagleton 
borrows from Jürgen Habermas (1989), and refers to  
 
a realm of social institutions – clubs, journals, coffee houses, 
periodicals – in which private individuals assemble for the free equal 
interchange of reasonable discourse, thus welding themselves into a 
relatively cohesive body whose deliberations may assume the form of 
a powerful political force (Eagleton 1984, 9).  
 
It could also be said that the process of criticism, which the bourgeoisie 
endorsed against the old aristocracy, was like a child that turned, in the 
nineteenth century, against its parents (Eagleton, 1984, 21). To begin with, 
it would soon be revealed that the bourgeois public sphere was not 
structured by free, equal and reasonable exchange, since it excluded large 
segments of society: it was based on symbolic mutual recognition, which 
remained class based and ideological. The Industrial Revolution therefore 
triggered not only bourgeoisie's victory over Absolutism, but also the 
coming into existence of an industrial proletariat that will soon question the 
ideological foundations of this sphere. At the same time, market pressures 
sealed the fate of criticism's commodification: the competing political 
forces whose voices are to be heard in the epoch’s newspapers and 
pamphlets subdued it. One consequence is criticism's fragmentation into 
critical disciplines such as art criticism and hermeneutics; another is its 
enclosure in the spaces of universities, where it becomes an issue of 
merely academic concern. In other words, there is a tendency of the 
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nineteenth century, still visible today, which relates to the fact that criticism 
has less and less social relevance.  
 The gap between morality and politics, which Koselleck argued to 
be structural to the Enlightenment, grew wider. Critique progressively lost 
contact with moral issues; instead, art and literature would supplant ethical 
thinking with romanticism's support, loudly contesting the ravaging forces 
of capitalism. In this process, artists appropriated the idea of an 
autonomous space for art. But this idea would itself in turn be questioned, 
towards the turn of the twentieth century, even from within the art field 
itself. Artists of the avant-garde would declare their political allegiance to 
what some authors called the proletarian public sphere (see for example 
Negt and Kluge, 1993). But what this general dissolution of an allegedly 
homogenous public sphere amounts to, above all, is the disappearance of 
all 'common-sense' rules and criteria for critical assessment. 
 A proper place to understand this development is the field of art 
criticism. Art criticism is a discipline that emerged at the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. As an external 
observer of the art world, the art critic claimed for herself/himself the 
autonomous jurisdiction of criticizing the art on display in the century's 
salons. Her/his judgements were stated in the name of a public possessing 
a reasonable education and understanding of what good taste and 
aesthetic 'common sense' meant. Criticism was supposed to be professed 
from a distance that assured the lack of bias, interest and corruption. But it 
is with the avant-garde of the early twentieth century that the autonomy of 
the art critic is exposed as a matter of self-delusion: the art critic's claim of 
objective judgement proved to be an ideological mask in fact representing 
the interests of certain social classes. Boris Groys argued that the 
category of art criticism was suspended once the avant-garde brought 
forth its contempt for any actual, contemporary, notion of the public. 
Refusing to address an actual public, the avant-garde summoned a new 
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humanity, a possible humanity, for its reception. In other words, the 
function of an external observer that judges the work of art was, as it were, 
overtaken by the artwork itself that directs judgements and condemnations 
towards the public. 'In place of the critic in the name of society arose social 
critique in the name of art: the artwork doesn’t form the object of 
judgement but is instead taken as the point of departure for a critique 
aimed at society and the world' (Groys, 2008, 62–63). There is a mutation 
that takes place, from a society represented by the art critic who speaks in 
its name and judges whether an artwork follows common-sense norms, to 
an art which speaks not in the name of the public, but somewhat against it. 
Interior to this was a questioning of the social and cultural background of 
this public, whose representative the art critic claimed to be. Essentially, 
Groys points out that the avant-garde subverts the art critic's role, not by 
taking her/his place, but by contesting both her/his place and the public in 
the name of whom she/he speaks. It could be said, therefore, that the art 
critic remained without the object of her/his activity. 
 James Elkins observes a similar delegitimation of the art critic. He 
explains that art critics of the early nineteenth century were taken seriously 
by contemporaneous philosophers and writers (Elkins 2003, 7) and that 
before the first half of the twentieth century 'it was more common for critics 
to think on large scales, comparing their judgements on different 
occasions, or considering the difference between their positions and those 
of other critics' (Elkins 2003, 10). By comparison, art criticism today is in a 
worldwide crisis (Elkins 2003, 2): 'it is flourishing, but invisibly, out of sight 
of contemporary intellectual debates. It's ignored and yet has the market 
behind it' (Elkins 2003, 2). This observation is interesting, since it points to 
the manner in which, in our age, the commodification of criticism has been 
conducted to its extremes. The capitalist contradiction of art criticism refers 
to this: although there is a huge machine behind it which swallows 
significant economic resources – think of all the paper and ink used to print 
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catalogues, guiding tours, leaflets of virtually all the exhibitions in this 
world, and also of the hundreds, perhaps more, critical art journals out 
there on the market – art criticism has little relevance. This fact could not 
be alien to the tendency that 'in the last three or four decades, critics have 
begun to avoid judgements altogether, preferring to describe or evoke the 
art rather than say what they think of it' (Elkins 2003, 12).  
 I want to suggest that we can relate the phenomena described by 
Groys and Elkins to the dissolution of a presumably neutral public space of 
equal, free, and rational discussion and debate. Authors like Boris Buden 
doubt that it has ever existed (Buden and Morariu, 2007), events like the 
Yugoslavian war demonstrating that culture, education, and political 
upbringing shape subjectivity beyond levels of consciousness, up to the 
point where rational and equal discussion are not even much helpful in 
preventing humanitarian catastrophes. In this context, it would be 
interesting to ponder on the deeper significances of both the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment and of Critique and Crisis. 
 Adorno's and Horkheimer's work suggests the essential fact that the 
Enlightenment functions according to a fundamental logic of exclusion. On 
the one hand reason maps previously uncharted territories, establishing 
the limits of what can be known; but on the other hand it downgrades and 
represses the unknown to the status of the inessential, irrational, marginal 
and unworthy of consideration. What the two authors convincingly argue is 
that what the Enlightenment expels nevertheless remains embedded in 
the structure of reason: 'the myths which fell victim to the enlightenment 
were themselves its product' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 5). The 
dialectic of Enlightenment follows a certain logic of violent repression, 
wherein the repressed haunts like a ghost, returning at times: the moment 
one celebrates reason’s power, superstition returns through the back door. 
In other words, Enlightenment and rationality have themselves a mythical 
structure. Thus, the apparently innocent path of enlightened reasoning is, 
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on the contrary, dominated by the negativity of fear: 
 
Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer 
anything unknown. This has determined the path of 
demythologization, of enlightenment, which equates the living with the 
nonliving as myth had equated the nonliving with the living. 
Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalised (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
2002, 11). 
 
The pattern of this fear-driven behaviour is readable in all those 
apparatuses of domination: domination of nature, but also domination of 
the human being by the human being (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 
xvii). If the source of fear is the very existence of an outside, then there 
must be no outside: the flip coin of the myth of progress is the domination 
of the outside, where the other is enslaved, exploited and exterminated. 
The two authors explain that enlightened thinking is intimately connected 
with a pursuit for freedom in society (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, xvi). 
But this triggered, at the same time, a loss of freedom: the epitome of the 
Enlightenment's self-destruction was reached in the 'nationalist paranoia' 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, xvi), the Nazi death camps, but also the 
emergence of cultural industry.  
 From an alternative perspective, Koselleck's book (Koselleck, 1988) 
refers as well to Enlightenment's fundamental failure. Both his book's 
subtitle, Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society and its 
Introduction indicate that his work attempts to construct a genealogy of the 
present. The said pathogenesis refers to the fact that the modern world 
was unable to solve the cleavage between ethics and politics, and that it 
was not capable of acknowledging and translating into concrete political 
practice the critical conscience of crisis. Instead, it took refuge, at times 
hypocritically, into utopian philosophies of history that inevitably had to 
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compete against each other. In the Preface to the English Edition, 
Koselleck explained that his study attempted to examine the historical 
preconditions of German National Socialism, whose 'loss of reality and 
Utopian self-exaltation had resulted in hitherto unprecedented crimes' 
(Koselleck, 1988, 1). Another significant contextual element was the Cold 
War and its Utopian roots which, writes Koselleck, prevented U.S.A. and 
the U.S.S.R. from recognizing each other as opponents: ‘instead they 
blocked one another and thereby destroyed the opportunity for a peace 
which each superpower self-confidently proclaimed to be capable of 
establishing single-handedly' (Koselleck, 1988, 1).  
 The reason why the binary concept of criticism, therefore, is not 
adequate to respond to current social arrangements is that it functions 
according to a logic which expels and destroys that which it promises to 
emancipate and liberate. I believe that Adorno, Horkheimer and Koselleck 
point precisely to the fundamental failure of enlightened critique, and to its 
incapacity of conceptualizing difference. Instrumentalized in repressive 
ideologies, or in hypocritical ideological battles, critique's grounds have 
been deligitimized. 
3.2. A Critique that Acknowledges Singularity and Difference 
 
But how will the delegitimation of the binary concept of critique conduct to 
a new type of conceptualization? We could observe, from the outset, that 
the necessity of this new critique triggered, to paraphrase Kant, its own 
Copernican revolution of the ways in which we see and understand the 
world. It was about this revolution of parallax that Michel Foucault spoke in 
his 1976 lectures at the College de France, when he described 'what has 
been happening for some time now (the last ten-fifteen years)'. He pointed 
out to his students the  
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immense and proliferating criticizability of things, institutions, 
practices, and discourses; a sort of general feeling that the ground 
was crumbling beneath our feet, especially in places where it seemed 
most familiar, most solid, and closest [nearest] to us, to our bodies, to 
our everyday gestures (Foucault, 2003, 6).  
 
This statement was describing an age in which everything submitted to the 
process of criticism; but criticism itself was put under scrutiny, and perhaps 
this was part of the reason why the 'ground was crumbling beneath our 
feet'. To understand what happened 'before' and 'after' one could turn to 
Foucault's Preface to Deleuze's and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. Here 
Foucault explained that in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War there was a 'certain way of thinking correctly, a certain style of political 
discourse, a certain ethics of the intellectual' (Foucault, 2000, xi), all of 
which were intimately connected with Marxist terminology, with Marxism in 
general (and, for the matter, Freudianism). They were 'correct' in the sense 
that any 'serious' analysis of society in general could not do without them. 
But then came 'five brief, impassioned, jubilant, enigmatic years' (1965-
1970). Enigmatic because, writes Foucault, the Anti-Vietnam movement 
triggered a major blow against all powers, that no one seems to have 
expected. But in parallel, 'inside our walls' another phenomenon was 
unfolding: 'an amalgam of revolutionary and antirepressive politics; a war 
fought on two fronts: against social exploitation and psychic repression; a 
surge of libido modulated by the class struggle' (Foucault, 2000, xi). The 
momentous difference that these passionate years brought forth, with their 
sexual revolution, anti-war rhetoric, and student revolts, amounted to 'a 
movement toward political struggles that no longer conformed to the 
model that Marxist tradition had prescribed; toward an experience and a 
technology of desire that were no longer Freudian' (Foucault, 2000, xii). In 
other words – and this was what essentially Anti-Oedipus was doing – all 
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of a sudden there were the resources and the will to articulate new forms 
of social and political struggle which exceeded old categories of critical 
thought. The old categories appeared, as it were, anachronistic, unable to 
respond to the decade's transformations. Therefore, when Foucault spoke 
to the College in 1976, he noticed a shift in the scope and the manner in 
which the concept of critique was articulated, from a critique performed in 
the name of grand utopian narratives, to a critique that pays attention to 
the singularity and difference of the situation in which it is applied. 
Furthermore, Foucault contended that older critical instruments needed a 
radical update, for they had even reached that point where they proved to 
be obstacles in the way of contesting power: facing the 'astonishing 
efficacy of discontinuous, particular, and local critiques', by which I 
understand the singularity of each of critique's iterations in different 
contexts, it has also been revealed 'what might be called the inhibiting 
effect specific to totalitarian theories, or at least – what I mean is – all-
encompassing and global theories' (Foucault, 2003, 6). However, it is not 
as if Marxism and such theories can't provide tools that can be used at the 
local level. They still can, but only provided that 'the theoretical unity of 
their discourse is, so to speak, suspended, or at least cut up, ripped up, 
torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced, caricatured, dramatized, 
theatricalized, and so on' (Foucault, 2003, 6). In other words: a 
deconstruction of Marxism's2 and Freudianism's theoretical unity.  
 I suggest that Foucault's considerations need to be understood from 
within the perspectives of critical theory. I see them as the necessary 
continuation – perhaps as a critique pursued to its last consequences – of 
the obvious pessimism concerning the role of the proletariat that 
Horkheimer formulated in Traditional and Critical Theory and also of 
Adorno's and Horkheimer's assessment of the failure of Enlightenment in 
                                            
2
 In chapter six I examine in detail the relation between deconstruction and Marxism. 
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the death camps of Auschwitz. The manifest closeness of Foucault's and 
the Frankfurt School's discourses refers to the fact that they both remain in 
the realm of an immanent type of critique. Foucault and his generation – 
what has been later known as poststructuralism – only refine the already 
existing tendency of distrusting grand narratives and what I explained to 
be the binary concept of critique. Foucault's is an immanent critique, 
nevertheless informed by theory, but which tackles the singularity and 
difference of the situation in which it emerges. Theory, in his view, should 
resemble 'a sort of autonomous and noncentralized theoretical production, 
or in other words a theoretical production that does not need a visa from 
some common regime to establish its validity' (Foucault, 2003, 6). 
 But assuming and accepting a critical inquiry that takes hold of 
singularity and difference, presupposes a series of changes, at the same 
time, in what amounts to the position of the critic in the field of her/his 
investigation. If the dual and binary world-view of the modern concept of 
critique determines that the critic's position is 'outside' of its object of 
inquiry, a concept of critique that is able to grasp singularity and difference 
generates a transformation of position. One finds a clear expression of this 
shift in Irit Rogoff's (2008) concept of criticality. Rogoff begins by observing 
not only the practical impossibility of formulating criticism as a completely 
separate realm from the object criticized, but also our participation in, and 
active transformation of it: 'we now recognize not just our own imbrication 
in the object or the cultural moment, but also the performative nature of 
any action or stance we might be taking in relation to it' (Rogoff, 2008, 97). 
The term 'performative' should be understood in the context of our 
discussion about speech acts in the previous chapter. This is to say that 
every act of criticism modifies the object of criticism, in a single act of 
knowledge production. Rogoff suggests that within a period of a couple of 
decades we have moved 'from criticism to critique to criticality' (Rogoff, 
2008, 99).  
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 Rogoff associates criticism with an activity of finding fault, and 
critique with an inquiry of the assumptions on which something appears as 
having a convincing logic. Historically, however, criticism and critique are 
two terms that have been used indiscriminately, and my use of the two 
terms in this thesis makes no distinction. But even if this distinction is open 
to debate, I think that what is new in Rogoff's suggestion is the very 
concept of criticality that, as a matter of novelty, is articulated in the 
absence of any commonly shared norms and foundations. Criticality, then, 
has an uncertain ground that 'while building on critique, wants 
nevertheless to inhabit culture in a relation other than one of critical 
analysis; other than one of illuminating flaws, locating elisions, allocating 
blames' (Rogoff, 2008, 99-100). So instead of refusing culture, criticality 
operates virally, 'inhabiting' culture, installing itself in its nodal points, and 
transforming its genetic codes. I think that criticality is the momentous 
development of what Foucault described as 'happening for some time 
now': a critique of existing theoretical frameworks, a certain undoing of old 
structures of thought while building on new ones:  
 
Criticality [...] is precisely in the operations of recognizing the 
limitations of one’s thought, for one does not learn something new 
until one unlearns something old, otherwise one is simply adding 
information rather than rethinking a structure (Rogoff, 2008, 99).  
 
But it is not as if the notion of criticality gets rid, in one movement, of all 
that we learned from Kant and Marx. Criticality is still in pursuit of the limits 
of one's knowledge, still questions the limitations of knowledge or the 
authority that legitimizes knowledge, and still speaks from the position of 
the dispossessed. However, in comparison to criticism and critique, it 
operates a series of core transformations. First, the historical specificity of 
the object of study comes only second after the historical specificity of the 
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he/she/they doing the studying (Rogoff, 2008, 101). This shift informs a 
concept of culture that, losing all ground and fixity of position, is based on 
negotiation and translation of the singularities of the social, economic, 
politic and cultural backgrounds involved. Second, what has been given up 
is the very notion of a methodology, or, to put it in other terms, of a certain 
manner of approaching the object of study, which rested on the 'the 
certainty of an approach, of a problematic, of a set of analytical frames 
which we can use to tackle whatever issue of problematic we are 
preoccupied with' (Rogoff, 2008, 102). Third – and this refers again to the 
clarity and completeness that critique used to provide (remember Kant and 
his self-assessment of the methodology of the Critique of Pure Reason) - 
Rogoff suggests that the notion of a clearly demarcated subject of 
research is a thing of the past: we are in a phase when it is very difficult to 
suppress doubts of what a work is 'really' about (Rogoff, 2008, 102). Here 
she speaks from her experience as a PhD supervisor. But significantly, 
Rogoff doesn't see this as a shortcoming of criticality, and suggests that it 
is perhaps better if, rather than asking about the meanings that a subject 
of work uncovers, one asks about what the work produces 'of what effects 
it has in the world' (Rogoff, 2008, 104).  
 What motivates this shift is the growing importance of the question 
'what comes after critique?' Finding similar concerns in Conceptual Art, 
Rogoff argues in favour of a performative 'cultural making' that goes 
beyond critical analysis towards the 'possible imagining of an alternative 
formulation, an actual signification of that “disrupted-through-analysis” 
cultural phenomenon' (Rogoff 2008, 104). Significantly – at least for the 
conceptual affinities it has with the present research on institutional 
critique – Rogoff argues that what remains essential in the processes of 
criticality is a certain concern for 'unfitting' ourselves, for making ourselves 
unfit in the structures and disciplines wherein we carry out our critical 
enterprise and which might eventually capture us (Rogoff, 2008, 105). She 
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speaks as a pioneer in what is known as the discipline of visual culture; 
from this position she observes the rapid institutionalization and 
canonization of the discipline's subject. Unfitting is, as she explains, not far 
from a certain understanding of Derrida's concept of deconstruction. It 
seems to me that it refers to a certain mobility of thought and action, a 
certain moving back and forth over a field's boundaries, and a certain 
disposition of 'undoing' old hierarchies and framing new zones of 
knowledge production. The fourth and the fifth chapters of this thesis move 
precisely in this direction: they show that institutional critique, with its 
subversion of topological binaries (inside-outside), its continuous de-
framing and re-framing, and, most importantly, with its preoccupation with 
what comes after critique, operate with a critical logic that amounts to 
deconstruction.   
 But then, what is to offer a critique in the present? I believe that the 
concept of critique that we use in the present articulates itself at the 
crossing point of certain critical genealogies. Until now I talked about the 
Kantian and Marxian paradigms of critique, about their synthesis in the 
work of the Frankfurt School, and about the shift from master (critical) 
narratives towards a concept of critique that recognizes singularity and 
difference, and that 'inhabits' in a certain way the structures that it 
criticizes. But we see ourselves facing the following problem: how can we 
have a theory of critique – thus something that is possible only if we are 
capable of grasping the 'identity', the 'general patterns' of critique – if 
critique unravels itself to be possible only as taking hold of difference and 
singularity? In other words, what do these patterns of critique amount to if 
critique is in each instance singular and differential? My aim in the next 
subsection is to provide an answer to this question. 
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3.3. The Undecidability of Critique: Towards Deconstruction 
 
I would begin to answer this question by introducing some of Michel 
Foucault's remarks from his 1978 lecture entitled What Is Critique? 
(Foucault, 1997). Foucault proposes here that there is a unity in critique, in 
spite of the fact that 'by its very nature, by its function, I was going to say, 
by its profession, it seems to be condemned to dispersion, dependency 
and pure heteronomy' (Foucault, 1997, 42). This identity of critique that 
survives its heterogenous iterations is the very fact that critique is a 
function, a relation to something other than itself:  
 
it is an instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not know 
nor happen to be, it oversees a domain it would want to police and is 
unable to regulate. All this means that it is a function which is 
subordinated in relation to what philosophy, science, politics, ethics, 
law, literature, etc. positively constitute (Foucault, 1997, 42).  
 
There are two important aspects that emerge from this statement. The first 
one refers to critique's relation to truth; the other one to critique's 
ambiguous relationship with its object of inquiry. Describing what amounts 
to critique's relation to truth, Foucault has convincingly argued throughout 
his work that truth is not something that awaits discovery, or something 
hidden that needs to be revealed, but rather something which is produced 
through various kinds of technologies which serve the dynamic of power. 
Truth is not 'the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor 
the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. [...] [It] 
is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces 
regular effects of power' (Foucault 1984, 72–73). This is the reason why 
Foucault talks about 'regimes of truth' rather than about truth in itself. A 
regime of truth generates discourses about truth, the frames that allow one 
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to discern between truth and falsity, it produces the authority that sanctions 
something as true and the place of that authority in society:  
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that 
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; 
the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true 
and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true 
(Foucault, 1984, 73).  
 
Therefore, critique is intimately connected to truth, in the sense that 
critique contributes to the articulation of truth. But if truth is the product of a 
regime of truth, and critique participates in the production of truth, then it 
could be said that critique is also part of a regime of truth3. This implies 
that, on the one hand, critique is relative to a certain regime of truth; and, 
on the other hand, that it co-participates in the production of truth. In other 
words, critique must be both inside and outside, or neither inside, nor 
outside of a regime of truth, as well as being specific and differential in 
each of its iterations. Its participation in the production of truth refers to the 
manner in which it negotiates its relation of subordination and dependency 
on its object: more precisely, how it will accept or contest the regimes of 
truth that the fields of philosophy, science, politics, ethics, law and 
literature articulate. This is to say that critique doesn't have a truth of its 
own, not in a particular regime of truth, nor a 'universal' truth across 
various regimes of truth. Critique contributes to the overall production of 
truth in a regime of truth. It also enacts a certain power effect that plays a 
certain part in the overall production of power in a regime of truth-power.  
                                            
3
 If the job of an institution is to construct a certain regime of truth about the 'whatness' of what is, 
then arguing via Foucault, that critique is produced in a regime of truth is none other than arguing 
that between institutions and critique there is a necessary relation of symbiosis and cohabitation. 
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 But precisely because of this co-participation in the production of a 
truth, that it does not know beforehand, but only produces, as it were, 'as it 
goes along', critique has an ambiguous, one can even say a bastard 
relationship with its object. On the one hand critique, through its 
conceptual essence, exercises a certain violence upon its object: and I 
already referred this fact at the end of the second chapter, when I 
proposed that critique could fall prey to the lure of saying the 'whatness' of 
what is as if that is all that there is. In other words, critique could 
reproduce the violence of the logic of that which it criticizes. Foucault tells 
us that it 'polices' its object, that it wants to 'regulate' its object. And from 
this point of view critique is a foe, an adversary, a contestant. It wants to 
use a force that Foucault does not shy away from comparing it to the 
repressive force of police. But at the same time it discovers that it is 
unable to do so, precisely because it is always in a relation of precarious 
subordination: critique is dependent on what its object positively 
constitutes and institutes. It could be said, then, that critique is both violent 
and docile, both repressive and repressed, both collaborator and 
dissident. And I want to suggest that there is no way to decide between 
these alternatives, in a logic of the type either/or, and no way to unite them 
in a dialectical synthesis. In other words, the logic of such a critique is 
'undecidable' in the sense that its value is both produced and destroyed by 
its relations to its other. To anticipate a theme that I will develop properly in 
the sixth chapter of this work, I will limit myself here to iterating what 
Derrida understands through this concept:  
 
 
unities of simulacrum, false 'verbal' properties (nominal or semantic) 
that can no longer be included in philosophical (binary) opposition, 
but which however, inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and 
disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever 
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leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics 
(Derrida, 1982, 43).  
 
The logic of critique that I advocate, and that, in chapter six, I will 
associate with Derrida's project of deconstruction, allows critique to inhabit 
its object in a manner that keeps intact an undecidable relationship of both 
adversity and collaboration, a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and 
which is not and could not be decided in a dialectical synthesis.   
 To connect Derrida and Foucault on matters of critique might seem 
a little daring, if not blasphemy, given that on numerous public occasions 
they have indeed given expression to their intellectual incompatibility. But I 
believe that we do find grounds in Foucault's text to legitimate such a 
reading. Foucault attempts to locate something akin to critique that installs 
itself between 'the high Kantian enterprise and the little polemical activities 
that are called critique' (Foucault, 1997, 42), something that the French 
philosopher describes as 'the critical attitude'. The origins of this attitude 
date back to a period to which I referred in the first section of this chapter, 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries dominated by the protestant 
contestation of the Catholic Church's tradition of reading the Scriptures. 
The 'singular and quite foreign to ancient culture' idea (Foucault, 1997, 43) 
that the Church proposed was that the path to salvation couldn't be walked 
by the believer alone, but only in conjunction with a certain guidance, a 
certain wilful relation of obedience to a representative of the Church. In 
other words, the Church developed an art of governing men which was 
enacting, at the same time, a certain regime of truth:  
 
truth understood as dogma, truth also to the degree where this 
orientation implies a special and individualizing knowledge of 
individuals; and finally, in that this direction is deployed like a 
reflective technique comprising general rules, particular knowledge, 
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precepts, methods of examination, confessions, interviews, etc. 
(Foucault, 1997, 43).  
 
This art of governing men was developed in a context which preceded the 
Reformation and which sees an explosion of the arts of governmentality 
(the art of pedagogy, the art of politics, the art of economics) and of an 
entire series of institutions for governing in Western Europe. Foucault 
suggests that 'how to govern?' became one of the fundamental questions 
of the time (Foucault, 1997, 44). But this regime of truth whose essence is 
the refinement of an art of governing men did not go unchallenged; the 
French author argues that it cannot be dissociated from another type of 
question: 'how not to be governed?'  Foucault does not suggest, however, 
that the critical impulse was dominated by an anarchical thrust. The critical 
question was not 'how not to be governed at all', but rather 'how not to be 
governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and 
such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, 
not for that, not by them' (Foucault, 1997, 44). The emphasis falls on the 
syntagm 'like that', which attempts to avoid a conceptual dualism and 
opens what Gerald Raunig calls 'a space of instituent practices' or, with his 
own words, 'a permanent process of instituting' (Raunig, 2009, 4). From 
this point of view, Luther's Reformation can be seen as an instituent 
practice.  
 Inherent to this critical attitude are three anchoring points that 
virtually transform themselves into definitions of critique. I have discussed 
the first point when I approached Reformation's relationship to the Catholic 
Church. In this case, Foucault explains that not to be governed like that 
presupposed 'a certain way of refusing, challenging, limiting ecclesiastical 
rule [and] returning to the Scriptures, seeking out what was authentic in 
them, what was really written in the Scriptures' (Foucault, 1997, 45). One 
could call the second point 'the legal issue': it concerns what appears as 
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law. Not to be governed like that means, in this case, 'not to accept these 
laws because they are unjust because […] they hide a fundamental 
illegitimacy' (Foucault, 1997, 46). Finally, the third definition of critique 
refers to not accepting something as true, 'what an authority tells you is 
true, […] but rather accepting it only if one considers valid the reasons for 
doing so' (Foucault, 1997, 46). I understand the 'the legal issue' and 
critique's questioning of truth precisely in the light of what has been said in 
chapter two; there is an intention invested in the instituting act and, 
therefore, in law and in 'true' descriptions and definitions that accompany 
law, an intention to determine exhaustively the 'whatness' of what is as if 
that is all that there is. But the total actualization of intention in the act of 
instituting is necessarily impossible. Not to be governed like that means, 
then, precisely the grasping of the differential that escapes the act of 
instituting. Critique, in this sense, exposes the limits of the power of 
instituting and of the power of 'law' and 'truth'.  
 The identity of critique, then, despite its multiple iterations, refers to 
the critical attitude: Foucault argued that it contains something 'akin to 
virtue' (Foucault, 1997, 43). It refers to the inauguration 'of both a moral 
and political attitude' (Foucault, 1997, 45) and Judith Butler comments that 
this has to do with 'objecting to that imposition of power, to its costs, to the 
way in which it is administered, to those who do that administering' (Butler, 
2002, 218). The virtue, then, of the critical attitude is that it is able to face 
the arts of governing  
 
as both partner and adversary [...] as an act of defiance, as a 
challenge, as a way of limiting these arts of governing and sizing 
them up, transforming them, of finding a way to escape from them or, 
in any case, a way to displace them, with a basic distrust, but also 
and by the same token, as a line of development of the arts of 
governing (Foucault, 1997, 44-45).  
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In this single quotation one already finds a consistent number of themes 
on the margins of which deconstruction (and here I refer mainly to the 
writings of Jacques Derrida) has commented: the idea of something which 
exists as 'supplement' and 'compensation', the transformation of limits, the 
concept of escaping, the idea of re-framing a context wherein one fails to 
find familiarity and, finally, the idea of an intimate collaboration with the 
very structures that one criticizes up to the point where both become 
unrecognizable. In the fourth and fifth chapter I will show that these 
themes belong to the practice of institutional critique, and I will particularly 
concentrate on the oppositions between inside/outside and work/frame. As 
the narrative thread progresses, the last chapter will properly articulate this 
quite singular meeting between institutional critique and deconstruction. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The thesis of this chapter is that there is a need to reconceptualize what 
we understand by critique if we are to avoid the dilemma with which the 
'new spirit' of capitalism challenges artistic critique. Consequently, I 
explained that we need to move away from the binary logic of critique of 
the type either/or and adopt a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and that 
would be able to grasp singularity and difference. It is the very logic with 
which critique can challenge institutional totalisation. In chapter two I 
explained, following Derrida, that the iterability of a sign 'divides its own 
identity a priori', that a sign retains both a sameness and a difference in its 
multiple iterations. If this is true, then we can explain now what is identity 
and what is difference in the meaning of the sign 'critique'. I argued, 
following Foucault, that despite its 'dispersion and pure heteronomy' the 
identity of critique rests on the critical attitude, an attitude of being both 
partner and adversary of the powers that be. And essentially, I argued, this 
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attitude is connected to the logic I have been after, a logic of the type 
neither/nor or both/and that finds no resolution in a dialectical synthesis. If 
this is the identity of critique, then what is different about it is that every 
time that it will occur, in all of its iterations, it does not appeal to ready-
made 'critical recipes', but has to start anew, each and every time, the 
labour of critique. In the next two chapters I will seek to explain how this 
logic applies to two pairs of antinomies that have emerged in the discourse 
of institutional critique: the opposition between the inside and the outside 
of the art institution, and the opposition between artwork and institutional 
frame. 
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Chapter IV: 
The Topology of Institutional Critique: neither Outside nor 
Inside or both Outside and Inside 
Introduction 
 
In the previous three chapters I explained that the labour of re-
conceptualizing the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique will 
have to question institutional critique’s own logic. Asking what this logic 
amounts to, in the second and third chapters I proposed an analysis of the 
logic of instituting and of critique. I argued that we need to move away 
from the binary logic of critique of the type either/or and built on the 
necessary failure of the totalising act of instituting, which invents rule and 
law. The fundamental iterability of the sign assures that a differential ‘rest’ 
always escapes and evades the total institutional determination of 
meaning. By following Foucault, I explained that the identity of critique 
resides in the critical attitude, which is a relation to something other than 
itself (the institution); and I suggested that the logic able to grasp the 
'hermeneutical contradiction' between what is recuperated in the act of 
instituting and what escapes it presupposes a relation of being, at the 
same time, partner and adversary of the powers that be. Therefore: if 
something like critique is to come into existence, it does so through a logic 
of the type either/or or both/and; this implies that between institution and 
critique, and, I added, between the art institution and institutional critique, 
there is a necessary relation of symbiosis and cohabitation. 
 In addition to what has been shown until now allow me to observe 
further that the ways in which the canon of institutional critique has been 
established are based, in great measure, on the binary concept of critique. 
The first wave of institutional critique is said to have attempted to escape 
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to an outside of the art institution, whereas the second wave realized that it 
has been trapped in the inside of the institution all along. It appears, thus, 
that institutional critique's alternatives belong to either an outside or an 
inside of the art institution. In this chapter I argue that, on the contrary, this 
binary topology of critique does not apply to institutional critique. How is, 
then, a topology of institutional critique possible, if institutional critique will 
acknowledge the fundamental relation of symbiosis and cohabitation 
between institution and critique? I want to show that, from the point of view 
of a binary topology of critique, what institutional critique inhabits is a non-
space: institutional critique is and ought to be neither inside nor outside, or 
both inside and outside, at the same time, of the institution. 
 I will develop my argument by proceeding from what I have 
perceived as a recent tendency in the art field: it praises the virtues of an 
outside of the art institution1, and suggests that this is the only place where 
critical art can engage with the 'urgencies' of society, a possibility 
otherwise refused if art remains in its institutional 'ghetto'. I analyse the 
circumstances of this tendency in the first section of this chapter. In the 
second section I will show that, parallel to this suggestion, there are 
arguments proposing that it is impossible for art to engage the urgencies 
of the social reality as art outside of the art institution. Here I will 
particularly focus on Andrea Fraser's text, From the Critique of Institutions 
to an Institution of Critique, which argues that the institution of art is 
embodied in our perceptions and habits, and that there is no way to 
escape to an outside without carrying the structures of the art field with us. 
In the third section I will develop my main argument: institutional critique is 
and ought to be thought as a non-place which is neither inside, nor 
outside, or both inside and outside of the art institution. Moreover, I will 
argue that if critical and political art's reasons to escape the art institution 
                                            
1
 I understand the term 'art institution' in the sense in which I defined it in chapter two, and namely 
as the bodiless being that states the 'whatness' of what art is. 
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refer to the fact that its meanings are neutralized by the same forces which 
generate the urgencies of the social-economical fields, then the only way 
in which art can have an effect outside of the art institution is to occupy 
this non-place and become, at the same time, an institutional critique. In 
other words, the potential of critical and political art, of responding to 
urgencies deriving from the social and economic reality, is fulfilled only 
when they articulate themselves, at the same time, as an institutional 
critique.  
 
1. The Seductiveness of the Outside 
 
In this section I want to show that the idea of an outside of the art 
institution, towards which a socially and politically engaged art should 
escape, still seduces many of the practitioners of the art field. I would 
begin by recounting the twisted effect that Benjamin Buchloh sought with 
his declaration that a certain set of critical artistic practices and positions, 
exhibiting a 'model of critical resistance and radical negativity' had come to 
an end. I proposed that Buchloh's text, in fact, amounts to a 
deconstruction of its own declaration; that it described a certain end which 
is about to come, but is not there yet. And that it is precisely this space of a 
gap between what is and what is about to come that institutional critique 
has occupied during the 2000s. But at the end of this decade we identify 
another set of similar declarations disseminated in the art realm, as if the 
gap has shortened and, indeed, what was about to come has already 
arrived. This time, however, these declarations surprisingly come from 
supporters of what was to replace what Buchloh declared as finished: a 
depoliticised and disengaged art in search of pure aesthetics and a secure 
place on the art market.  
 
 In October 2012 an article in The Guardian announced that 
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American critic and author David Hickey was walking away from the art 
world, which he described as 'calcified, self-reverential and a hostage to 
rich collectors who have no respect for what they are doing: “Art editors 
and critics – people like me – have become a courtier class. All we do is 
wander around the palace and advise very rich people. It's not worth my 
time.”' (Helmore and Gallagher, 2012, webpage). Julian Stallabrass 
observed, however, that Hickey, once a dealer, was one of the main 
supporters of a 'cheery, market-friendly prettiness in art' and that he had 
always been critical of the 'dreary run of grim and grimy politicised art 
found in public spaces and on the biennial scene' (Stallabrass, 2012, 
webpage). Stallabrass explained that Hickey's statement should be 
compared with Charles Saatchi's from 2011, in which he denounced 'the 
hideousness of the art world'. Saatchi contended that being an art buyer 
these days 'is comprehensively and indisputably vulgar […] even a self-
serving narcissistic show-off like me finds this new art world too toe-curling 
for comfort' (Saatchi, 2011, webpage). The 'new art world' refers, in this 
case, to the 'Eurotrashy, Hedge-fundy, Hamptonites; [to the] trendy 
oligarchs and oiligarchs; [and to] art dealers with masturbatory levels of 
self-regard' (Saatchi, 2011, webpage). Stallabrass proposes that such 
statements amount to a failure of 'seeing oneself as others see you': for 
Saatchi was indeed one of the main characters responsible for how the art 
world looks today, precisely the art world he doesn't like any more. Hans 
Haacke made a range of works in the 1980s focusing precisely on how 
Saatchi's position in the Boards of Trustees of the Tate and Whitechapel 
Gallery allowed him to establish the public agenda of these institutions, 
and ultimately manipulate the market value of artists that he collected. 
Haacke's Taking Stock (1983-1984) and The Saatchi Collection 
(Simulations) (1987) had also suggested that one should not divorce 
Saatchi's promotion of a certain artistic discourse from the fact that his 
advertising companies created the image of the Conservative Party and of 
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the apartheid regime of South Africa (see Bois et. al., 1984).  
 I have brought in the discussion of these statements in order to 
suggest that there seems to be a growing agreement among the art 
world's actors – and, essentially, this time coming not only from those who 
have supported models of 'critical resistance and radical negativity' - that it 
has become unbearable how the art market has transformed the 
conditions and possibilities of art making. It is not a surprise, then, that the 
acknowledgement of this condition has revived an old idea, that one 
should move outside of the art institution and establishment where artists 
could respond to social, economic, and political urgencies.  This idea is 
'old' in the sense that, for example, back in the 1970s artists like Robert 
Smithson (Smithson, 2009) or Daniel Buren (Buren, 2009b) were 
describing the art institution as a prison, asylum, and jail. Smithson 
commented that the art institution enacts a cultural confinement that 
places restrictive limits on the subversive meaning of art, and suggested 
that 'a work of art when placed in a gallery loses its charge, and becomes 
a portable object or surface disengaged from the outside world' (Smithson, 
2009, 280). He argued in favour of a 'dialectics that seeks a world outside 
of cultural confinement […] an art that takes into account the direct effect 
of the elements as they exist from day to day apart from representation' 
(Smithson, 2009, 281). 
 Returning to the present day, BBC's arts editor Will Gomperz 
commented on Hickey's refusal, and compared the current arrangements 
of the art realm to the Paris salon of the nineteenth century 'where 
bureaucrats and conservatives combined to stifle the field of work'. 
Impressionism, explains Gomperz, broke the system and created modern 
art and a new way of looking at things. If the analogy is to hold, 'we need 
artists to work outside the establishment and start looking at the world in a 
different way – to start challenging preconceptions instead of reinforcing 
them' (Will Gomperz, BBC's arts editor, in Helmore and Gallagher 2012, 
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webpage). 
 The idea of an outside of the art institution animated the discussions 
during the much awaited 24h/7 days Truth is Concrete marathon camp 
that took place in the Austrian city of Graz in September 2012. During a 
staged discussion between artist Michelangelo Pistoletto and the curator 
Charles Esche, one of the protagonists of New Institutionalism, Esche 
explained that the notion of an exodus, or of an escape or passage from 
the art world to some place other than itself still seems to be a 'pertinent 
metaphor', in the sense that it appeals to many practitioners in the art field 
(Esche, in Esche and Pistoletto, 2012, webpage, min. 0:42 – 0:52)2. The 
panel's title in which Esche was placed by the organizers was itself 
suggestive: 'Leaving the Ghetto of Art'. One needs to ask, however, 
whether the term 'ghetto' should be understood as a metaphor or whether 
some level of concreteness could be attributed to it? And if it is a 
metaphor, what reasons are there to actually employ such figures of 
speech suggesting a realm that is excluded in some way, closed and 
opaque from the rest of society, for describing the set of symbolic practices 
that we call art? The iteration of the term 'ghetto' in this context cannot 
avoid the historical relation to racial and ethnic oppression and exclusion, 
in which minorities ('blacks', Jews, 'gipsies') were deprived of civic rights, 
excluded from public spaces, and physically enclosed in designated areas, 
apart from the majority. That is to say that the presupposition behind this 
set of discussions is that the art realm could be described as an excluded 
space, deprived of political power, or of the potential to transform the 
social realities outside of itself. But does art inherit the lack of perspective 
that characterizes a ghetto? Is escaping from the field of art the only 
possibility at hand? As if trying to adjust himself to this thought, Esche 
                                            
2
 Esche himself does not seem to support this position, as for him 'the field of art has been a tool, 
an apparatus, in which to try and construct meaning that can have an impact outside of itself (Esche 
in Esche and Pistoletto, 2012, min. 1:18 – 1:45, webpage).  
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continued: 'Escape is maybe too much, but certainly the idea that art is 
somehow insufficient for the current urgencies or that art can be a means 
to deal with other issues or to become visible in other spaces seems to be 
very much part of the discussions in this camp over the last week' (Esche, 
in Esche and Pistoletto, 2012, webpage, min 0.52 – 1:14).  
 The reduction of ‘art's capacity to speak outside of itself' is 
connected, to be sure, to the 'new spirit' of capitalism's effect upon artistic 
critique. What seems to motivate the questioning of art's possibility of 
'leaving its ghetto' is the intensity of this recuperation: one reads a certain 
concern that the recuperation is total, exhaustive, and final. However, 
when in the first chapter I discussed Benjamin Buchloh's case, I tried to 
suggest that similar circumstances determined his declaration. And, at the 
same time, I have tried to suggest that one can identify throughout the 
time line of institutional critique artistic positions that have expressed 
similar concerns.  
 Martha Rosler, for example, wrote self-reflectively back in the 1990s 
about the often-contradictory relationship that the politically conscious 
artist has with the art world. She explained that she 'was making 
photomontages that I didn’t call “art” though I didn’t doubt they were, and I 
had no intention of placing them in the art world – that was the point. 
Instead, I wanted them to be agitational arguments meant to persuade' 
(Rosler, 1999, 487). It seems to me that implicit in this statement is the 
idea that art does have, indeed, an agency capable of triggering new ways 
of seeing and challenging a reality outside of its field, but that the art world 
and the art institution act by suspending this potential. If the art world and 
art institutions neutralize the 'agitational' and 'persuasive' character of her 
pieces, then one gains something by placing them outside of their 
confines. But, at the same time, I read a certain tension in what amounts 
to the topology of 'something' (not art, but still art) being persuasive. For 
Rosler does say that she was convinced that her pieces were art: and it 
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does seem like art needed to disguise itself in its non-artistic other in order 
to retain its capacity to transform the ways in which we perceive the social 
and economic realms. It could be said, then, that the crucial question 
behind the discourse of art's escape towards the outside of the art 
institution is precisely this: does art have a transformative effect upon 
social reality and if yes, how is this possible? Will art transform the ways in 
which we perceive the world from within or from without the art institution? 
What I am trying to argue in this chapter is that institutional critique 
articulates a space in-between, a space which from the point of view of a 
binary topology of critique is a non-space: it is neither inside, nor outside of 
the art institution, or both inside and outside, at the same time, of the art 
institution. 
 The organizers of the Truth Is Concrete camp marathon seem to be 
inclined to adopt the second option – that one needs to escape to an 
outside – since the purpose of this event was that of investigating if and 
how it is possible for art to get out of its 'ghetto'. For, the organizers 
explained, 'art, theory and practice seem to be constantly lagging behind 
reality [and] art is seen more and more as a mere leftist hobby rather than 
a foundation of humanity' (Truth Is Concrete Platform, 2012, webpage). 
What is needed is precisely an 'art that not only represents and 
documents, but that engages in specific political and social situations – 
and for an activism that not only acts for the sake of acting but searches 
for intelligent, creative means of self-empowerment: artistic strategies and 
tactics in politics, political strategies and tactics in art' (Truth Is Concrete 
Platform, 2012, webpage). In other words, what is explored is the 
possibility of art's concatenation with activism outside of the art institution, 
but in a manner which retains the identity of both: art is to remain art, 
though enriched with activist tactics, and activism is to remain activism 
though enriched with artistic strategies.  
 However, what appears to me as symptomatic of this sort of 
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position is that it grounds itself upon an implicit presupposition: the 
argument for art's escape to its outside is based on the belief that the 
inside of the art institution has no value if art is to fulfil its transformative 
potential, because the forces responsible for the urgencies in social 
reality3 are the same forces which shape the ways in which the art 
institution looks today. Art is, therefore, lagging behind reality from two 
points of view. First because it is unable to respond directly to the 
urgencies of social reality, since it exists only in the institutional form; 
secondly, even if institutionalization hadn't been problematic, the fact that 
the art institution is currently shaped, to put it in the vocabulary we have 
been using so far, by the will and intention of the exact same forces that 
generate social and economic inequality, political injustice, and 
environmental disasters, necessarily neutralizes art's critical potential.  
 What I showed in this section is that the idea that artists need to 
escape to an outside of the art institution, in order to be able to respond to 
urgencies stemming from the social, economic, and political realms, has 
retained a certain seductiveness which motivated something like the Truth 
Is Concrete marathon camp. This event attempted to gather a large range 
of artistic and activist positions and articulate a dialogue between them. 
Parallel to this idea there is another argument that implies that the outside 
of the art institution is unreachable, and that an art with political and critical 
scope has to acknowledge its ready institutionalization. The main 
proponent of this argument is Andrea Fraser, and in the next section I want 
to analyse its implications. 
                                            
3
 At the beginning of their statement, the organizers offer a list of 'urgencies' in relation to which art 
seems to be 'lagging behind'. Among them one finds: the uprisings in the Arabic world; the 
persecution of artists (Pussy Riot and Ai Wei Wei); the nuclear disaster in Japan; the appearance 
(and disappearance?) of the Occupy movement all over the world; the rise of the right wing in many 
countries (Truth is Concrete Platform, 2012, webpage).  
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2. The Institution of Art Is Inside of Us 
 
In this chapter, the question that I try to answer is: how is a topology of 
institutional critique possible, if institutional critique will acknowledge the 
fundamental relation of symbiosis and cohabitation between institution and 
critique? What I analysed until now are the circumstances that made it 
possible for many practitioners in the art field to be seduced by one 
alternative provided by the binary topology of critique, the alternative of an 
outside of the art institution. What I want to do in this section is to analyse 
the other alternative, that which proposes that there is no escape from the 
inside of the art institution, because the art institution is 'within us'. In this 
sense, I will focus on Andrea Fraser's controversial From the Critique of 
Institutions to an Institution of Critique (Fraser, 2009a) that seems to hold 
this position.  
 The opening three paragraphs of From the Critique of Institutions to 
an Institution of Critique (Fraser, 2009a, 408–417) have the role of 
introducing what the author perceives as a certain prevailing conception of 
institutional critique. This practice, it is said, has been institutionalized and 
lost its critical potential. First of all, it has been recuperated by the 
categories of art history. Second, it is common nowadays to see former 
institutional critics exhibiting in institutions that once excluded them. Last 
but not least, we even witness how, at times, institutional critique joins 
forces with the art market. The plethora of arguments against institutional 
critique also includes the perceived corporatization of the museum and the 
aggressive advance of the art market. For many, explains Fraser, 
institutional critique appears as losing pace with the social transformations 
of the present time; it also appears as a thing of the past, proper to a 
certain period in which artists' beliefs genuinely expressed an anti-
establishment attitude. In the present era of the corporate museum and of 
art hedge funds, 'one finds a certain nostalgia for institutional critique as a 
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now anachronistic artefact of an era before the corporate mega museum 
and the 24/7 global art market, a time when artists could still conceivably 
take up a critical position against or outside the institution' (Fraser, 2009a, 
409). 
 I want to insist on a term that Fraser uses to describe the laments 
for the loss of an outside, totally overtaken, the argument goes, by the 'all-
encompassing apparatus of cultural reification' of museums and the art 
market (Fraser, 2009a, 409). The respective term is 'nostalgia': the 
argument against institutional critique amounts to a nostalgia for the 
allegedly former privileged spaces of institutional critique. These spaces, it 
should be said, referred to a certain outside of the art institution. In the 
economy of the text, this description is more than of marginal interest: 
'nostalgia' literally means pain, sickness, distress (Gr. algia), a longing for 
a journey back home (Gr. Nostos). This word describes a passage, a 
crossing towards the place where one feels, presumably, 'at home'. 
Nostalgia, as 'homesickness', refers to a longing for the possibility of 
taking this journey, a longing, to put it differently, for the possibility of 
escaping towards an outside. This implies that in the art institution, the 
critical artist finds herself/himself, as it were, in exile; she feels not at ease, 
because her 'natural and proper' environment is somewhere else, a purely 
conceived 'outside'. Section one of this chapter showed that what Fraser 
describes as the nostalgia for the outside is, indeed, commonly spread 
among practitioners of the art field. 
 Fraser's list of counter-arguments against institutional critique 
seems to me to refer to a certain politics of 'clean hands' towards art 
institutions and the art system. Proponents of a pure 'outside' are not only 
nostalgic, but they also appear to regret that there is no option for 
disengaging the art institution and moving towards an outside that would 
offer ethical integrity. A double binding is at play here, between the wish to 
keep one's hands clean and the actual state of affairs in which one 
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constantly has them tainted. Bearing in mind Fraser's Freudian influences 
(see Fraser and Alberro, 2005) I wonder whether what Fraser is pointing at 
here is precisely what in psychoanalysis was called dèlire de toucher? In 
Totem and Taboo (1999) Freud highlighted the ambivalent attitude towards 
a given object, which the subject wants to touch, as a result of a primitive 
instinct in the psychic life, but at the same time, refrains to do so because 
of an existing external (social) prohibition. This ambivalence is at the origin 
of taboos, in the sense that the object of desire that social prohibitions 
interdict becomes taboo. It also generates what is known as obsessive-
compulsive behaviour. So what I am indicating here is the possibility that 
the art institution has become taboo, for at least a part of the art world that 
sees itself as critical and aiming to reach a certain outside from where it 
could respond to social urgencies. The lament for an escape towards a 
pure outside could be read as obsessive behaviour which, nevertheless, 
infinitely postpones the reaching of the outside. What Fraser essentially 
shows in this text is that the nostalgic longing for an outside is infinite 
deferral and postponement precisely because one cannot make the 
journey back home without carrying with oneself the structures of the 
inside. Read like this, I think that Fraser's argument is entirely correct. 
 But what are her grounds? Fraser's response begins with an 
exercise in linguistic archaeology. She first highlights a certain ambiguity 
between the constative and the performative side of institutional critique's 
self-instituting speech acts. For she observes that the referent of the term 
'institutional critique' might have been created together with the concept's 
emergence, although for many it seemed that something like institutional 
critique, a historical canon, had already existed before the term came into 
existence. This ambiguity between the is and the ought to be of 
institutional critique became obvious in the manner in which the students 
of Benjamin Buchloh, Craig Owens, or Martha Rosler explored the work of 
artists like Hans Haacke, Michael Asher, Daniel Buren and Marcel 
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Broodthaers. This younger generation of artists was using the term 
'institutional critique' as shorthand for 'the critique of institutions' (Fraser, 
2009a, 410); and it might be the case that the acts of instituting and the 
institutionalization and canonization of institutional critique began precisely 
with this post-factum ambiguity between what was already and what ought 
have been, between fact and prescription. Moreover, Fraser proposes that 
it might have been her who used the term 'institutional critique' for the first 
time, in a text in which she discussed Louise Lawler's practices. Fraser 
declares that she finds herself, as well,  
 
enmeshed in the contradictions and complicities, ambitions and 
ambivalence that institutional critique is often accused of, caught 
between the self-flattering possibility that I was the first person to put 
this term in print and the critically shameful prospect of having played 
a role in the reduction of certain radical practices to a pithy 
catchphrase, packaged for co-optation (Fraser, 2009a, 410).  
 
In chapter two I explained the role of this ambiguity between the constative 
and the performative dimensions of speech acts in the act of instituting. It 
grounds the violence of saying the 'whatness' of what is as if that is all that 
there is. And I read Fraser's 'shamefulness' as a confession that she has 
contributed to enacting a violence, the violence of institutional critique's 
canonization and institutionalization; that she has contributed, therefore, to 
the exhaustive determination of the meaning of institutional critique, from 
which many of the allegations and accusations against it stem today. If my 
reading is correct, it could be proposed that, beyond this institutionalization 
and canonization, we still might not know what institutional critique is. In 
other words, something might have escaped this exhaustive determination 
of its meaning and my suggestion is that Fraser's further arguments are, in 
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fact, an exploration of this rest and remainder4. 
 Her strategy, in this sense, is to observe how restrictively the terms 
'institution' and 'critique' have been used: whereas the term 'institution' 
most likely referred to established and organized sites for the presentation 
of art, the meaning of 'critique' spans between reformist approaches and 
more radical, oppositional ones. 'In either case, “art” and “artist” generally 
figure as antagonistically opposed to an “institution” that incorporates, co-
opts, commodifies, and otherwise misappropriates once-radical – and 
uninstitutionalized – practices' (Fraser, 2009a, 411). Fraser's proposal is to 
look at these concepts differently, in order to show that this antagonism is 
untenable. First, she proposes that the writings and work of artists such as 
Haacke, Buren, Asher and Broodthaers contradict the idea that art 
opposes the institution, or that radical art has ever existed or could ever 
exist 'outside' of the art institution. On the contrary, these artists' 
interventions were reflecting on the conditions of the possibility of artistic 
practice, and they at times have acknowledged that they have consciously 
supported the establishment. At the same time, and looking at the work of 
Hans Haacke, for example, she proposes that the concept of the institution 
that institutional critics worked with is much larger than that of the art 
institution as a site for the presentation of art.  
 Fraser emphasises one of Michael Asher's works, which I will in fact 
be approaching as well, in the fifth chapter of this thesis. Fraser proposes 
that Asher's Caravan project exhibited at Skulptur Projekte Münster (1977) 
shows that the institutionalization of art is complete, that it does not 
depend on the physical frame of an institution, but on its conceptual 
frames which are, as it were, always present. Asher's project presupposed 
that a commonplace caravan would be placed in each of the Mondays 
                                            
4
 It should be said that this is the argument which motivates the present research, which also seeks 
a certain remainder and rest of what has been defined as 'institutional critique'. 
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during the triennial in a different part of the city. Besides a notice at the site 
of the main museum that informed the art audience where the caravan 
could be found, the object itself did not possess any other 'artistic' 
distinctive sign. Asher, explains Fraser, took Duchamp one step further, 
because he made it clear that it is not authorship (signature) or the 
physical architecture of a museum which make something art, but the very 
fact that it is conceptualized as art: certain discourses and practices 
recognize it as art, sanction it as art and consume it as art. In other words, 
the institution of art is not something external to the work of art 'but the 
irreducible condition of its existence as art […] what is announced and 
perceived as art is always already institutionalized, simply because it 
exists within the perception of participants in the field of art as art, a 
perception not necessarily aesthetic, but fundamentally social in its 
determination' (Fraser, 2009a, 413).  
 That art is art because it exists in the socially determined perception 
of the participants in the art field is a statement that draws much from 
Bourdieu's critical sociology. It resonates with Bourdieu's concept of 
habitus, which the French sociologist defined as  
 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can 
be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990, 53).  
 
This is the reason why Fraser contends that art is not only 
'institutionalized' but also 'internalized' and 'embodied in people'. In a 
sense, it could be said that, indeed, 'we are the institution'. Consequently, 
if the outside of the art institution exists, it is not a 'fixed' place, with 
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'substantive characteristics': the outside is simply what is not considered 
by artistic discourses and practices.  
 
And what we do outside the field, to the extent that it remains outside, 
can have no effect within it. So if there is no outside for us, it is not 
because the institution is perfectly closed, or exists as an apparatus 
in a 'totally administered society,' or has grown all-encompassing in 
size and scope. It is because the institution is inside of us, and we 
can't get outside of ourselves (Fraser, 2009a, 414).  
 
In other words, we cannot operate outside of the art institution as artists, 
curators, and critics except by extending the boundaries of the art 
institution to the outside. From this point of view, institutional critique has 
been always institutionalized. Institutionalization, co-optation, voluntary 
participation are, therefore, false problems, or not a problems per se, since 
they are part of the conditions of the possibility of art itself and, 
consequently, of institutional critique as an artistic practice. Seen from the 
perspective that I offered in the second and third chapters, about the 
necessary relationship between institution and critique, this is a correct 
observation.  
 At this moment, I would like to remind the reader that in chapter two 
I reached the conclusion that the art institution is the irreducible condition 
of the existence of art. But at the same time, I emphasized that we should 
not understand this implication in the manner that the institutional theory of 
art does. For the other irreducible condition, I argued, is the very existence 
of something that escapes the logic of instituting, something which, 
perceived from the perspective of an institution's total determination of 
meaning, is outside of the institution. In the next section I will show, 
however, that the remainder and rest are neither inside, nor outside; it is 
outside of the institution as long as it is excluded and repressed, but 
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always already inside, in a way, 'illegitimately', as it is part of the meaning 
of the sign upon which institutionalization builds. And I have argued that it 
is essential to maintain that there is a sense in which we can say that there 
is an outside, because critique can work only on the differential between 
inside and outside. I want to argue that precisely this necessary second 
and irreducible condition, that of a critique which is always already inside-
outside, seems to be missing from Fraser's account. And this is perhaps 
why Brian Holmes refers to Fraser's text as internalizing a 'governmentality 
of failure' and as defending what 'becomes little more than a masochistic 
variation on the self-serving “institutional theory of art” promoted by Arthur 
Danto, George Dickie and their followers (a theory of mutual and circular 
recognition among members of an object-oriented milieu, misleadingly 
called a “world”)' (Holmes, 2009, 59)5.  
 I think that the relationship between Fraser's text and the 
institutional theory of art remains ambiguous. I would be inclined to 
respond negatively to this issue, for two reasons. The first one relates to 
the fact that Fraser gives credit to strategies of artists like Hans Haacke 
who, in her opinion, understood the interplay between the inside and the 
outside of the art field. Haacke, writes Fraser, engaged the art institution 
'as a network of social and economic relationships, making visible the 
complicities among the apparently opposed spheres of art, the state, and 
corporations. In section three of this chapter I will refer to one of Haacke's 
projects as precisely exemplifying a certain being of institutional critique 
both inside and outside, or neither inside, nor outside, of the art institution. 
Describing Haacke as one of the figures that evokes the characterizations 
of the institutional critic 'as a heroic challenger, speaking truth to power', 
Fraser shows that 'anyone familiar with his work should recognize that, far 
from trying to tear down the museum, Haacke's project has been an 
                                            
5
 I will have more to say about the institutional theory of art and particularly about Arthur Danto in 
chapter five. 
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attempt to defend the institution of art from instrumentalization by political 
and economic interests' (Fraser, 2009a, 415). Therefore, like Haacke, 
Fraser is of the opinion that what happens inside of the institution has 
effects outside of it; and indeed, the inside of the art institution is affected 
by its outside. The art world is part of the 'real world' and the art market 
boom, as effect of neoliberal policies, illustrates at best this thesis.  
 The second reason for responding negatively to the allegation that 
Fraser advocates a version of the institutional theory of art is the fact that, 
in this text, Fraser does explain that the distinction between art and real 
life as wholly separate realms serves an ideology which separates the 
social and economic interests and relations from artistic, intellectual and 
political interests. Through this separation one reproduces the mythologies 
that make art attractive and that, in return, reinforce social and economic 
distinctions. In this context, it is interesting to observe how Fraser 
describes the function of what I called délire de toucher. When discussions 
about the outside of the art institution emerge, their function is to avoid the 
responsibility of our own complicities, compromises and self-censorship. 
And by avoiding them, we only reproduce the conditions of their existence. 
The question is not, therefore, how to escape to the outside, or how to be 
against the institution. The most important question is: since we 
internalize, embody and perform institutions, what kind of institution we 
are? This implies asking ourselves 'what kinds of values we 
institutionalize, what forms of practice we reward, and what kinds of 
rewards we aspire to ' (Fraser, 2009a, 416).  
 However, what in my opinion precludes a complete rejection of 
Holmes' description is the manner in which Fraser concludes her text. She 
contends that institutional critique constructs on the institutionalization of 
the avant-garde's failure of integrating art in the praxis of life. Aware of it, 
institutional critique rather defends the institution of art against itself, 
against its critical claims and against its legitimizing discourses, 'against its 
162 
 
self-representation as a site of resistance and contestation, and against its 
mythologies of radicality and symbolic revolution' (Fraser, 2009a, 417). But 
by doing this, institutional critique, writes Fraser, becomes what she 
describes as an 'institution of critique' (Fraser, 2009a, 417). Given the 
manner in which I described the relations between the instituting logic and 
the logic of critique, something like an 'institution of critique' appears as a 
contradiction in terms. Or, it could be said, it appears as critique's failure of 
warding itself against itself, against its own totalizing speech acts, of 
saying the 'whatness' of what is as if that is all that there is. Critique is 
critique precisely when it fails to become an institution, be that an 
institution of critique. Moreover, if institutional critique is an 'institution of 
critique' within the art institution, isn't this precisely reproducing a binary 
concept of critique that Fraser seemed to get away from when she brought 
in the discussion the cases of Asher and Haacke? What would be the 
purpose of an ‘institution of critique’ other than determining, in an 
exhaustive manner, the meaning of (institutional) critique and the limits of 
its application?  
 Fraser, therefore, correctly dismisses the arguments that advocate 
the necessity of an escape towards an outside of the art institution as 
romantic and hypocritical; their effect is that they reinforce those 
hierarchies that push art practitioners towards an outside, in the first place. 
But I think that, at the same time, Fraser's text problematically restores a 
binary concept of critique when she describes institutional critique as an 
'institution of critique'. An institution of critique is precisely the total and 
exhaustive determination of the 'whatness' of what critique is and this runs 
contrary to a concept of critique that constructs on what escapes the logic 
of instituting. If my suggestion is correct, then perhaps there is a certain 
sense in which it could be said that Holmes is correct when he contends 
that Fraser's text is only a version of the institutional theory of art. Because 
ultimately I think that the concept of an 'institution of critique' describes 
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precisely the total and exhaustive recuperation of critique by the institution 
of art. My aim in the next section is to investigate the possibility that there 
might be a certain position, which is neither inside nor outside, or both 
inside and outside of the art institution, which would allow the institutional 
critic to perform his/her critique. 
3. Institutional Critique's Non-Space 
 
In the previous sections I proposed that precisely the paradigm of a binary 
type of critique allows us to conceive only two possibilities for art's 
transformative potential: either art (critical and political) would be mounted 
outside of the art institution, but then risking becoming invisible and 
unrecognised as art; or inside of the art institution, however risking total 
recuperation and neutralization. I want to suggest, in this sense, that many 
simplifications of institutional critique’s history rest on the same type of 
binary logic. In the first chapter I mentioned the case of cultural sociologist 
Pascal Gielen that described the two waves of institutional critique as 
pertaining to a 'dissatisfaction with claustrophobia' (Gielen, 2013, 14). 
Gielen particularly follows Brian Holmes' historicization of institutional 
critique offered in his Extradisciplinary Investigations (2009). Holmes 
explains that the first wave of institutional critique had been articulated as 
a reaction to the realization that 'everything about this specialised 
aesthetic space is a trap, that it has been instituted as a form of enclosure' 
(Holmes, 2009, 55); essentially its goal was of 'breaking out' (Holmes, 
2009, 55), in the hope that this would articulate a praxis with 
transformative aims for the institutional confines one attempted to break 
out from and, as a result, of art's and art institution's potential to reach out 
the world. The second generation, however, 'added a subjectivizing turn 
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[…] which allowed [artists] to recast external power hierarchies as 
ambivalences within the self' (Holmes, 2009, 57). In other words, artists of 
the second generation of institutional critics realized that what they were 
doing as artists and as art was already reproducing the institutional 
hierarchies that they tried to analyse; this implies that they had been 
'institutionalized' all along. This is in fact Andrea Fraser's contention 
(2009), whom Holmes criticizes for having mingled Bourdieu's 
'deterministic analysis of the closure of socio-professional fields' with 'a 
deep confusion of Weber's iron cage and Foucault's desire “to get free of 
oneself”'. The result was the internalization of a 'governmentality of failure, 
where the subject can do no more than contemplate his or her own 
psychic prison, with a few aesthetic luxuries in compensation' (Holmes, 
2009, 59).  
 What I want to propose is that we should think instead at the 
possibility of a space for art and critique which, if viewed from the 
perspective of a binary topology of critique, appears, in fact, as a non-
place. It is a place where art with a critical scope is both inside and outside 
of the art institution, or neither inside, nor outside of the art institution; it is 
a place where art is both partner and adversary and at the same time of 
the art institution. Moreover, in this section I want to argue that an art 
capable of responding to urgencies which stem from the outside of the art 
field would be able to do so if – and only if – it occupies this non-place and 
if and only if, consequently, it becomes an institutional critique. In other 
words, art will respond critically to the urgencies coming from outside of 
the art institution and thus, have a transformative effect on the ways in 
which we see and perceive the world, if and only if it will mount, through 
the same act and at the same time, a critique of the institution which hosts 
it. If critical and political art are to respond critically and politically to the 
urgencies of social reality, they have to be, at the same time, a critique of 
the institution that frames them. 
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  How is this possible? First of all, I want to suggest that the art 
institution has never been the 'ghetto' or 'aesthetic trap and enclosure' that 
it is often associated with. We could observe that a certain  'outside' of the 
art institution has always broken the confines of the art institution or, to put 
this differently, that the 'outside' has always been constitutive of the inside 
of the art institution. This is the sense in which I observed, towards the end 
of the second chapter, that the concepts of art and art institution are 
constitutive of each other, and that it will be in vain to search for their 
foundations, since we will only find violence, both symbolic and material, 
both semantic and deontic, of imposing a collective will and intention of 
defining and describing in an exhaustive manner the 'whatness' of what art 
is. Only because the outside of the art institution constitutes its inside is 
the art institution an instrument of educating the proletariat in the 
nineteenth century. And only because the outside inhabits the inside is the 
prison model of the panopticon developed in the exhibitionary complex 
that, as a technique of governmentality, normalises behaviour in the art 
institution.  
 In this sense, in his dialogue with Pierre Bourdieu, Hans Haacke 
asks a fundamental question: 'What interests would corporations have in 
sponsoring an inaccessible enclave?' (Bourdieu and Haacke, 1995, 98) 
That is to say that if the art institution had been a closed, impermeable 
fortress which does not communicate to the world, there would be no 
sense in which capitalist processes should exert their power of 
recuperating the subversive potential of art. And I take it that this 
fundamental structuration of the inside by the outside is one of issues that 
emerge with clarity from Andrea Fraser's piece Museum Highlights (1989).  
 Here Fraser takes the identity of Jane Castleton, a guide of the 
Philadelphia Museum of Art and a stereotypical 'figure of identification for a 
primarily white, middle-class audience' (Fraser, 1991, 107, f.4). But the 
tour that she offers proceeds to producing ruptures in the institutional 
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signifying chains, by 'unmatching' words that should belong to the 
institutional discourse of a tour guide and their designated referents. 
Augustin Pajou’s The Four Seasons: Autumn as Bacchus (1770-90), for 
example, is accompanied by an excerpt from a 1910 report on the 
Degenerate and Feeble Minded Women. A discourse about 'scale and 
complexity, abundance and grace, free from time and change' is uttered 
when she addresses a guard's stool in the corner of the gallery, or 
indicating towards the men’s room. The aim of this strategy, I suggest, is to 
unmask the fundamental openness and permeability of the art institution, 
an openness of being inhabited by an outside structured by economic 
inequalities, gendered exploitation, and social injustice that the art 
institution necessarily reproduces. 
 If the art institution has never been a ghetto, in the sense that it is 
already structured by the forces which generated social contradictions 
outside of its confines and, thus, if it has been always open to the 
inhabitation of its outside, what consequences does this argument have for 
the thesis that between the art institution and critique there is a necessary 
relation of symbiosis and cohabitation? In the previous three chapters I 
showed that what Robert Smithson calls 'cultural confinement' (Smithson, 
2009), which I identify with the instituting will and intention to determine 
exhaustively the 'whatness' of what art is, is, in fact, never fulfilled; that 
due to the fundamental iterability of the sign and of its meaning something 
always escapes the instituting act of determining meaning in a total and 
exhaustive manner. At the same time, I showed that the art institution is 
inhabited by its outside, in the sense that whatever the art institution 
defines and describes as the 'whatness of what' art is, this 'whatness' is 
already inhabited by a force which, from a certain point of view, seems 
alien to it.  
 From the point of view of an instituting intention and will of 
determining the 'whatness' of what art is as if that is all that there is, the 
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'whatness' of what art is, is indeed all that there is; therefore, what 
escapes the totalising act of instituting will be excluded as marginal, 
inferior and insignificant. Critique, which builds precisely on this remainder, 
will appear from the institution's point of view as accidental, exterior and 
marginal. One of the clearest illustrations of this fact stems from former 
Guggenheim director Thomas Messer's explanation for cancelling Hans 
Haacke's participation in a museum exhibition from 1971. Haacke's two 
works Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, A Real-Time 
Social System as of May 1, 1971 and Alex DiLorenzo Manhattan Real 
Estate Holdings, A Real-Time Social System as of May 1, 1971 explored 
precisely how the meaning of what Haacke understood as the 'system' of 
art is open to the pervasion of financial interests that influence and control 
museum policies. Messer argued that precisely because Haacke's work 
tried to force 'art boundaries', it was aesthetically weak; the contradiction 
between art's neutrality and Haacke's pursuit of aims that lie 'beyond art' 
transferred itself 'onto the museum environment and beyond it, into society 
at large'; therefore, explains Messer, 'the choice was between the 
acceptance of or rejection of an alien substance that had entered the art 
museum organism' (Haacke, 1975, 138). What we see in this confrontation 
is precisely what I have tried to suggest in the previous chapters: a 
'hermeneutical contradiction' between what the art institution says that art 
is – in this case, Messer implies, art's intrinsic nature is to be an end in 
itself and socially disengaged (Haacke, 1975, 138) – and the remainder 
that escapes institutionalization, the fact that art can precisely respond and 
engage with social issues. The cancellation of Haacke's work is in fact an 
institution's rejection of critique as marginal, accidental and external, as an 
alien substance that has somehow fraudulently entered the museum 
organism. But now I can add to what has been said in the previous 
chapters between the necessary relation between institution and critique: 
since the differential that escapes the act of instituting is part of the 
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meaning of what is instituted, in a bastard and 'illegitimate' manner – that 
is, from the point of view of the institution's laws – critique is already 
inscribed within the 'inside' of the institution. 
  Haacke's critique had been possible because it was part of the 
possibilities of what art is and ought to be. Therefore, the instituted 
'whatness' of what art is, is in fact only provisionally closed off: and, in a 
certain way, it could be said that institutional frames are both closed and 
open, both to the pervasiveness of those forces that trigger the social and 
economic urgencies that art is called to respond, and to the work of 
critique. In chapter five I will argue that this is so because frames are ruled 
by a certain parergonal logic, which is also of the type neither/nor, or both 
/and. What art is and what art does appear, therefore, as a matter of 
confrontation and struggle between various forces that inhabit the art 
institution. Haacke's critique appears not only as a critique of the institution 
of art: it appears as a critique of the art institution which is already 
inhabited by its outside. Ultimately, Haacke's critique is an institutional 
critique articulated from a non-place, neither outside nor inside of the art 
institution, or both inside and outside of the art institution. It is a critique 
that reaches an outside that already inhabits the inside of the art 
institution.  
   These thoughts conduct us to the following proposition: if the art 
institution is shaped by the will and intention of the same forces that 
generate the urgencies of the social field, and if whatever art is, it is 
constituted in the field of struggle between critique and the institution of 
art, then art will be capable of responding critically to those urgencies if it 
becomes, at the same time, an institutional critique, therefore, an art which 
questions its conditions and possibilities. Critical-political art is not critical 
and political unless it is, at the same time, an institutional critique. 
 This is what I significantly understand when Hans Haacke explains 
to Pierre Bourdieu that 'if artists step out of the art context [...] they operate 
169 
 
simultaneously in two different social arenas. Our categories of 
classification then get scrambled' (Bourdieu and Haacke, 1995, 97–98). 
This 'scrambling' of classification categories occurs only when we think in 
the logic of the either/or. But, I want to suggest, this is a productive 
'scrambling' if viewed from the perspective of a logic of the type neither/nor 
or both/and. This categorial 'scrambling' is the condition which allows 
artists to operate simultaneously in two different social arenas, inside and 
outside, at the same time, of the art institution, or neither inside, nor 
outside of the art institution.  
 Haacke is a prime example of how an artist is capable of occupying 
different social arenas at the same time. His piece And You Were 
Victorious After All (1988) was a public monument that he mounted in the 
second largest city of Austria, Graz, once celebrated as the 'City of 
People's Insurrection' during the Anschluss. Haacke recreated a red Nazi 
column built with the occasion of Austria's annexation by Hitler's Germany, 
to which the artist added a list of the locals who had fought against the 
Nazis and died. The work operates, to be sure, a short-circuiting of 
meaning: it concatenates Nazi imagery and symbols and the list of those 
killed by the Nazis, and associates the title (in German) Und Ihr Habt Doch 
Gesiegt with the Nazi salute Sieg Heil! (Hail to Victory!). The work was fire-
bombed and irreparably destroyed by a group of neo-Nazis one week 
before it was due to be taken down. In his conversation with Bourdieu, 
Haacke expressed his conviction that most people on the streets of Graz 
did not respond to the column in terms of art, but understood it as a 
political statement: and as a political statement it triggered the political 
reaction of the fire-bombing. The piece 'in itself', suggests Haacke, was 
perceived only as art by members of the local art world. In this context, he 
seems to be at odds with what he describes as the recent phenomenon of 
the ghettoization of art:  
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Attempts to break out have been made by Tatlin, Heartfield, and 
others. Rodchenko thought of advertising as a way to fuse art and 
social action. These efforts are now part of art history. Museums, 
galleries, and private collections attach symbolic value (and of 
course, also economic value) to certain objects, and they provide a 
refuge, protection, and even a platform to speak from. But for some 
time now there has been a sense of malaise. I ask myself, however, 
whether this unease is not based on a romantic notion of the 
contemporary world and a profound misunderstanding of the role the 
assumed ghetto plays in today’s practice. The terms 'platform' and 
'ghetto' are contradictory (Bourdieu and Haacke, 1995, 97–98).  
 
 
I have already written about this 'sense of malaise' in the first section, 
when I mentioned the participants of the Graz Marathon Camp from 2012 
who lamented the fact that art always seems to 'lag' behind the set of 
urgencies stemming from 'reality'. But I think that Haacke's statement is 
correct in highlighting an interesting fact. It does show, for example, that 
the discourse of the ghettoization of the arts relies on a romantic 
presupposition, which implies that the art institution completely encloses 
and neutralizes art. Most importantly, it shows that the art institution is 
inhabited not only by the outside of capitalism and corporations: it is 
already inhabited by what appears as the outside of critique, an outside 
which, I argue, has always been part of its inside. This is why the art 
institution is a platform and offers protection. Something like And You 
Were Victorious After All could not have been possible if it did not 
articulate itself as 'art' – in this particular case, if it did not articulate itself 
under the category of 'public monument' and therefore, be framed by the 
art institution.  
 This is to say that art institutions are spaces of struggle and 
negotiation where, writes Haacke, conflicting ideological currents clash. 
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'The art world, contrary to what is generally assumed, is not a world apart. 
What happens there is an expression of the world at large and has 
repercussions outside of its confines' (Bourdieu and Haacke 1995, 99).  
 Allow me to add a more recent example that illustrates what has 
been argued until now. Liberate Tate is a collective that was formed in 
2010 during a workshop on art and activism commissioned by Tate. It is 
composed of artists, activists, writers and other types of cultural workers 
and came into existence when the Tate curators tried to censor an 
intervention of the participants in response to Tate being sponsored by 
British Petroleum (BP). The intervention itself was unplanned and its idea 
arose during the workshop. Afterwards, the group decided to continue 
doing actions as Liberate Tate (see Hickey, 2013). In 2012, during Damien 
Hirst's blockbuster show at Tate Modern, over one hundred of Liberate 
Tate members and affiliates forced the two entrances and, with all the 
opposition of the museum guardians, introduced parts of a 16.5 metre, one 
and a half tonne wind turbine blade that they reassembled in the Turbine 
Hall. The blade, a beautiful ready-made object, was offered as an art piece 
and as a donation to the nation, 'given for the benefit of the public, under 
the provisions of the Museums and Galleries Act from 1992, the legal act 
from which Tate's mission is drawn (Liberate Tate, The Gift, July 2012, 
webpage).  
 A film realized by VICE UK follows the journey of the wind turbine 
blade from a Welsh valley to London, documenting, at the same time, the 
laborious preparations and the impressive mobilization of forces 
undertaken for this guerrilla performance. In this seven minutes 
documentary, Tim Ratcliffe, former Greenpeace activist and coordinator of 
The Gift, answers the question 'Why putting this object in the Turbine 
Hall?' Ratcliffe explains that the intention is to allow the Tate to have a 
'little thinking about their relationship with BP' (VICE United Kingdom, 
Liberate Tate’s The Gift, webpage, min. 1:12). Most significantly, Rattclife 
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reflects that for many years he had been involved in protest movements 
and that they are 'very valid places for placards, marches etc., but only as 
long as they satisfied my want to communicate what I am thinking through 
holding a placard up' (VICE United Kingdom, Liberate Tate’s The Gift, 
webpage, min. 1:22). In other words, the placing of the wind turbine blade 
as art and as a gift to the nation, under the provisions of a law that 
regulates the activity of the Tate, has a different potential and effect than 
protesting and marching. One thing is to protest in front of the BP 
headquarters for the environmental disasters they are responsible for, 
another thing is to offer an artwork to an art institution reminding it that its 
twenty years long sponsorship agreement with BP is contrary to its ethics 
policies. These policies state that sponsorship would not be accepted if it 
'harms Tate’s relationship with other benefactors, partners, visitors or 
stakeholders; creates unacceptable conflicts of interest; materially 
damages the reputation of Tate; or, detrimentally affect the ability of Tate to 
fulfil its mission' (The Tate, 2012, webpage). In other words, The Gift 
arriving from the outside of the Tate as a commonplace wind turbine blade, 
but violently forcing its entrance in the Tate as an artwork, points to Tate's 
hermeneutical contradiction which was already there. The Gift, then, is 
both outside and inside of the Tate, or neither inside nor outside; at the 
same time it is both adversary of the Tate and partner of the Tate. 
 A petition letter signed by more than one thousand people and 
addressed to Sir Nicholas Serota, director of the Tate, and to the Tate 
Trustees, explained that the artwork was created 'using an icon of 
renewable energy with an express wish for Tate to stop its relationship with 
BP so the public gallery’s reputation cannot be used to improve the oil 
company’s terrible image following the Gulf of Mexico disaster' (Liberate 
Tate, The Gift, July 2012, webpage). It seems to me that there are two 
essential elements in this guerrilla performance which merit closer 
attention. The first one is that it presses Tate Modern to consider The Gift 
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as art; the other one is that Tate Modern should consider The Gift as art in 
the framework of a law (a declaration, a speech act) that says what Tate is 
and ought to be. Section seven of this law determines that:  
 
(l) In any case where (a) a work of art is given for the benefit of the 
public or the nation, and (b) the donor has made no provision as to 
the person responsible for its care, it shall, subject to subsection (2) 
below, vest in such of the bodies for the time being specified in 
Schedule 5 to this Act as the Lord President of the Council may 
direct6. (2) If the body in whom a gift by will would, apart from this 
subsection, vest under this section determine that the work of art is 
not fit to be part of their collection, it shall unless otherwise disposed 
of by the testator become part of his residuary estate (HMSO, 1992, 
9).  
   
In other words, when a work of art is offered to an art institution and as 
donation to the nation, the institution will consider it to be included in its 
permanent collection, unless the work of art is determined as 'unfit'. 
Liberate Tate has played, as it were, by the rules of the institution and 
offered The Gift as art and as donation to be included in the permanent 
collection. The communiqué that Liberate Tate issued advised that the 
Tate should consider this work judiciously. And it also offered an 
interpretation of The Gift as artwork, whose occurrence, I understand, is to 
reinforce the idea that the wind turbine should be considered as art and 
not as a common place object: 
 
The journey of The Gift bears witness to an epic of cooperation and 
points to a time beyond fossil fuels. Resting on the floor of your 
                                            
6
 Schedule five regulates transfers to and from certain collections, and establishes the Board of 
Trustees of the Tate Gallery, among other art institutions' corporate bodies, as both transferor and 
transferee.  
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museum, it might resemble the bones of a leviathan monster washed 
up from the salty depths, a suitable metaphor for the deep arctic 
drilling that BP is profiting from now that the ice is melting. But it is not 
animal, nor is it dead, it is a living relic from a future that is aching to 
become the present. It is part of a magic machine, a tool of 
transformation, a grateful giant. (Liberate Tate, Communiqué #3, 
2012, webpage).  
 
 
Nicholas Serota, director of the Tate, responded to Liberate Tate in 
September 2012 and communicated the Board's decision, supported by 
the recommendation of the Collections Group, that the offer of The Gift is 
declined. The letter argued that the refusal is due to the 'line with the 
current strategy, commitments and priorities for the Collection and the size 
of the object in relation to existing pressures on collection care' (Liberate 
Tate, Tate Board Response to Liberate Tate’s The Gift, 2012 webpage). 
However, the Board offered that 'supporting material comprising 
performance documentation and related images, be accepted into Tate’s 
archive as a record of the action at Tate Modern' (Liberate Tate, Tate 
Board Response to Liberate Tate’s The Gift, 2012, webpage). In a 
response to this letter, Liberate Tate asked whether Lord Browne, once 
chief executive of BP and now chair of the Boards of Trustees, had any 
involvement in the decision. It also commented that the decision of the 
Tate is self-contradictory, since The Gift responds to Tate's commitment of 
finding 'appropriate and imaginative ways to reflect the responses and 
commitment of artists [that] engage with environmental issues in their work 
and have chosen to be vocal in public debate' (Liberate Tate, Reply to Tate 
about the Board decision on 19 September, 2012, webpage). Doubting 
whether the Tate has a Size Strategy that would impede the acceptance of 
The Gift in the collection because it is 'big art', Liberate Tate also observed 
an essential fact: precisely how Serota and the Board of Trustee's 
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response recuperates The Gift not as art, but as an 'action' whose 
documentation would be allowed in Tate's archive.  
 There are two issues at stake here. The first one refers precisely to 
The Gift's status as art; and if it is not art, asks Liberate Tate, 'how does 
Liberate Tate’s latest piece deviate from current formal definitions of art?' 
(Liberate Tate, Reply to Tate about the Board decision on 19 September, 
2012, webpage). The point is not that The Gift deviates from any current 
definition of art, because in fact it doesn't. The point is that The Gift 
deviates from what the art institution of the Tate defines and describes as 
the 'whatness' of what art is as if that is all that there is. However, more 
importantly – and this is the second issue which is at stake here – this 
exchange shows a certain productive 'scrambling' of categories; because 
in the last instance, whether The Gift is art or not is less important than the 
fact that by insisting that it is art, it inhabits and occupies the field of 
struggle over the 'whatness' of art is, not only in the sense of what art is 
and ought to be, but also in the sense of what art does and ought to do. 
For what is essential in this story is the fact that from a certain outside of 
the Tate, which is already inside of the Tate, The Gift addresses critically 
and politically the social urgency of BP's environmental disaster in the 
same manner in which it addresses, critically and politically, the art 
institution of the Tate.  
 This is to say that art is capable of responding to urgencies 
stemming from the outside of the art field if and only if it is able to 
articulate itself as a critique of the art institution which is always already 
inhabited, shaped and structured by its outside. Therefore, in order to 
answer our initial question, of the possibilities of a topology of institutional 
critique, I will say that it is by necessity neither inside nor outside of the art 
institution, or both inside and outside of the art institution. This 
undecidability is, in other words, constitutive of the performative effect of 
what institutional critique does and ought to do. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The argument of this chapter was that the binary topology of critique that, I 
suggested, is constitutive of the canon of institutional critique, does not 
apply to the concept of institutional critique that I have advocated so far. 
That is, an institutional critique which constructs on the fundamental 
relation of cohabitation between institution and critique and which aims to 
be, at the same time, both partner and adversary of the institutional 
powers that be. Institutional critique does not and will not fall prey to the 
seductiveness of a certain outside of the art institution; but neither will it let 
itself articulate an 'institution of critique' within the institution of art, 
because it is only then that the possibility of a remainder, which escapes 
the logic of instituting, is closed off. Therefore, from the point of view of a 
binary topology of critique, institutional critique appears as limitless, since 
what it inhabits is a non-space: inside and outside are not limits for 
institutional critique because institutional critique is and ought to be neither 
inside nor outside, or both inside and outside, and at the same time, of the 
institution. But my argument also showed something else: that if critical 
and political art's reasons to escape the art institution pertain to the fact 
that its meanings are neutralized by the same forces responsible for the 
urgencies stemming from social reality, and if escaping to the outside 
proves to be an impossible option, then the only way in which critical art 
can have an effect outside of the art institution is to inhabit this non-place 
and become, at the same time, an institutional critique. In other words, the 
potential of critical-political art, of responding to urgencies stemming from 
the social and economic reality, is fulfilled only when critical and political 
art become, at the same time, an institutional critique. 
 There is another issue which came out from the discussion in this 
chapter: in the cases of Haacke and Liberate Tate I have observed a 
certain productive 'scrambling' of categories that is, at the same time, a 
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scrambling of the frames in which we perceive something as art, as a 
political gesture, as a critique of society, or as institutional critique. This 
implies that in works such as Haacke's and Liberate Tate's, whether 
something is perceived as art is less important than what that something is 
able to do. In other words, 'art' becomes a tactical term employed in 
strategies of tackling issues stemming from the outside of the art field. 
Indeed, I believe that institutional critique functions in a logic of framing 
and reframing, and that the ultimate effect that it attains is that it frames 
the frames that frame it. In the next chapter I will address precisely the 
logic of this fact. 
  
Chapter V: 
Framing the Frames of Art 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the possibilities of a topology of 
institutional critique: given that the logic of institutional critique is of the 
type neither/nor or both/and, what space does institutional critique inhabit 
in relation to the art institution? I have shown that the binary topology of 
critique does not apply to the concept of institutional critique that I have 
advocated so far. Inside and outside are not limits for institutional critique: 
institutional critique is and ought to be neither inside nor outside, or both 
inside and outside, and at the same time, of the institution. This is the 
place where it can articulate a critical attitude, of being both partner and 
adversary, at the same time, of the powers that be; a critical attitude that 
works on what escapes the total and exhaustive determination of meaning 
within the logic of instituting. At the same time I explained that critical and 
political art are not critical and political unless they articulate, at the same 
time, an institutional critique of the institutional frames that host them. In 
other words, the potential of critical-political art, of responding to urgencies 
stemming from the social and economic reality, is fulfilled only when critical 
and political art become, at the same time, an institutional critique. 
 The presupposition which grounds both the idea that the outside is 
still a viable option for critical and political art and, likewise, the idea that 
we have been always trapped within the art institution, is that art frames 
only have the negative function of dislocating whatever appears within 
them from social and economic reality. What I want to demonstrate in this 
chapter is that it is necessary that institutional critique remains inside the 
art institution (but also, in a sense, outside of it). This necessity, I will 
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argue, stems from a fundamental undecidable nature of the frame: on the 
one hand they do have, indeed, the negative utility of excluding and 
repressing whatever appears as critical to the 'whatness' of what is 
instituted within them. But at the same time they have the positive utility of 
augmenting, contributing and increasing the performative effect of 
whatever appears within them. My argument is the following: if institutional 
critique does indeed manage to secure a place for itself inside the art 
institution, but also outside of it, as other to the institutional 'whatness' of 
what art is, then the frames of the art institution will be both limiting and 
liberatory, and institutional critique will employ the positive utility of the 
frame. Institutional critique will use the frames of the art institution in order 
to augment and enhance the performative effect of that which it says and 
does. What it says and does is to work precisely on that which escapes 
the institutional totalisation of the 'whatness' of what art is. This is the 
reason why I suggested in the previous chapter that institutional critique 
operates a productive 'scrambling' of categories, and ‘art’ becomes rather 
a tactical term that allows institutional critique to inhabit the field of struggle 
that the art institution comprises. 
 In order to show this, I will first refute the institutional theory of art 
which, in my understanding, represents the theory that recognizes and 
reinforces the idea that the 'whatness' of what art is, is determined 
exhaustively by what the art institution says that art is. The institutional 
theory of art is the expression of the intention and will of exhaustively 
determining the 'whatness' of what art is as if that is all that art is. To refute 
this theory is to demonstrate that the frames encasing the institutional 
'whatness' of what art is are in fact open to the coming of a certain other 
from without. In the first section I will show that there is a certain 
'shallowness' of the theory, which Arthur Danto recognizes, tries and fails 
to overcome. The shallowness of this theory refers precisely to the fact 
that it works in a logic of the type either/or and consequently, it fails to map 
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those cases of artworks which are able to occupy several social arenas at 
the same time. Precisely the failure to consider those cases of institutional 
critique and their critical topology (neither inside nor outside, or both inside 
and outside) is what makes the institutional theory of art insufficient to 
determine in an exhaustive manner the 'whatness' of what art is. I will 
concatenate the findings of the first two sections with what in sections 
three and four I will present as the parergonal logic of the frame. In section 
three I will argue that institutional critique does indeed operate within a 
different logic than that of the institutional theory of art. There is a certain 
sense in which the work of institutional critique is both art and non-art, or 
neither art nor non-art; but essential to the strategies of institutional critics 
is that it is not 'art' per se, but the frame which becomes the object of their 
focus. I have already explained why: institutional critique seizes the 
positivity of the frame, the fact that to articulate a critical project from within 
the art institution can have a different and, perhaps, more significant effect 
than articulating it from outside of it. In section four, I explain why frames 
have an undecidable nature. If the frames of the art institution are 
insufficient to determine, in an exhaustive manner, the 'whatness' of what 
art is, in other words, if they can be described as open to the intervention 
of the outside other, and if, at the same time, inherent to them there is a 
certain positivity of augmenting the performative effect of the work of art, 
there is a reason for institutional critique to remain within the institutional 
framework, but also, in a way, outside of it. Institutional critique operates, 
as it were, before and beyond the frame, but precisely on the frame and 
with the frame. 
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1. On the Institutional Theory of Art 
 
From a certain point of view, it could be said that the institutional theory of 
art (Danto, 1964, 1981; Dickie, 1974, 1984) is precisely the theory that 
says that the 'whatness' of what art is, is exhaustively determined by what 
the art institution says that art is. This is how I translate, in the vocabulary I 
have used so far, Danto's famous statement from 1964, in which he 
argues that 'to see something as art requires something the eye cannot 
decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: 
an art world' (Danto, 1964, 580). Andrea Fraser's argument that the art 
institution is already embodied in our perceptions, as members of the art 
world, has a certain resonance with this theory: the 'art world', which 
presupposes a certain knowledge of art history and theory, appears to be 
the ultimate authority and foundation which grants something the status of 
art. Therefore, if the institutional theory of art says that the 'whatness' of 
what art is, is exhaustively determined by the instituting acts of the 
members of the 'art world', then this theory appears in fact as the 
expression and reinforcement of the arbitrary violence which grounds an 
instituting intention's exhaustive determination of the meaning of what art 
is. Danto is particularly an interesting case, because he seems to be 
aware that this is the consequence of a theory that he had fathered when 
he wrote The Artworld (1964). The project of the Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace (1981) represents, in fact, an attempt to delimit himself 
from the conventionalism and relativism implied in this theory. His strategy 
will be that of restoring a dualist metaphysics of art, within which he will 
argue that art necessarily has a series of essential properties that delimit 
itself from commonplace objects. In this section my intention is to analyse 
the tension that Danto's project of the Transfiguration introduces within the 
institutional theory of art. I believe that Danto's argument against the 
institutional theory is correct, but his solution is wrong: in other words, both 
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the institutional theory of art and Danto's metaphysics of art from the 
Transfiguration fail to take into account the fact that what appears as the 
'outside' realm of the 'mere real' object already always structures the 
'whatness' of what art is; and if this is so, this outside partly constitutes the 
meaning of art. In sections two and three I will show that this is precisely 
what is at stake in institutional critique's transformation of 'art' into a tactical 
term.  
 Halfway through the first chapter of his Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace, which glosses the allegedly essential ontological difference 
between artworks and 'mere things', Arthur C. Danto deploys a lengthy 
argument against the idea that the difference in question amounts to the 
psychic distance we place art works at. With its origins in Immanuel Kant's 
Critique of Judgment, the concept of psychic distance presupposes a 
contemplative attitude and a sort of aesthetic reverence towards a class of 
given (and mainly aesthetic) objects; it contrasts with the 'practical 
attitude', whose corresponding incentive would be to 'act' and 'do' 
something in regard to what one perceives or experiences. Danto's 
rejection of this concept partly relies on ethical grounds: there are cases – 
for example, the destruction of life in a bomb attack – in which it is 
'inhuman' to adopt an aesthetic attitude and see the bombing as a 
'mystical chrysanthemum' (Danto, 1981, 21). For parallel reasons, it is 
'almost immoral' to make art in response to a situation in which one should 
rather act or do something. Danto contends that there is some degree of 
truth in the concept of 'psychic distance' because admittedly, at the 
extreme, one could see the whole world and life as a spectacle or some 
sort of theatre piece. But this is 'at odds' with the fact that art often had 
useful roles, for example, 'didactic, edificational, purgative' roles: otherwise 
said, art has had a social, cultural and economic function. Thus, what this 
distinction does is to generalize for the whole concept of art a 'degree of 
detachment available only in special periods of art history'. At this point 
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Danto apprehends George Dickie's take on the argument1. Dickie argued 
that it is not because of a mysterious attitude that we do not intervene in 
actions that we see on the stage, but because we know how to look at a 
play: we master the conventions of the theatre. 'For knowing that it is 
taking place in a theatre is enough to assure us that “it is not really 
happening”' (Danto, 1981, 22)2. 
 I am not here interested in the polemic against the concept of 
psychic distance per se: the argument itself intervenes in a larger 
discussion about the theory of mimetic art, which Danto eventually shows 
is incapable of mapping cases of pairs of identical entities out of which 
only one is 'uplifted' to the status of art. But it is precisely within this 
context that a rather conspicuous appearance intervenes in the middle of 
the argument, an analogy that is taken for granted and which, I want to 
suggest, contains a presupposition upon which the institutional theory of 
art is based. Danto (and Dickie) take the analogy for granted which means 
that it does not derive logically from the concept of 'psychic distance' [Art 
like a theatre play – this is the analogy in question]. Therefore, art is like a 
theatre play not because of an alleged attitude of aesthetic contemplation, 
proper to the theatre, and which art reproduces; on the contrary, 
something like psychic difference comes into existence because one 
masters certain conventions which allow us to understand that what 
passes as art does not happen for real. The conventions of the theatre are 
                                            
1
 In his Art and the Aesthetic. An Institutional Analysis (1974, ch. 4), George Dickie dedicates an 
entire chapter to the theory of 'psychical distance', whose main proponent is Edward Bullough. He 
considers it as a version of the aesthetic-attitude theory of art, which 'can be summed up as the 
view that any object can become an aesthetic object if only aesthetic perception is turned on it' 
(Dickie, 1974, 57). 
 
2
 Danto does not provide a complete reference, but I take it that he refers to Dickie's seventh 
chapter of his Art and the Aesthetic. An Institutional Analysis (1974), titled 'Aesthetic Object: An 
Institutional Analysis', especially pages 173-181. Dickie offers here an account of the 'conventions 
and practices involved in the presentation and appreciation of the aesthetic objects of art' (Dickie, 
1974, 173). This account begins with a discussion of traditional theatre, 'which because of its 
complexity offers a great variety of distinct items for discussion and because of its formality offers 
many explicit cues' (Dickie, 1974, 173).  
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already embedded in our perception, and therefore, we know in what 
cases we are supposed to take a psychic distance, as opposed to the 
cases in which we should act or do something.  
 Danto has, indeed, used examples from theatre ever since the early 
years of The Artworld (1964). For example, he often appeals to 
Shakespeare's Hamlet to suggest that theatre plays the cognitive role of a 
mirror revealing a self that cannot be itself perceived 'in reality' – that 
Claudius committed the crimes, that Hamlet knows them, and Claudius 
knows that Hamlet knows but cannot do anything about it, since what is on 
stage is theatre and not real life. The same can be said about Dickie. For 
example, in the first chapter of his Art and the Aesthetic. An Institutional 
Analysis (1974), in which he presents his version of the institutional theory 
of art, and precisely in the paragraph in which he asks whether the social 
institution that Danto calls the 'artworld' exists, Dickie appeals to the case 
of theatre and writes that both actors and audience have traditionally 
prescribed roles, and that 'what the author, management, and players 
present is art, and it is art because it is presented within the theatre-world 
framework' (Dickie, 1974, 30). 
 I will focus, however, only on what Danto has to say about the 
connection between art and theatre. Art is like theatre, therefore, but not 
because an attitude of contemplation is common to both, or because in 
both cases we place something at a psychic distance, but rather because 
they both amount to matters of convention from which something like a 
psychic distance derives. It should be said that, in the economy of Danto's 
argument, that art and theatre share something constitutes, to be sure, a 
presupposition. If the analogy is to hold, then the difference between the 
'mere real' thing and the art work is similar to the difference between 
something happening for real and the same 'event' taking place in the 
perimeter of the theatre. 
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But the analogy between art and theatre does not withstand by 
itself. It is reinforced by a second analogy. Danto tells us that  
 
the conventional perimeters of the theatre serve, then, a function 
whose analogue might be that of quotation marks, where these serve 
to dislocate whatever is contained within them from ordinary 
conversational discourse, neutralizing the contents with regard to the 
attitudes that would be appropriate to the same sentence were it 
asserted, for example, rather than merely mentioned (Danto, 1981, 
23).  
 
The reader may remember here that in chapter two I explained that Austin 
develops a similar argument. He distinguished between 'natural' and 
'parasitic' uses of language, the speech acts of an actor on the stage 
belonging to the latter category. Austin commented that, in such cases, 
performative utterances become 'in a peculiar way hollow or void' and that 
language is not used 'seriously' (Austin, 1962, 22). Something goes wrong 
in the case of the speech act uttered on a stage; the very fact that it is 
uttered on the stage constitutes an 'infelicity'; in other words, the 
conditions of success of the respective speech act are not met, and 
therefore, the state of affairs that the speech act 'says' that it brings into 
existence in fact does not come into existence. Or, if we want to present 
the matters differently, the same speech act uttered in 'real life' has 
different conditions of success than if uttered on the stage. Danto appears 
to be on the same track: on the stage (and, by analogy, in art), sentences 
are mentioned and not asserted; and it is presupposed that the hearer 
already masters the conventions which allow her/him to discern that what 
she/he hears on the stage has different condition of success than what 
she/he hears 'in real life'. 
 So let us understand what Danto is actually saying here. He 
correctly observes, to begin with, that a certain iteration takes place in art's 
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case. A sign that we call a 'mere real' thing is iterated in a context that acts 
analogously to quotation marks; in other words, the frames of that context 
dislocate and neutralize something like the 'primary' meaning and attitude 
that sign elicits in the hearer-reader. There are cases when the existence 
of these 'quotation marks' has to be made very clear. In street theatre, for 
example, it needs to be obvious that we are dealing with actors playing 
roles and not with real people doing real things; hence the use of masks, 
special costumes, make up, characteristic intention, and the like. 'In 
realistic plays, realistic costumes enhance the artistic illusion, but in street 
plays they would confuse attitudes on the part of spectators, who are 
uncertain whether they are witnesses or audiences' (Danto, 1981, 24). 
What gets scrambled in these cases are precisely the 'conditions of 
success'; if one uses realistic costumes, then street theatre risks being 
taken as real action; it thus risks failure precisely as a theatre piece. 
Likewise, Danto thinks that similar devices are to be found throughout the 
domain of art:  
 
picture frames or display cases, like stages, are sufficient to inform 
the person privy to the conventions they imply, that he is not to 
respond to what they mark off as though it were real; and artists will 
exploit them to just that end and violate them only when it is their 
intention to cause illusions or to create a sense of continuity between 
art and life, as in the case of the painting of the entombment of Saint 
Petrinella by Guercino, where the lower edge of the painting is 
coincident with the actual edge of the tomb of Saint Petrinella herself, 
above which the painting was originally displayed  (Danto, 1981, 23). 
 
Let it be said that precisely this idea that institutional frames are sufficient 
to inform an audience that it is not to respond 'to what they mark off as 
though it were real' grounds the argument that art needs to escape to an 
outside of the art institution, in order to be able to respond to urgencies 
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stemming from the social and economic reality. But allow me to ask 
precisely in what sense can it be said that frames can ever be sufficient to 
inform an audience that it is to respond differently to whatever is contained 
within them? I ask this question from the following perspective. Danto 
does recognize those cases in which frames fail or could fail to inform an 
audience that it is dealing with 'art' and not 'real life': one such case was 
street theatre, in which frames need to be made obvious. Another case, 
and indeed, more important, is that of artists which 'exploit and violate' 
frames in order to 'cause illusions or to create a sense of continuity 
between art and life'. It seems to me, however, that Danto rejects these 
cases as marginal and insignificant, and as accidents which are unable to 
shatter the unity and the interiority of the institutional 'whatness' of what art 
is. And I say this precisely because he describes these cases as pertaining 
to 'artistic illusion'. In other words, even if frames fail to inform an audience 
that it is to respond differently to whatever is contained within them, this is 
still to be understood under the category of art, as artistic illusion, and not 
as a 'real situation'. Or, to put it differently, the failure of art institution's 
conventions should itself be a convention of the art institution. This is to 
say that if it can be shown that this failure does not amount only to an 
artistic illusion, but to a condition of possibility for the existence of art, as 
art, this triggers the conclusion that institutional frames are not sufficient in 
themselves to define and describe in an exhaustive manner the 'whatness' 
of what art is: in other words, a certain outside of art will have to be 
acknowledged and recognized, an outside that always already inhabits the 
inside of art. This is what I will show in the second section of this chapter.  
 At the moment, however, let us expand on what I announced in the 
opening sentences of this section. Twenty years earlier, when he wrote 
The Artworld Danto explained that 'what in the end makes the difference 
between a Brillo box and a work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain 
theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into the world of art, and keeps 
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it from collapsing into the real object which it is' (Danto, 1964, 581). In 
other words, it is the arbitrary conventions of the institution of art, of which 
art theory is a part, which uplifts something to the status of art. But note 
that the project of the Transfiguration, as Danto confesses in the 'Preface', 
tries to avoid precisely the conventionalist and relativist consequences of 
The Artworld. Danto, in other words, believes that there is something else 
pertaining to art, which is not reducible to the arbitrary will and intention of 
the experts of the art world that determine in an exhaustive manner the 
'whatness' of what art is. The institutional theory, says Danto, is quite alien 
to anything he believes in; and therefore, the Transfiguration, 'in classical 
oedipal fashion, must do battle with my offspring, for I do not believe that 
the philosophy of art should yield herself to him I am said to have fathered' 
(Danto, 1981, viii). So what will Danto say about the conventionalism of 
the institutional theory? He acknowledges that there is some truth in the 
conventionalist definition: 'this suggests the natural next answer, that the 
difference between art and reality is just a matter of those conventions, 
and that whatever convention allows to be an artwork is an artwork. There 
is an element of truth in this theory, but at the same time it seems to be 
shallow' (Danto, 1981, 31). But in what way is this shallow? Is this shallow, 
in the sense that the conventionalist definition of art is superficial? Or is it 
shallow for some other reason? Here is Danto's explanation:  
 
 
the predicate 'is a work of art' [...] is an honorific predicate. And 
honours do indeed seem very much to be matters of convention. But 
there are honours which are earned, and the question is what entitles 
something to this honour: is there not something which must first be 
present before the honour relevantly descends? And what about 
defeating conditions? Are there not at least some facts such that, if 
we knew those facts, the object of which they were true would be 
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disqualified as an artwork no matter what anyone says? (Danto, 
1981, 31) 
 
Let us ponder upon the meanings of this statement. For it does say that 
something 'earns' the honorific predicate 'is an artwork' if and only if there 
is something which offers itself to the structure of honour-granting. In other 
words, a structure of legitimation underdetermines the process of 
something being uplifted to the status of art; and if there is legitimation, 
then there must be legitimate foundations that ground, in the last instance, 
this structure. Danto's position, as I understand it, is that these foundations 
are partly to be found in the artwork itself. This is why in the 
Transfiguration Danto argues that an artwork has to have a series of 
unique properties such as a theme or a subject, a certain point of view 
made visible by the style of the artwork, and a manner of expressing an 
artwork's point of view by means of a rhetorical ellipsis which engages an 
audience that is supposed to fill in what is missing. But by themselves, 
these are not sufficient conditions; because Danto says that these 
conditions must be first satisfied in order for the 'honour to relevantly 
descend' (Danto, 1981, 31). This implies that in the last instance, the 
agency belongs to that from which 'the honour relevantly descends' – to 
conventions. In other words, Danto tries to avoid the conventionalism of 
the institutional theory of art by turning towards a metaphysics of the 
artwork; but this metaphysics of art, nevertheless, ultimately fails back in 
conventionalism. Danto is correct to observe that the conventionalism of 
the institutional theory of art is 'shallow'; he is only wrong to assume that 
this shallowness has something to do with the fact that art has a number 
of intrinsic properties that the conventionalist theory of art fails to take into 
account. What I want to suggest is that the shallowness in question rather 
refers to the fact that this theory fails to recognize that those cases of 
failure are border cases which exhibit a certain irruption of the outside 
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within the inside of the 'whatness' of what art is. What those cases 
demonstrate, I argue, is that the 'whatness' of what art is, is not entirely a 
matter of institutional determination; what art is and ought to be and what 
art does and ought to do is a matter of struggle and contestation which 
already presupposes the intervention of an other from the outside. This is 
the perspective from which I will analyse, in the next section, Michael 
Asher's Caravan; my purpose is to show that institutional critique operates 
with this necessary and essential failure of the institutional theory of art. 
2. Work and Frame: Lack and Cohabitation 
 
The institutional theory of art proposes that the 'whatness' of what art is, is 
exhaustively determined by the instituting acts of the members of the 'art 
world'; in my understanding, this theory appears as the expression and 
reinforcement of the arbitrary violence which grounds an instituting 
intention's exhaustive determination of the meaning of what art is. What I 
have articulated until now as the logic of institutional critique runs contrary 
to this perspective and I will prove this contention by referring to an art 
piece that could well be one of Danto's examples of pairs of indiscernible 
objects.  
 During the Skulptur Projekte Münster 1977, Michael Asher placed a 
caravan in different spaces in the city, 'in places where it might have 
appeared to be slightly out of context, and in locations where it would have 
been unlikely to appear altogether' (Asher, 1983, 166)3. The social spaces 
                                            
3
 In fact, Michael Asher recreated his Caravan project for every edition of Skulptur Projekte 
Münster, which takes place every ten years: in 1977, 1987, 1997 and 2007 (Skulptur Projekte 
Münster Information, 2007, webpage). In 2007 Jan Verwoert commented for the Frieze Magazine: 
'You can imagine how, compared to the residential architecture of its surroundings, this mobile 
home looked not just slightly out of place, but also increasingly out of time in ’87 and ’97' (Verwoert, 
2007, webpage). 
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in question, says Asher, were precisely those that 'public sculpture refuses 
or neglects to address, or those that it wants to conceal (Asher, 1983, 
170).  
 The Caravan has a certain familiarity to the reader accustomed to 
the institutional theory of art. Even more, it seems that as an example, it 
will reinforce this theory: for this is not a case of an industrial object that 
the artist takes into a gallery, nor a gallery piece which has an exact 
counterpart in reality, but rather the very same industrial object which is, at 
the same time, art and non-art, an industrial object which acquires, as it 
were, two orders of visibility. But things are not as quite as simple as this. 
Because, if seen in the city, for example, this rather low-profile trailer, of 
West-German production, not too large to dominate its surroundings, had 
nothing to announce what sort of object it was. Yet it had enough to 
announce a certain lack: it appeared 'unlikely to be there', 'slightly out of 
context'. In other words, not even the status of what Danto would call a 
'mere real' thing would be assured. The immediate question that we can 
ask is whether there is a frame-anchorage which this caravan would fit 
'within'?  
 Is it the context of the art world? Not really, indeed, as the Caravan, 
as an art object lacks something as well. It is true that a simple note 
placed in the main venue of the event comes to supplement this loss, 
announcing a schedule of the trailer's moving around various locations. 
But then, this object, allegedly a piece of public sculpture, exhibits some 
peculiar qualities that make it resistant to being submitted to the category 
of public sculpture. It doesn't have, for example, a pedestal on which it 
should stand. Asher wrote, for example, that the Caravan 'used the 
temporal and contextual body of an exhibition of outdoor sculpture as its 
materially specific and temporally limited pedestal' (Asher, 1983, 170). But 
then, is the city the proper context of this object? Again, not really, since 
even in the context of the city it appears to be 'out of context’. To put it 
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differently, there was no reason for the Caravan to be where it was. 
Remember how Andrea Fraser describes this work:  
 
Asher demonstrated that the institutionalization of art as art depends 
not on its location in the physical frame of an institution, but in 
conceptual and perceptual frames […] Art is art when it exists for 
discourses and practices that recognize it as art, value and evaluate it 
as art, and consume it as art, whether as object, gesture, 
representation, or only idea. The institution of art is not something 
external to any work of art but the irreducible condition of its existence 
as art (Fraser, 2009a, 413).  
 
And indeed, at a first glance, this seems to be what Asher plays with here, 
a sort of stripped down version of the institutional theory of art, in that the 
label which was placed at the main venue of Skulptur Projekte would be 
enough to frame the object as art. Or, put differently, that what this work 
shows is that it is art because those who visited the museum and read the 
label understood that the Caravan should be perceived as art. In a certain 
way the Caravan does suggest this; but what seems to me interesting 
about this particular work is the fact that any frame that would come to fill 
in the lack within the work is not enough to exhaustively determine its 
meaning. Fraser, for example, misses the detail that the presence of the 
label runs contrary to the absence of the pedestal. This is to say that the 
frames of the label and the museum are not sufficient, by themselves, to 
exhaustively determine the meaning of the Caravan. And to extend this 
reflection on the Caravan being 'out of context' within the city landscape, it 
could be safely inferred that whatever category is used to interpret the 
presence of the object, it will not be enough to determine its meaning. The 
Caravan could be recuperated and captured, by being submitted to the 
category of everyday object, or to the category of art object; but at the very 
moment when it is recuperated as this or that, it escapes recuperation, 
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since it shows that it is and ought to be different as well. It seems to me, 
thus, that what the Caravan does is hailing, luring a certain frame, 
therefore, calling for a certain interpretation and perception; but by luring 
them in order to fill in a work's lack, it betrays them, pressing them into 
acknowledging their insufficiency. With a twisted effect, I think that what 
the Caravan does is frame the frames that come to frame the work. And it 
does this by essentially showing that in the moment of recuperation there 
is something that escapes it. If frames of art encode its perception, it 
shows that it is also something other than art; and if the frames of the 
'everyday object' frame it, it shows that it might be something quite 
different as well: it oscillates between being (slightly) in and out of a certain 
context. Slightly out of the urban context, but also slightly out of art 
historical categories as well. The work, indeed, responded to the context of 
the exhibition and the category 'public sculpture', to the history of the 
ready-made object and to the abstraction processes that the art objects 
are submitted to. But the logic of this response is to employ the lack and, 
as it were, reverse it. The trailer, for example, calls forth the urban context, 
but only to the extent that it is out of place – out of the place in areas 
undergoing gentrification where it is placed. Or, it calls forth the art 
institution, but only to show that it is less than a public sculpture since 
there is no pedestal, and no explanation associated with it; the work is less 
of a ready-made since it is placed outside of the traditional museum; and 
finally it is less than an abstract aesthetic object, since it is reintegrated in 
the context of the city. This is to say that it is not only that the Caravan 
appears as an example of the institutional theory of art, but also that in my 
understanding it deconstructs this theory, just like it deconstructs every 
convention and every theory that would place it in a certain category.  
 What the Caravan does, as neither art nor non-art, or both art and 
non-art, is that it articulates a certain movement on the frame, inside and 
outside of the frame, a systematic organization of a lack, which renders 
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the categorial purity and (art historical) puritanism futile: 'Being neither 
pure sculpture, nor pure architecture, both levels of discourse constantly 
interacted with one another within the exhibition context of 
sculpture/architecture' (Asher, 1983, 171). The object, Asher tells us, 
borrows from the categories of both architecture and sculpture. As a piece 
of architecture, the Caravan is 'a functionalized, human-scale shell 
suitable for dwelling' (Asher, 1983, 171); as sculpture, it is 'a three-
dimensional voluminous container, to be seen in the round, attached to the 
ground by its own mass' (Asher, 1983, 171). The intention of this 
'scrambling of categories' is to ‘cross-reference, superimpose, or place its 
separate institutionalized discourses upon one another' (Asher, 1983, 
171). In other words, Asher is articulating for this work precisely what I 
have been arguing in the previous chapter, a non-space, neither inside nor 
outside, or both inside and outside, of the art institution. The Caravan 
employs a logic of collaboration and dissent with frames. It constructs, as it 
were, its own context and its own frames, but these are both inside and 
outside of every possible context and out of every possible frame. 
 It is as if this piece works with a sort of negative theology (not-
enough readymade, not enough sculpture, not enough architecture): but it 
essentially does this, Asher says, 'in the manner of an allegorical 
statement': 'As a concrete object the trailer could have been seen as a 
sculptural, architectural hybrid. In the exhibition context, however, its 
declarative method negated, in the manner of an allegorical statement, the 
validity of both discourses – sculpture and architecture' (Asher, 1983, 171).  
 The logic here, I have suggested again and again, is of the type 
neither/nor or both/and. The space of the work is not that of a negative, 
transcendental criticism 'outside' the art institution, but something neither 
'inside' nor 'outside'. It is on the line (before and beyond) of the frame from 
where allegory proceeds:  
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a double negation, this work required that reified high-cultural notions 
(public sculpture) be reintegrated into the basic, underlying social 
practice (architecture), and that the reification within social practice be 
confronted with the perspective of high art individuation. [...] 
Therefore, the work questioned the historical legitimation of 
contemporary sculpture which pretends to be disconnected from 
social practice, as it also questioned the legitimization of architecture 
which, by assembling past stylistic conventions, attempts to 
recuperate its failure as social practice (Asher, 1983, 171).  
 
A work like Asher's points precisely to the fact that institutional critique 
operates a certain 'opening' of the concept of art, in the sense that what art 
is and ought to be becomes less important than what art does and ought 
to do, in a way critical to what conventions say that art is or should do. If it 
is correct that critique and institutional critique seize precisely this moment 
of a failure of what is instituted as 'art', then what institutional critique does 
or can do is in fact integral to whatever the concept of 'art' covers. Is 
Asher's Caravan a case of the institutional theory of art? What has been 
said until now implies that this theory would need to look for supplements, 
in order to map something like the Caravan. Its conventions, in other 
words, would not be sufficient to inform one that the Caravan is a work of 
art, because the Caravan itself betrays them. The moment when one 
would take the Caravan as an artwork, one is offered enough reasons to 
interpret the Caravan as something different as well. What is lacking in the 
institutional theory of art is the possibility that there is always a remainder 
that escapes whatever the art institution says is art. In the next section my 
argument will be that institutional critique works precisely on this 
remainder, that its work opens the institutional 'whatness' of what art is to 
the inhabitancy of the other. By inviting the other, institutional critique 
shows that institutional frames are insufficient to determine, by 
themselves, the 'whatness' of what art is; institutional critique operates 
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therefore, on the frame, on the border, and with frames and borders. 
3. The Work Is the Frame 
 
What I have done until now is to show the limitations of the institutional 
theory of art. Moreover, I suggested that institutional critique installs itself 
precisely where the institutional theory of art fails, and it does so within a 
process that transforms the concept of art into a tactical term. This implies 
that institutional critique refers to a process in which the work articulates 
new arrangements of frames. This strategy operates in the logic of 
neither/nor or both/and: in chapter six I will describe this as a 
deconstructive process, by which the work frames the frames that frame it. 
Essential to this process is not only the fact that what appear as 
institutional arrangements of frames are de-structured and destroyed; but 
that there is also a construction at play, an invention concerning a certain 
reframing. This construction allows the opening of 'art' to a certain other, 
which comes from the outside, but which is already always inside. The 
reconstruction of institutional critique, then, refers to the implication of 
something that is excluded from the 'whatness' of what art is.  
 Unsurprisingly, the most recent anthology of artistic statements and 
texts written on institutional critique (Alberro and Stimson, 2009) begins 
with a section entitled 'Framing'. This collection shows us two things. The 
first is a progression from the concrete to the abstract. It is not only picture 
frames, pedestals and the like that artists consider as frames: they rather 
pay attention to economic and social conditions of art making, to 
institutional ideologies, and to the intricate connections between art and 
society. This is to suggest a general point that I have highlighted both in 
the second chapter and the fourth chapter when I unpacked Andrea 
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Fraser's text: the art institution is more than the physical spaces of the 
museum and the gallery, it is rather what holds together a concatenation of 
concrete (picture frames, pedestals, architectural disposition of spaces, 
price, titles, labels, leaflets) and symbolic (social, economic, political, 
cultural-ideological conditions, art history categories and discourses) 
frames. Frames are the materials an institution is made of. The second 
point to observe is the increasing interest of artists in frames. John C. 
Welchman argues that, in the 1970s the interest of the artists shifted from 
the frame as a literal object or limit to what he calls the meta-frame or 
second frame of the institutional context (Welchman, 1996, 213). But here 
there is something peculiar happening. Michael Asher is only one among a 
series of artists and artist groups that realize a shift in their artistic practice, 
a shift which presupposes a constant struggle to, as it were, frame the 
frame. My suggestion is that this relates to a strategy of institutional 
critique that adopts a logic of the type neither/nor or both/and, a logic to be 
understood through the categories of deconstruction rather than through 
the categories of negative criticism.  
 The moment is well documented in art history and some 
explanations are particularly significant in order to comprehend what 
happened within this shift. To begin with, Craig Owens observed that the 
effect of art history's canonization of the ready-made amounted to the fact 
that it has become somewhat 'customary' to attribute to Duchamp 'the 
recognition of the importance of the frame in constituting the work of art' 
(Owens, 1994a, 127). But against some interpretations that placed, for 
example, Marcel Broodthaers's Musée d'art modern. Départment des 
Aigles (1968-1971) in the tradition of the avant-garde, Owens argues that 
Musée d'art modern rather exhibits a shift from work to frame. The art 
project was first created in the artist's house but possessed neither a 
permanent building nor a collection. These appear rather as pretext for an 
investigation 'of the apparatus the artist is threaded through' with the 
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intention of refusing 'to supply the existing productive apparatus without 
attempting to change it' (Owens, 1994a, 127). Essentially, however, this 
investigation appears as the work itself. There is a disengagement from 
the Duchampian legacy which, Benjamin H.D. Buchloh suggested, 
presupposed an aestheticization of the readymade, accompanied by a 
repression of the memory of the labour invested in its production, of its 
exchange value and of its sign value imposed on its consumption 
(Buchloh, 2003, 227-228). The difference between the avant-garde and 
what later was called 'institutional critique' clearly stems from one of 
Haacke's statements: 
 
'I did think of signing the rain, the ocean, the fog, etc. [...] But then I 
hesitated and wondered if isolation, presentation at one given limited 
area, an estrangement from the normal is indispensable. It is a very 
difficult question. It finally boils down to a definition of art and I don't 
know what this "Art" is.' (Haacke, quoted in Buchloh, 2003, 221)  
  
This is precisely the point: to tie everything down to a definition of art, to 
show that this or that can also be accepted as art, is precisely what 
Haacke's practice is not looking for. We may note that whereas the 
institutional theory of art also inscribes itself within Duchamp's legacy, in 
the sense that the Urinal is the prime example of a 'mere real' thing 
uplifted to the status of art object, artists like Haacke progressively shift 
their attention onto frames. These artists don't have a particular answer to 
the question 'what is art?'; what their work does, nevertheless, is to 
articulate themselves as an outside which is already inside within the 
institutional 'whatness' of what art is. This 'whatness' of art implies 
particular arrangements of frames, and institutional critique works by de-
structuring these arrangements and reconstructing precisely on what 
escapes the institutional (exhaustive) determination of the 'whatness' of 
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what art is. 
 I believe that it is in this sense that, at the beginning of the 1980s, 
Fredric Jameson acknowledged the 'volatilization' of the art object4 and the 
emphasis placed on 'the inner-worldly decorative fragments of a different 
kind of postmodernism' (Jameson, 1986, 41–42). In other words, these 
'decorative fragments' become the artwork. Haacke's Manet-Project '74, 
for example, consists precisely in a collection of 'decorative fragments' – 
the personal history of the owners of Manet's Bunch of Asparagus (1880), 
up to Hermann Josef Abs, former member of the board of directors of the 
Deutsche Bank during Germany's Nazi era and, at the time, member of 
the acquisition committee of the Wallraf Richarts Museum in Cologne (see 
Haacke, 1975, 69-93). Haacke's work, in this case, is a collection of 
frames, a frame of frames, which was eventually censored by Museum 
Ludwig where it was supposed to be displayed. Jameson commented that 
'What survives the “work” is not its materials or components, but rather 
something very different, its presuppositions, its conditions of possibility' 
(Jameson, 1986, 41–42). 
 It could be said, then, that if what survives the artwork are its 
conditions of possibility, the artwork is precisely those conditions and 
possibilities, those frames. But I want to suggest that this meta-framing 
has a different sort of effect: the work of institutional critique re-arranges 
frames, re-articulates them in a certain space that in the previous chapter I 
designated as both inside and outside, at the same time, of the art 
institution. This re-arrangement of frames is within and without the 
arrangement of art institution's frames.   
 Haacke published in the mid-1970s a book whose title was Framing 
and Being Framed (1975). During the same period, Daniel Buren realized 
                                            
4
 The 'volatilization' of the art object corresponds, perhaps, to what Lucy R. Lippard and John 
Chandler called 'the dematerialization of art' (1968/1999, 46-51). 
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an installation at the John Weber Gallery in New York (1973), which was 
entitled Within and Beyond Frame. The French artist hung striped banners 
on a line that went across the gallery and outside of the window across 
West Broadway. At the same time, at the beginning of the 1970s, Buren 
wrote a series of texts in which he analysed precisely how different types 
of frames place their mark on artworks. In The Function of the Studio 
(2009a, published initially in 1971) he argues that the studio is the first 
frame and limit of an artwork, both from architectural and ideological points 
of view. He shows that, in fact, the shape of the studio influences what 
ultimately ends up in the art institution display:  
 
Thus the first frame, the studio, proves to be a filter which allows the 
artist to select his work screened from public view, and curators and 
dealers to select in turn that work to be seen by others. Thus the 
studio is a place of multiple activities: production, storage, and finally, 
if all goes well, distribution. It is a kind of commercial depot (Buren, 
2009a, 112). 
 
Buren suggested that when the work is taken out from the studio to the 
exhibition place the work is removed from 'its own reality'; what is lost is 
precisely the relationship between artist, artwork, and the context of its 
emergence. The exhibition space will function, thus, as a second type of 
frame:  
 
the place where we see it influences the work even more than the 
place in which it was made and from which it has been cast out. Thus 
when the work is in place, it does not take place (for the public), while 
it takes place (for the public) only when not in place, this is, in the 
museum (Buren, 2009a, 113).  
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 The reason for his aversion to the museum as an exhibition place 
was stated one year earlier in his The Function of the Museum (Buren, 
2009b, published initially in 1970). The museum has a triple role, wrote 
Buren: it is the aesthetic 'frame and effective support upon which the work 
is inscribed/composed'; it is an economic agent as it 'gives sales value to 
what it exhibits'; and it has an ideological, 'mystical' role as it promotes to 
the status of art whatever it exhibits 'thus diverting in advance any attempt 
to question the foundations of art without taking into consideration the 
place from which the question is put' (Buren, 2009b, 102). But more 
importantly 'it does this all the more easily since everything that the 
Museum shows is only considered and produced in view of being set in it' 
(Buren, 2009b, 103). The other function of the museum is that of 
collecting, which enhances its aesthetic role as it simplifies labelling, 
grouping work in historical schools, and the work of comparing, which is 
often (as in the case of group shows) economically motivated. Finally, and 
depending on the function of collecting, the museum is a refuge:  
 
The museum is an asylum. The work set in it is sheltered from the 
weather and all sorts of dangers, and most of all protected from any 
kind of questioning. The museum selects, collects and protects. All 
works of art are made in order to be selected, collected, and 
protected (among other things from other works which are, for 
whatever reasons, excluded from the Museum) (Buren, 2009b, 105).  
 
Although formulated more than four decades ago, I believe that Buren's 
reflections bear a striking validity precisely in the current context of the 
corporatization and privatization of the field of art and culture and their 
transformation according to the principles of a market-based logic. In the 
previous chapter I discussed the intricacies of the connections between 
the Tate – Britain's flagship art institution – and British Petroleum; in this 
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context, Liberate Tate's intervention could be interpreted as a charge 
against the ideological, aesthetic and, ultimately, economic shield that the 
Tate provides for BP. At the same time, one could approach further 
phenomena of the globalized art world and investigate the ideological, 
aesthetic and economic functions of blockbuster art shows or 
contemporary art biennials. In this sense, a convincing study of what he 
calls 'the politics of biennialization' and of the connections between 
Germany's global political hegemony, mainstream culture, and the three 
editions of documenta X, XI, and XII are to be found in Oliver Marchart's 
Hegemonie im Kunstfeld. Die documenta-Ausstellungen dX, D11, d12 und 
die Politik der Biennalisierung (2008). In the same vein, and to anticipate, 
in chapter six I will investigate economic, aesthetic and ideological aspects 
of the ways in which the contemporary art fair is organized nowadays. 
 Daniel Buren believed that if a work does not examine the influence 
of the exhibition framework upon itself, it falls in the illusion of self-
sufficiency, or idealism (comparable to a false artistic autonomy or art for 
art's sake). This is the sense in which, in the previous chapter I suggested 
that an artwork is critical and political only if it challenges the frames that 
frame it. Buren's stripped canvases and banners, which he exhibited in the 
1970s and the 1980s, are in some way similar to Asher's Caravan; they 
speak of a certain iteration of the same sign within differential contexts. 
And in this sense it could be said that Within and Beyond Frame are the 
expression of this fundamental property of the sign; that within the frame, 
in the gallery, a striped canvas appears as something different than what it 
is beyond the frame, across West Broadway. But the line is not fractured in 
the manner in which the institutional theory of art would want us to believe; 
the work of art is not self-sufficient or autonomous. The continuity of the 
line of striped banners across differential frames suggests that the 
meaning of what appears beyond them already constitutes the meaning of 
what appears inside the frames of the gallery. This is to say that there is 
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always something that escapes the institutional determination of the 
'whatness' of what art is. If anything, something that comes from beyond 
the frames will always be there to contest and challenge whatever the art 
institution says that art is. Buren's Within and Beyond Frame is precisely 
that: both within and beyond the frame. Whatever meaning the gallery, the 
museum, the art festival or the contemporary art fair gives to it, as art, it 
always has to be supplemented, by what comes – in this case, by 
invitation of the artist – from the outside of their frames.   
 In this section I explained in what sense can it be said that 
institutional critique operates both a destruction and a reconstruction of 
frames, in that it frames the frames that frame it. But this implies that there 
is something in the nature of the frame that allows it to be worked from 
within and without, destructured and reconstructed in new arrangements. A 
certain permeability of the frame that runs contrary to the suggestion that 
they exhaustively enclose whatever appears within them. How is this 
possible? 
4. The Parergonal Logic of the Frame 
 
In the fourth chapter of his Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981), 
Arthur Danto recounts the story of a sculpture at Columbia University's 
Arden House Conference Centre, a statue of a cat in bronze. It was placed 
at the head of a stairway that led into a common room at a lower level. 
What was particular about this statue is that it had been chained to the 
railing. Presumably, it was chained because it had some value, comments 
Danto. However, the situation is open to the suggestion that  
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it is not a chained sculpture of a cat but a sculpture of a chained cat, 
one end of which is wittily attached to a piece of reality (a chain from 
art to reality is what we have been looking for). Of course what we 
take to be a bit of reality can in fact be part of the work, which is now 
a sculpture of a cat-chained-to-an-iron-railing, though the moment we 
allow it to be a part of the work, where does or can the work end? It 
becomes a kind of metaphysical sandpit, swallowing the universe 
down into itself. In any case, suppose we have just cat-cum-chain. 
The question is what is to be subtracted, if anything? (Danto, 1981, 
102). 
 
The problem that Danto poses here concerns the difficulty of taking a 
decision: it also points out that it is all decision – there is no natural, 
discoverable point, no anchorage at which the contextualisation/framing 
can be said to stop. What are we supposed to interpret in the case of this 
particular artwork? Are we dealing with a representation of a cat (in 
bronze) or are we dealing with a representation of a chained cat? The 
metaphysical 'sandpit' opens its cave even wider since, in the extreme, we 
might have to deal with a cat-chained-to-railings-attached-to-university 
walls, and it seems that, by decision, the whole of reality could receive 
artistic signature. In the absence of supplementary aids – titles, 
explanatory notices, an artistic statement, etc. - how does one know what 
to subtract as art? Several paragraphs later, he introduces the case of 
Richard Serra's Corner-Piece (described as 'lead plate and lead wrapped 
around steel core') and subsequently asks whether the corner is part of 
the work or not (must one provide a corner when one buys the work?). He 
also refers to the case of some of Tintoretto's works in which the coarse 
canvas is so visible that one could ask whether one should subtract it in 
order to concentrate on The Miracle of Loaves and Fishes, and Danto 
describes the problem as parallel to the that of the Cartesian distinction 
between mind and body.  
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 This is in fact the problem with Danto's theory: decisively influenced 
by the Catholic story of Christ's originary transfiguration, Danto's project 
remains trapped in the realm of a dualist metaphysics. Compare this with 
Haacke's statement, that I mentioned in the previous section: 'I did think of 
signing the rain, the ocean, the fog, etc. [...] But then I hesitated and 
wondered if isolation, presentation at one given limited area, an 
estrangement from the normal is indispensable' (Haacke, quoted in 
Buchloh, 2003, 221). Or, add to that monochrom founder, Johannes 
Grenzfurthner's following statement5:  
 
many of those interested in what we did called us artists. Over the 
time we learned that calling what we do 'art' has some benefits. First 
of all because you can get money, as there is art funding for weird 
stuff that nobody can define; second it's good to call it art because 
sometimes it protects you from getting arrested. 'Art' is a tactical term. 
It could happen as well that in some contexts it is the worst thing you 
can do, because nobody takes 'art' seriously any more. 
(Grenzfurthner and Morariu, 2013, 76) 
 
And indeed, it does seem that what some practices of institutional critique 
amount to, is to make the question of subtraction dispensable. The stake 
here is not how to solve old binaries (inside/outside, art/non-art): if there is 
anything in institutional critique strategies which can be discerned with 
clarity, it is a particular surpassing of binaries, and a sustained and 
continuous movement around the frame, here and there, before and 
beyond it. But is there something peculiar to frames that allows this 
                                            
5
 monochrom, whose founding member Grenzfurthener is, is an Austrian tactical media group that 
was invited by curator Zdenka Badovinac to represent Austria at the Sao Paolo Biennial in 2002. In 
response to the political climate in Austria, whose politics of the time took a turn towards the far 
right, monochrom hacked the invitation by passing it further to the fictive former communist party 
member and 'rogue' conceptual artist Georg Paul Thomann. The latter, in the end, did not even care 
to show up in the exhibition, as he was too busy 'watching porn in his hotel room': he distributed the 
task of mounting the exhibition to a team of technicians (actually the members of monochrom). 
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movement? 
 One needs to examine the logic according to which frames operate 
in order to answer this question. In an attempt to decipher one of Derrida's 
few texts dedicated to art, The Truth in Painting, Craig Owens concluded 
that the frame, that which situates itself at the margins of the ergon (work), 
the parergon, is ‘added to the representation [but] it is never part of it. Its 
existence is marginal; it marks the limit between the intrinsic and the 
extrinsic. Still the parergon, like the supplement, may compensate for a 
lack within the work' (Owens, 1994b, 33–34). In section two I offered 
Michael Asher's example of the Caravan, and I explained that this is a 
clear case in which it seems that the work exhibits a lack, that it hails, as it 
were, its frames. I suggested that the American artist consciously employs 
this logic of lack that invites frames and, if anything, his strategy is to play 
on the possibilities of the lack. I propose that the logic of the Caravan 
could be described as parergonal: allow me to clarify, in the next 
paragraphs, what I mean by this. 
 Jacques Derrida explained that what constitutes frames as frames, 
as parerga  
 
is not simply their exteriority as a surplus, it is the internal structural 
link which rivets them to the lack in the interior of the ergon. And this 
lack would be constitutive of the very unity of the ergon. Without this 
lack, the ergon would have no need of a parergon' (Derrida, 1987, 
59–60). 
 
In other words, the relationship between work and frame is one of both 
familiarity and estrangement, or neither familiarity, nor estrangement. It is 
familiar inasmuch there is an intimate connection between a work and its 
frames; and indeed, there can be no work without frames. At the same 
time, however, it is estranged inasmuch as frames remain exterior to the 
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work; they are never part of the work, they simply mark a work's limits. 
Derrida derives the concept of the parergon from Kant's Critique of the 
Faculty of Judgement. In a particular place in this text, Kant is preoccupied 
with a problem similar to Danto's: what precisely is that which separates 
the inside and the outside of the art object? The climax of the tension 
between the inside and the outside emerges with clarity when Kant takes 
into consideration the function of colours, shades, decoration and 
ornamentation – what passes as the parerga of art objects (see Kant, 
2000, §14, and particularly 5:226, pp. 110-111). Kant thinks that though 
not proper to the beautiful object as such, parerga make it more clearly, 
definitely, and completely intuitable, and 'besides stimulate the 
representation by their charm, as they excite and sustain the attention 
directed to the object itself' (Derrida, 1987, 53)6. To this one could add 
picture frames, clothes on statues and palace colonnades. The parerga 
enhance 'the delight of taste', but do so only by means of their form. There 
is nothing in terms of substance that they contribute and, moreover, they 
might even take away from 'genuine beauty'. So it could be said that 
frames do indeed have a negative function, in that they delimit whatever 
they frame. But at the same time, they have a positive function, in that 
they make the art object more attractive. Derrida would say of the 
parergon that it 
  
comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon, the work done 
[fait], the fact [le fait], the work, but it does not fall to one side, it 
                                            
6
 In the English version of Truth in Painting the longer passages from Kant are quoted from the 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement translated by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1911). In Paul Guyer’s more recent version, the fragment reads: ‘The charm of colours or of the 
agreeable tones of instruments can be added, but drawing in the former and composition in the 
latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste; and that the purity of colours as well 
as of tones as well as their multiplicity and their contrast seem to contribute to beauty does not 
mean that they as it were supply a supplement of the same rank to the satisfaction in the form 
because they are agreeable by themselves, but rather they do so because they merely make the 
latter more precisely, more determinately, and more completely intuitable, and also enliven the 
representation through their charm, thereby awakening and sustaining attention to the object itself.’ 
(Kant, 2000, 5:226, 110). 
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touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside. 
Neither simply outside nor simply inside. Like an accessory that one 
is obliged to welcome on the border, on board  [au bord, à bord]. It is 
first of all the on (the) bo(a)rd(er). [Il est d'abord l'à-bord] (Derrida, 
1987, 54).  
 
Note not only the place of the parergon, which I have already described as 
inside and outside, at the same time, of the work, but also a certain sense 
of coercion: that the frame is 'an accessory that one is obliged to welcome 
on the border, on board'. But why obliged? From where is this sense of 
coercion and compulsion that the frame derives? From where is this force, 
a certain force of imposing itself, arising especially since frames intervene 
only by means of their form and thus, since there is no content and no 
substance that they put into play? This is not only an accidental slip of 
language in Derrida's discourse. Because further down he writes that 'the 
parergon inscribes something which comes as an extra, exterior to the 
proper field (…) but whose transcendent exteriority comes to play, abut 
onto, brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the 
inside only to the extent that the inside is lacking' (Derrida, 1987, 56). 
Thus, one speaks about points of pressure, about friction, and about a 
certain conflictual asynchronism between the parergon and the ergon; but 
one also notices, we should not forget, that precisely because they come 
to supplement a lack in the work, frames increase the performative effect 
that a work has.  
 This is essential, because it refers to a certain undecidability of the 
frame, a certain 'being both': both healing and poisoning, both constitutive 
and destructive. Thus, a double functioning of the parergon: 'it de-limits 
what it (de)limits; it liberates what it secures' (Barzilai et al., 1990, 11). And 
here is what the criticality of the parergon amounts to: 'It creaks and 
cracks, breaks down and dislocates even as it cooperates in the 
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production of the product, overflows it and is deduc(t)ed from it. It never 
lets itself be simply exposed' (Derrida, 1987, 75).  
 What I am getting at is precisely this: institutional critique 
consciously operates with this double functioning of the parergon, with this 
undecidable relationship of both familiarity and estrangement, or neither 
familiarity nor estrangement between work and frame. In its transformation 
of art into a tactical term, in its articulation of the artwork as the collection 
of its conditions and possibilities, and thus, of its frames, institutional 
critique grasps this fundamental undecidability of the frame. And this is the 
reason why, despite their negative function of delimiting what they enclose, 
institutional critique does not leave the art institution. Because, as much as 
they delimit, frames also emphasize, enhance, augment, and add to the 
effect that an artwork has. Essentially, this is the reason why Liberate 
Tate's The Gift takes place in the art institution of the Tate and not in front 
of the BP headquarters. And this is the reason why Asher's Caravan works 
with a certain scrambling of frames and categories. In both examples, it is 
essential that they be framed as artworks. But at the same time, in both 
examples, it is essential that they show that framing is insufficient, and 
necessarily open to the intervention of an outside other, the other of 
critique. It is necessary, therefore, that institutional critique works within 
and without, inside and outside, at the same time, of the frame; but just as 
much, it is necessary that institutional critique operates with frames, with 
possibilities that frames themselves offer. What institutional critique 
ultimately does is to 'annex the frame, examine it relentlessly, make it work 
in new and different ways' (Barzilai et al, 1990, 11). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I explained why it is necessary that institutional critique 
remains inside the art institution (but also, in a sense, outside of it). I 
started by explaining that the institutional theory of art is incorrect, in the 
sense that the frames of the art institution are incapable of determining in 
an exhaustive manner the 'whatness' of what art is. This is to say that 
frames are somewhat porous, and allow the intervention of the other from 
the outside. This is precisely what the work of institutional critique does: it 
permeates the frames of the art institution, and occupies a space which is 
neither inside, nor outside of the art institution, essentially in order to allow 
the intervention of the outside other in the struggle for the 'whatness' of 
what art is. The effect of this struggle is that, at times, art is transformed 
beyond recognition; it becomes a tactical term. At the same time, 
institutional critique comprehends the essentially undecidable nature of the 
frame: on the one hand, frames do appear to have a negative function, 
and it is the consideration of this function that grounds the idea that art 
should escape its institutional frames, to an outside where it would be able 
to respond to social, political and economic urgencies. But at the same 
time, they do have the positive utility of augmenting, increasing and 
contributing to the performative effect of whatever appears within them. 
Institutional critique works with the positive utility of the frame: from a 
certain outside of the frame it destructures and disorganizes the frame, 
reworks and reorganizes the frame; but it is doing so essentially from the 
inside of the frame, letting itself be framed by the frame and framing the 
frame, because frames add something that the work in itself lacks.  
 Therefore, this chapter showed that if the frames of the art 
institution are open to the intervention of the outside other, and if, at the 
same time, they do have a positive function of augmenting the 
performative effect of the work of art, there is a reason for institutional 
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critique to remain within the institution, but also, at the same time, outside 
of it; it operates, as it were, before and beyond the frame, but precisely on 
the frame and with the frame. 
 My suggestion is that this takes place within a logic that – the word 
has been haunting this entire thesis – amounts to the structures of a 
deconstruction. Institutional critique is and ought to be a deconstruction. It 
understands and ought to understand the fact that, as Derrida puts it 
 
 
no 'theory', no 'practice', no 'theoretical practice' can intervene 
effectively [...] if it does not weigh up and bear on the frame, which is 
the decisive structure of what is at stake, at the invisible limit to 
(between) the interiority of meaning (…) and (to) all the empiricisms 
of the extrinsic which, incapable of either seeing or reading, miss the 
question completely (Derrida, 1987, 61). 
 
Essentially, however, institutional critique as a deconstruction refuses the 
old binary structures of criticism. And, in a manner that I already explained 
in the previous chapters, it interferes, inhabits material institutions, as an 
outsider but already inside, as beyond but already before the frame.  
'Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream of the pure and simple 
absence of the frame. These two apparently contradictory gestures are the 
very ones – and they are systematically indissociable – of what is here 
deconstructed' (Derrida, 1987, 73). In the next chapter my aim is to explain 
and develop the connection that has constantly accompanied the 
argument of this thesis, the association between institutional critique and 
deconstruction. This is the place where I will show that institutional critique 
can be nothing else but a deconstruction. 
  
Chapter VI: 
Deconstruction and the Possibilities of Institutional 
Critique 
 
Introduction 
 
This research was conceived as an attempt to respond to a particular 
hypothesis that motivated part of the recent range of discourses 
concerning a 'new phase' of institutional critique. Gerald Raunig proposed 
that a new phase will emerge; but essentially, this hypothesis was based 
less on empirical evidence, than on a 'political and theoretical necessity to 
be found in the logic of institutional critique' (Raunig, 2009, 3). This thesis 
asks what is this internal logic of institutional critique? 
 A certain concept haunted my attempts to offer an answer to this 
question and I have conceived this chapter as the place where I will unfold 
its connections with institutional critique. What I argue is that the internal 
logic of institutional critique, its topology and its relationship with 
institutional frames amounts to what Jacques Derrida called 
'deconstruction'. My main concern, in the first section, is to explain why the 
apparatus of deconstruction has not been taken into account by recent 
discourses on institutional critique. The allegation against deconstruction is 
that it is politically powerless and I will show that deconstruction refers to a 
radically political practice though, as the reader will understand, I will use 
the term 'radical' in a particular manner. In the second and third sections I 
will develop the idea that institutional critique as a deconstruction is a 
political practice, and I will particularly approach two questions. The first 
one asks how institutional critique invites and 'invents' the outside-other of 
critique within the art institution; the second one asks in what sense we 
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can say that institutional critique as a deconstruction makes justice and 
does justice. Finally, in the fourth section, I will respond to one of the most 
significant allegations against institutional critique, the fact that it has been 
co-opted and rendered as politically ineffective. My approach will positivize 
co-optation, and I will claim that institutional critique as a deconstruction 
starts precisely from the moment of co-optation. Co-optation is, in other 
words, a positive condition of an institutional critique that operates 
displacements and architectonic shifts within the material and symbolic 
layers of the art institution. 
1. The Politics of Deconstruction 
 
My argument in this chapter is that if there is a concept that describes the 
practices of institutional critique, a concept that maps, as it were, its 
internal logic, the concept of deconstruction serves us best. Nothing is 
further away, however, from the concept of deconstruction, than the 
presentation of institutional critique in terms of waves, or stages. Stepping 
outside of the institution or the acknowledgement of one's intricate and 
inescapable involvement in the institution – to describe the two waves of 
institutional critique in a brief manner – appear as necessary 'critical' 
moments of deconstruction; but deconstruction does not end here. There 
is a non-dialectical going beyond of deconstruction, beyond analysis, 
critique, and method. Institutional critique as a deconstruction is the 
dismantling of what appears as rock solid foundation and certainty, for 
there is nothing that grounds them besides an arbitrary violence, the 
violence of an intention and will to determine exhaustively the 'whatness' 
of what is as if that is all that there is. This is the violence that founds 
institutions; but it is also the violence of a critique that 'polices' its object, 
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that wants to ‘regulate’ its object. Institutional critique as deconstruction 
refers to a certain state of undecidability, of choosing between mutually 
exclusive pairs of opposites: institutional critique as a deconstruction is not 
either partner or adversary of the art institution, it is both partner and 
adversary, or neither partner nor adversary of the art institution. But if 
institutional critique dissolves all that takes the aspect of certainty, the 
certainty of a foundation, rule, norm and law, and if it even runs contrary to 
the foundation and law that critique gives to itself, if it works with the 
aporetic of an undecidability, if its logic is of the type neither/nor or 
both/and, does this mean that it has little relevance in advancing a political 
project which, in a certain manner, relies precisely on foundations, law, 
rules and norms? In this section, therefore, I want to answer to the 
following question: how is institutional critique as a deconstruction 
politically relevant, precisely when deconstruction seems to dissolve the 
foundations of any possible politics? 
1.1. The Political Consistency of Deconstruction 
 
Let us begin by noticing a certain observation that Derrida made at the 
beginning of his lecture that was later published as the first part of Force of 
Law. The Mystical Foundations of Authority (Derrida, 2002b). Derrida 
indicated here a productive use of deconstruction in response to problems 
articulated at the junction point between literature, philosophy, law and the 
institutional infrastructure of politics, economics, and the social. He 
suggested that they correspond  
 
to the most radical programs of a deconstruction that would like, in 
order to be consistent with itself, not to remain enclosed in purely 
speculative, theoretical, academic discourses but […] to aspire to 
something more consequential, to change things and to intervene in 
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an efficient and responsible (though always, of course, in a mediated 
way), not only in the profession but in what one calls the city, the 
polis, and more generally the world (Derrida, 2002b, 236). 
 
It seems to me that this statement emphasizes two essential aspects. 
First, it acknowledges a temptation of some deconstructions, of remaining 
a purely speculative, academic discourse, in fascination with its own 
protocols, but with little to say about what happens beyond the exercise of 
deconstruction. It points to a certain forgetfulness, a certain self-
infatuation, as when one loses oneself in the work of deconstruction, 
forgetting that there is a beyond, which amounts to intervening at the level 
of rules, laws and institutions. If this is true, and Derrida seems to 
acknowledge that this is the case, then we could understand why 
deconstruction is not the first choice as a tool, as an apparatus, for those 
re-conceptualizing the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique. 
Boris Buden explained that the reason why we problematize the conditions 
and possibilities of institutional critique is that 'we still believe that art is 
intrinsically equipped with the power of criticism, [with] the ability to 
criticize the world and life beyond its own realm, and even, by doing that, 
to change both' (Buden, 2009, 33). Deconstruction seems to preclude the 
possibility that criticism should have any power, since deconstruction 
undermines the foundations of criticism as well. But note that in the above 
fragment, Derrida says that at the juncture between literature, philosophy, 
law and the institutional infrastructure of politics, economics, and the social 
there is a certain productive use of a deconstruction that remains 
'consistent' with itself. And in fact, the consistency of deconstruction is 
necessary, if deconstruction is to remain deconstruction: against the 
prevalent charge that deconstruction melts everything away, the 
imperative of deconstruction's 'consistency' is not itself – can it be? – 
deconstructed.   
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This refers to the second aspect emphasized in the above quoted 
statement: Derrida points to a definite responsibility of deconstruction. 
Deconstruction's self-consistency, which means nothing other than the fact 
that the work of deconstruction needs to be carried further, to get out of 
the walls of academia, to challenge the structures, rules, and norms of 'the 
polis, the city, the world', this self-consistency is something of the order of 
deconstruction's political responsibility. In this sense, we should observe 
that the terms 'city', 'polis' and 'world' do not emerge accidentally here: I 
take them as directly referring back to the Greek origin of the term 'politics' 
and perhaps to that prime Aristotelian treatise on politics (Aristotle 2010; 
Miller 2012). Politics, thus, as that which concerns 'the polis', that which 
accounts for the tasks that the politician or statesman, the law-maker and 
law-giver, therefore the 'giver' of rules and norms needs to institute with 
the aim of assuring the happiness of all citizens. I consider this statement 
as a distinctive and straightforward recognition of the fact that 
deconstruction's procedures are ultimately directed towards political 
engagement.  
 It is not by accident, again, that this declaration occurred in a 
lecture which aimed at clarifying the connections between law, as a 
normative organon, a calculable chain of legitimate prescriptions, rules, 
and norms, and justice as the sphere of absolute autonomy of decision: for 
what is more internal to politics than the manner in which laws are 
enforced and justice is made? If politics is about the foundations of law 
and justice, then deconstruction is political since it asks about the 
possibilities of law and justice.  
 This certain insistence that deconstruction is, ultimately, a matter of 
political engagement, is in fact increasingly present in Derrida's late texts. 
Indeed, the French author never missed an occasion to exhibit his belief 
that there is more to a deconstruction than academic speculation or a 
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literary interpretative technique. The lines above have a certain resonance 
with Marx's 11th thesis concerning Feuerbach: 'The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it' (Marx, 
1998, 569-575). Deconstruction, as well, seems to have been used to 
interpret the world, in various ways; but it appears that deconstruction's 
virtues have been believed as amounting only to interpreting the world. 
The point, however, is 'to change things and to intervene in an efficient 
and responsible way' (Derrida, 2002b, 236). Without this getting out there, 
in the world, and precisely in the world of politics, there might not be any 
deconstruction at all, but only, perhaps, the simulation, the formal 
repetition1 of a deconstruction. This already announces the topic that will 
be discussed next: the fact that, as Derrida himself admitted several times, 
there has always been a deficit in understanding, or trivialization, of the 
tasks and aims of deconstruction. I invoke them in order to point to a 
certain misuse of the term 'deconstruction', which, I believe, reduces 
deconstruction to a certain mannerism, formalism, technique, or method. 
Deconstruction is far from that; indeed, what deconstruction does, 
precisely by being self-consistent, is to summon a certain kind of 
radicalism, which Derrida takes no precautions to affirm. To test 
deconstruction at the intersection point between philosophy, literature, law, 
and against any institutional field is an exercise that belongs, Derrida tells 
it, 'to the most radical programs of a deconstruction' (Derrida, 2002b, 236). 
A relation between deconstruction and radicality, then, whose meaning is 
even more important to decipher, since it is by becoming radical that 
deconstruction achieves its aim, that of installing itself within the structures 
of 'the polis, the city, and the world'. And what kind of strange, alien, 
unknown radicality is that since, Derrida explains, it comes 'always, of 
course, in a mediated way'? (Derrida, 2002b, 236)  
                                            
1
 N.B. repetition and not iteration, according to the distinction that I made in chapter two. 
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 This 'of course' is what troubles us most, since it arrives contrary to 
all expectations: radicality is supposed to deliver access to the 'root' of 
things, describing a passage to the origin and foundations of states of 
affairs. A certain political practice, for example, would assume that this 
passage depicts the straight line between two points, the direct and 
unmediated passage, without detours: the detours of a rhetoric of 
negotiation, for example, or of granting some credit to the opponent, or 
even the detour of conviviality, generosity, and friendship. This is perhaps 
a radicality which summons a certain manner of judging, separating and 
discerning2 clear cut ideas, pure origins and foundations, simply present to 
themselves; this is, therefore, the radicality of granting full access to an 
ontological solidity with no residue of doubt. But there is no description in 
the concept of 'radicality' of how this passage should be run through. 
Deconstruction is indeed radical, inasmuch as it works on the 'root' of 
things and states of affairs, that is, the 'root' of foundations, origins, chains 
of legitimation, and their effects on political, economic, and social 
structures. But deconstruction is essentially foreign to any direct access 
and straight line: it employs rather detours and delays as it discovers the 
impure, the repressed, the forgotten, the left behind, the arbitrary and the 
violence of the instituting and instituted law. It could be said that the work 
of deconstruction operates precisely on each and every 'radical' statement 
claiming to grasp the truth, and the simple presence of foundations and 
origins. Therefore, it cannot come into being except by invoking mediation; 
confronting all expectations, deconstruction becomes, as it were, radically 
radical, since it proceeds to showing that only by recuperating and 
revaluing that which is excluded, deleted, and repressed, one has access 
to the root of things. 
                                            
2
 This, we saw in the second and third chapters, essentially refers to the protocols of a binary 
concept of critique. 
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 What has been said until now is that any deconstruction, in order to 
remain consistent with itself, will have to look outside of itself, to 'the polis, 
the city, and the world', to precisely what I have indicated as the world of 
politics. Deconstruction is political, and moreover, it is radically radical, 
since it operates precisely upon structures built on 'pure' foundations and 
laws. But there is another sense in which deconstruction is radically 
political, the sense in which Derrida says that deconstruction has always 
been guided by a certain 'spirit of Marx'. The next subsection is dedicated 
to an analysis of the relationship between deconstruction and Marxism. 
1.2. A Certain Marxism of Deconstruction 
 
Specters of Marx (Derrida, 2006), the work which announces the close 
connection between deconstruction and Marxism, is perhaps the text 
which has elicited the largest amount of disbelief, irony and criticism 
against Derrida; and, to be sure, its negative reception contributed in a 
great measure to the misunderstanding of deconstruction's political 
ambitions. Published in French in the aftermath of the declared end of the 
Cold War (1993) and at a time when Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the end 
of history had achieved momentum (Fukuyama, 2006), Derrida's 
intervention aimed at responding to those who had waited for a long time 
for an explanation about deconstruction's relationship with political 
engagement and, specifically, with the heritage of Marxism. For many, 
however, this book meant just another reason for disappointment.  
 Derrida did, indeed, articulate and sign a declaration: Specters of 
Marx was, first of all, a keynote address, the performance of a certain 
contract signed in front of an audience, perhaps between Derrida and 
Marx, or between deconstruction and Marxism. It was an oath delivering 
an allegiance to a 'certain spirit of Marx', symbolically significant since the 
signature postdates another declaration, the declaration of Marx's and 
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Marxism's defeat against the neoliberal ideology. Nevertheless, though 
this was an official recognition of affiliation, the academic community 
received it with disbelief, in a somewhat ironic and incredulous manner, as 
for many this contract still seemed too playful and ambiguous.  
 Terry Eagleton (Eagleton, 2008, 83) noticed that the performance of 
this contract had been awaited ever since the publication of Positions 
(1981). The interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, both 
declared Marxists, announced it. But Derrida, somewhat surprisingly, 
stated in Specters that this contract had taken effect from the beginning:  
deconstruction had always been the fertile ground of a certain 
'radicalization' which amounted to the 'the tradition of a certain Marxism, 
[...] a certain spirit of Marxism' (Derrida, 2006, 115–116). It could be said, 
therefore, that it was a certain spirit of Marx and of Marxism that guided 
deconstruction's sense of radicalization, a certain spirit of Marx that 
pressed towards the radical deconstruction of 'the very thing it radicalizes' 
(Derrida, 2006, 115–116). But this obviously clashed with other Marxisms 
and other senses of radicalism, perhaps a Marxism that would claim to 
reach the very foundation of things without the work of mediation: for 
Derrida's spirit of Marx 'is not the only one and it is not just any one of the 
Marxist spirits, of course' (Derrida, 2006, 115–116). 
 Derrida had never hidden the fact that he rejected all that came out 
of the de facto Marxism of any communism: the Soviet Union, the Party, 
the Socialist Bloc, or the Communist International (Derrida, 2006, 15; 85–
86). Perhaps because these other spirits of Marx had registered 
themselves in the same binary logic of negation and exclusion (dialectical, 
oppositional) as the objects of their criticism: the radicality of positing the 
Party or the Communist International as ontological foundations did indeed 
rely on a logic of exclusion and repression of the other, on an originary 
violence whose effects have been disastrous. His private experience of 
being arrested and imprisoned by the Czechoslovak authorities in 1981, 
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while he was supporting the cause of the Jan Hus association whose aim 
was to help Czech and Slovak intellectuals (Powell, 2006, 151) contributed 
to his aversion.  
 His contract, therefore, with Marx, officiated in the public ceremony 
of a conference intervention, has never been countersigned 
wholeheartedly. Derrida's allegiance is sworn rather to a certain 'spirit of 
Marxism', thus rather to one of Marx's specters, which Derrida says that 
still needs to come: the contract would rather deliver the promise of a 
messianic time to come, no less aporetic since what is to come would be 
the time in which one liberates oneself from all dogmatism and, indeed, all 
messianism. A spirit of Marx, then, which for Derrida brings back the 
central themes of deconstruction: aporia, a never-ending critical 
questioning (the foundations of critique have to be put under scrutiny as 
well) and, above all, the ambiguity between the constative and the 
performative, between what is and what ought to be, the fact and the 
prescription that, with the force of a speech act, inaugurates, initiates, 
institutes, does what it says it does:  
 
Now, if there is a spirit of Marxism which I will never be ready to 
renounce, it is not only the critical idea or the questioning stance (a 
consistent deconstruction must insist on them even as it also learns 
that this is not the last or first word). It is even more a certain 
emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the 
promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even 
from any metaphysico-religious determination, from any messianism 
(Derrida, 2006, 111–112). 
  
The political in Derrida's statement is the political of a speech act that 
affirms and promises, at the same time, bringing into existence what 
seems to have already legitimated the promise, the messianism of a time 
without messianism: 'And a promise must promise to be kept, that is, not 
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to remain “spiritual” or “abstract”, but to produce events, new effective 
forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth' (Derrida, 2006, 111–
112).  
 Delivered in front of an audience that claimed a Marxist inheritance, 
this sense of political, a political-to-come, a ghostly political that lacks full 
presence to itself, has remained hierarchically subordinated to the grand 
narrative of an oppositional politics. The responses to Derrida's gesture of 
affiliation have been, indeed, numerous; many have been published in a 
book which itself followed the protocols of a symposium dedicated to 
Derrida's Specters and significantly entitled Ghostly Demarcations.  
 Tom Lewis observed that there were two basic positions, 
represented by Aijaz Ahmad's Reconciling Derrida: 'Specters of Marx' and 
Deconstructive Politics and Fredric Jameson's Marx's Purloined Letter 
(both published in the same volume). Whereas Jameson's position still 
attempted to discern what is valuable for the Marxist tradition – the one 
that Derrida took distance from - Ahmad's position rejects the political 
significance of the Specters, accusing Derrida of not properly 
understanding the heritage of Marxism and the significance of its 
application to political practice. What Ahmad sanctions drastically is 
precisely Derrida's Benjamin-influenced messianism, which he labels as 
'ambiguous' (Ahmad, 2008, 102–106). In his view, there is no politics 
without coordination, party, country and class belonging. In the same 
register, and perhaps raising the question of deconstruction's pertinence 
as a political tactic, Terry Eagleton rhetorically asked 'where was Jacques 
Derrida when we needed him, in the long dark night of Reagan-Thatcher?' 
(Eagleton, 2008, 83). But Ahmad's dismissal is particularly interesting 
because it resurrects a common charge against deconstruction, the fact 
that deconstruction allegedly amounts only to a literary practice of 
interpretation:  
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Deconstruction has always been primarily a textual hermeneutic; in its 
political declarations it has always involved, to my understanding, not 
just extravagance but also too much methodological individualism, 
too voluntaristic a notion of social relations and of the politics that 
inevitably ensues from those relations. It is odd that in affirming his 
association with Marxism – or as he puts it, 'a certain spirit of 
Marxism' – Derrida yields none of these grounds, restates them in 
fact with great firmness, introducing now a tone of religious suffering 
at odds with deconstruction's own virtually euphoric self-affirmation of 
the past (Ahmad, 2008, 107–108). 
 
A statement such as Ahmad's constitutes in fact the prevalent opinion 
about the virtues of deconstruction. And what I want to do in the next 
section is to show that this rejection of the political significance of Jacques 
Derrida's project is a commonplace in the field of art and culture. This 
denial of deconstruction's political significance, in my understanding, 
constitutes the ground for which its apparatus has not been taken into 
consideration by recent attempts of re-articulating institutional critique. 
1.3. Misconceptions of Deconstruction 
 
To be sure, Derrida was not unfamiliar with the allegation that 
deconstruction is reducible to a textual strategy. 'The idea that 
deconstruction should confine itself to the analysis of the discursive text – I 
know that the idea is widespread – is really either a gross 
misunderstanding or a political strategy designed to limit deconstruction to 
matters of language' (Derrida, 1993, 15). Nevertheless, it has become a 
commonplace to claim that deconstruction's effect is limited to the field of 
literary hermeneutics. George Yúdice, for example, in his otherwise 
exemplary The Expediency of Culture (2003), writes that the fundamental 
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problem of deconstructive analyses is that 'they work quite well for texts 
but seem powerless before the operations of the institutions that exert 
regulatory force over texts' (Yúdice, 2003, 58–59). Yúdice's book is 
inspired by Judith Butler's analyses of the performativity of speech acts; 
he, nevertheless, comments that though Butler held the belief that power 
can be turned against itself in order to produce alternative modalities of 
power, that contestation can be articulated beyond a 'pure opposition', this 
remains a matter 'yet to be elucidated at the level of institutions and their 
effects (legislative and juridical systems, welfare reform, affirmative action 
programs, military and foreign policy)' (Yúdice, 2003, 58–59).  Allow me to 
restate my argument: institutional critique operates and ought to operate 
with the logic of deconstruction, and, as such, it is a prime example of how 
a deconstructive practice intervenes in the systems and structures of the 
art institution. 
 However, it has to be admitted that deconstruction itself might 
responsible for its own rejection. Derrida indeed insisted that 
deconstruction needs to be 'consistent' with itself, implying that there are 
deconstructions that fail at this task, thus failing the test of a certain 
responsibility that I described as political. To begin with, much of 
deconstruction's dismissal relates to how one of its versions was 
appropriated by what is known as the Yale School of literary critics (Paul 
de Man, Geoffrey Hartmann), which had little interest in political analysis. 
Second, particular statements taken out of context did not work in 
Derrida's advantage – I refer to maybe deconstruction's most famous 
slogan 'there is nothing outside of the text/there is no outside-text [il n'y a 
pas de hors-texte]' (Derrida, 1998, 158). Pulled out of its context but 
always still in a (another) context, it contributed to deconstruction's 
stigmatization as a form of idealism, seemingly implying that Derrida has 
always maintained that reality is language, and that there is nothing 
outside of language.  
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 To this we should add the fact that more than often art journals and 
artist statements contribute to the proliferation of a certain 
misunderstanding and, perhaps, a certain trivialization of what 
deconstruction is. A simple bibliographic search, through magazines and 
journals like Artforum, Flash Art, and the like, reveals that the concept is 
often associated with artistic strategies of, for example, physically 
dismantling and recomposing received structures, spaces, styles, 
statements, and representations, that often tends to abbreviate new 
formalisms. Whereas these tactics and strategies might be understood as 
deconstructive, artists and authors which describe them as such hardly 
pursue further their political consequences, or ask how these 'strategies' 
aim, if they do aim at all, at tackling issues which concern, 'the polis, the 
city, the world'.  
 Art theorist Graham Coulter-Smith even argues in his 
Deconstructing Installation Art (2006) that what he identifies as the 
'playfulness' of deconstruction in art has rather served the art institution. 
Coulter-Smith describes by the term 'deconstructive art' a third, yet 
unnamed, artistic discourse, which has coexisted, throughout the twentieth 
century, alongside expressionism and abstraction. He believes that the 
main characteristics of this third discourse have been already theoretically 
articulated by Peter Bürger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984). They 
refer to the deconstruction of the traditional concept of the precious work 
of art via the use of poor materials and found objects; to the desire to 
integrate art with everyday life that implies a critical stance towards the 
elitism of institutionalised art; and to the creation of fragmented 
(‘nonorganic’) texts via strategies such as montage that encourage the 
reader to engage in the creative process (Coulter-Smith, 2006, webpage). 
Therefore, deconstructive art maps 
 
the ‘transgressive’ aesthetics of Duchamp, Dada and Surrrealism; this 
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was its first generation. It evolved further in the second half of the 
twentieth century via the mosaic of elaborations evident in art of the 
1960s, such as: Nouveau Réalisme, Fluxus, Pop Art, Minimal Art, Arte 
Povera, Land Art, Performance Art, and Conceptual Art. The third 
generation of deconstructive art emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s 
with the postmodern appropriation movement (e.g. Cindy Sherman, 
Barbara Kruger, David Salle, Hans Haacke, Victor Burgin, and Imants 
Tillers). Elements of all three generations of deconstructive art are 
evident in its most recent manifestation in the form of contemporary 
installation art—which in view of its movement status might also be 
termed ‘installationism’ (Coulter-Smith, 2006, webpage).  
  
If deconstruction, as I understand it, is a practice of inhabiting institutional 
structures of 'the polis, the city, and the world', then we have to consider 
that only some of the artists who Coulter-Smith counts would be 
deconstructive artists: precisely those artists that have articulated an 
institutional critique. Coulter-Smith's concept of deconstruction is based on 
Roland Barthes' The Death of the Author (1967) and rather means, as he 
puts it, a decomposition and recomposition of 'cultural material'; and a 
dialectical 'interface between intellect (reason) and creative processes' 
(Coulter-Smith, 2006, webpage). This conception differs from what I have 
been emphasising in this thesis as deconstruction, and which refers to a 
particular logic that disengages itself from working with the categories of a 
binary logic of the type either/or. Deconstruction employs a logic of the 
type neither/nor or both/and: this logic has nothing of dialectics, in the 
sense that there is not resolution in a dialectical synthesis, be that a 
synthesis of reason and creativity. From a Derridean perspective, the 
concepts of 'reason' and 'creativity' also appear as problematic. Derrida's 
numerous deconstructive returns to the 'age of reason' (his texts on Kant, 
but also his take on the genealogy of modern representation) and, 
especially, his late reflections on a certain 'madness' of decision (Derrida, 
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1996, 65; Derrida, 2002a, 255) that 'understanding, common sense, and 
reason cannot seize [begreifen], conceive, understand, or mediate [...] 
neither can they negate or deny it, implicate it in the work of negation, 
make it work' (Derrida, 1996, 65), place a doubt on the ready availability of 
such a concept. Similarly, Coulter-Smith does not sufficiently explicate the 
relation between deconstruction and 'creativity', a necessary explication, I 
believe, since a certain notion of 'creativity' prevails in the current ideology 
of the creative cultural industries.  
 In Coulter-Smith's argument, deconstructive art seems to refer to 
anything artistic with critical intent. In the fourth chapter, however, I argued 
that the critical and political potential of art is not fulfilled unless the work of 
art is, at the same time, an institutional critique, and, I can add now, a 
deconstruction of the context in which the work is placed. I argued that this 
is possible only if we are able to grasp a certain logic of being both inside 
and outside of the art institution, or neither inside, nor outside of it.  Only a 
deconstructive logic and a non-binary topology of critique would allow us 
to reach the 'polis, the city, and the world'. 
 Coulter-Smith, however, makes the interesting claim that whereas 
deconstructive art was rather marginal in the first half of the twentieth 
century, it has become the dominant artistic discourse towards the end of 
it. The celebration of its hegemony erased its transgressive character (the 
sublation of art into life) and deconstructive art or, rather, its inheritor that 
Coulter-Smith identifies in installation art, became accepted in art 
institutions. He suggests that the concept of 'transgression' was replaced 
with that of 'play', indicating an artistic engagement in a game of sorts with 
the art institution. Artists are 'intimately interwoven into the institutional 
fabric of the art gallery/museum. Most installation artists play with that 
fabric rather than trying to genuinely critique it' (Coulter-Smith, 2006, 
webpage). The outcome is that transgression has been civilized, 
naturalized, and captured by the art institution. My claim, however, is that 
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this phenomenon does not characterize the deconstructive possibilities of 
art, which is necessarily an institutional critique, but rather a type of art 
which has formalized and trivialized deconstruction. If my hypothesis is 
correct, if there is a necessary and intimate relation of symbiosis and 
cohabitation between institution and critique, it appears that artists cannot 
but be 'interwoven' in the institutional fabric of the gallery and museum. In 
the last section of this chapter I will argue that the fact that artists are 
enmeshed in the fabric of the institution, integrated and co-opted, 
constitutes an opportunity rather than a problem. For deconstructive art, 
which for me is always institutional, always political, and always aiming at 
challenging and changing nodal points in the art institution, the problems 
start when it is transformed into a mere style, mannerism or formalism.  
1.4. Deconstruction is neither/nor or both/and 
 
What I have done, until now, in this chapter, is to emphasize the sense in 
which it could be said that deconstruction is and ought to be political: I 
hope to have cleared the terrain of a number of misunderstandings, 
allegations and suspicions that target deconstruction's political potential. I 
have tried to suggest that, if anything, deconstruction cannot but be radical 
and political. The transformation of deconstruction in a formalism, style or 
a formal set of rules to be followed runs contrary to the nature of 
deconstruction. At the same time, throughout this thesis I have shown that 
deconstruction essentially employs a logic of inhabiting a space, both 
inside and outside of the borders and frames of the art institution. It 
remains now to ask precisely what deconstruction is and ought to be. 
 When asked about the best translation into Japanese of the term 
deconstruction (Derrida, 1988c), Derrida acknowledged his inability to 
provide an answer in positive terms. To be sure, deconstruction is not a 
critique, an analysis, a method, an act or an operation (Derrida, 1988c, 4). 
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It rather 'takes place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, 
consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It 
deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed' (Derrida, 1988c, 4). Why, 
then, does deconstruction not await modernity? Because modernity 
instituted a paradigm of rationality that presupposes a master-subject, a 
pure consciousness present to itself: it amounts to organization, to 
planning, to deliberation and calculation. Deconstruction is the other of this 
paradigm: it emphasizes, for example, the absence that is constitutive of 
presence, and the chance that it is impossible to capture in any type of 
calculation, any type of law, or any chain of legitimation. Deconstruction is 
about the other, the repressed, the outside of any pre-established rules 
and laws, of any canon of procedures, method or methodology. To be 
sure, it cannot but begin with calculation, and for that matter, it starts with 
critique, analysis, and method; but it does so only in order to 'deconstruct 
it-self', in order to suspend even the privileged point from where critique, 
analysis and method would be conducted. It means that every time one 
follows a method for analysis and critique one needs to question their own 
presuppositions, their own conditions of possibility.  
 It could be said, therefore, that deconstruction takes place 
everywhere: 'it takes place where there is something and is not therefore 
limited to meaning or to the text in the current and bookish sense of the 
word' (Derrida, 1988c, 4). One notices, again, the insistence on 
deconstruction's social and political implications. Derrida continues: 'we 
still have to think through what is happening in our world, in modernity, at 
the time when deconstruction is becoming a motif, with its word, its 
privileged themes, its mobile strategy, etc.' (Derrida, 1988c, 4). Perhaps 
one finds the guiding thread conducting the rationale of this thesis in the 
last quoted sentence: to claim that deconstruction is the logic proper to 
institutional critique is to claim that deconstruction's 'themes, its mobile 
strategy' are able to graft themselves on the re-conceptualizations of 
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institutional critique that would empower it and enable it to respond to its 
current provocations.  
 I would not advance much further if I did not first reflect on a certain 
architectural dimension of deconstruction. Describing his encounter with 
Bernard Tschumi's work, Derrida admitted that there is a close connection 
between deconstruction and architecture, since deconstruction is about 
destabilizing the structural principles of anything that relates to systems, 
architectonics, structures, foundations, and constructions (Derrida, 1997, 
313). Destabilization touches on critique and analysis: indeed, they may 
be part of a deconstructive protocol, but nevertheless, deconstruction 
'carries its jolt beyond semantic analysis, critique of discourses and 
ideologies, concepts or texts, in the traditional sense of the term' (Derrida, 
1997, 313). Towards where? Perhaps towards where one begins to see 
how deconstruction differs from destruction. Deconstruction does indeed 
dissolve everything that appears as self-evident and pure; but essentially it 
does not stop there. It is not only about destabilization, dismantling, and 
negative destructuration. On the contrary,  
 
deconstructions would be feeble if they were negative, if they did not 
construct, and above all, if they did not first measure themselves 
against institutions in their solidity, at the place of their greatest 
resistance: political structures, levers of economic decision, the 
material and phantasmatic apparatuses which connect state, civil 
society, capital, bureaucracy, cultural power and architectural 
education—a remarkably sensitive relay; but in addition, those which 
join the arts, from the fine arts to martial arts, science and technology, 
the old and the new (Derrida, 1997, 313). 
  
One may talk, therefore, about a certain positivity of deconstruction: 
deconstruction is also about construction, about positing, about 
configuring, about articulating and instituting. And my claim is that 
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institutional critique is precisely a deconstruction that 'measures' itself 
against institutional points of solidity. But before I dig further into this 
insight, let us observe that Derrida says 'not deconstruction itself, since 
there never was such a thing'. This sentence needs to be connected to the 
apparently insignificant fact that Derrida speaks of 'deconstructions' and 
not deconstruction.  How can we understand this? There might be two 
ways of answering this question. First, by recalling that there is a never 
ending deferring of deconstruction, a certain postponement for a time-to-
come. One, as it were, attempts at deconstructing, but as soon as one 
thinks that one deconstructs, one grasps something of a different order: 
deconstruction involves undecidability, but it is also decision. And a 
decision always implies that a set of rules, a certain procedure, and, 
indeed, certain rules and laws are brought into existence. And thus 
deconstruction is impossible; as soon as it starts, it becomes something 
other. If it were possible, it would not be deconstruction any more (Derrida, 
2007, 15). This insight implies a fundamental fact: there is no end to 
deconstruction – and, to apply this to our theme – there is no end to 
institutional critique. Institutional critique as a deconstruction needs to 
assure itself that it never stops. Because to stop means to reach certainty 
and there can be no certainty which is not questioned and deconstructed.  
 This relates to the second answer to the question: in the letter sent 
to his 'Japanese friend' Derrida claimed that deconstruction deconstructs 
itself. But how can deconstruction deconstruct itself unless deconstruction 
ends being deconstruction, that is, unless it passes onto a different 
regime, the regime of a type of deconstructible object? Deconstruction 
deconstructs itself, it needs to deconstruct itself, once it initiates, invents, 
proposes, constructs, once it is instituting a new set of rules, laws and 
procedural sequences. And here I will quote Derrida at length, from a live 
exchange precisely on the subject of the visual arts – or what the 
interviewers described as spatial arts:  
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Deconstruction does not consist simply of dissociating or 
disarticulating or destroying, but of affirming a certain 'being together', 
a certain maintenant (now); construction is possible only to the extent 
that the foundations themselves have been deconstructed. 
Affirmation, decision, invention, the coming about of the constructum 
is not possible unless the philosophy of architecture, the history of 
architecture, the foundations themselves have been questioned. If the 
foundations are assured, there is no construction; neither is there any 
invention. Invention assumes an undecidability; it assumes that at a 
given moment there is nothing. We found on the basis of 
nonfoundation. Thus deconstruction is the condition of construction, 
of true invention, of a real affirmation that holds something together, 
that constructs (Derrida, 1994, 27). 
 
Deconstruction implies, therefore, both dissociation, disarticulation, and 
destruction, but also construction, affirmation, invention. And this 'both' is 
of the order of neither/nor or both/and. In his attempt to explain the 
significance of the Derridean deconstruction for a Marxist perspective, 
Fredric Jameson wrote that deconstruction is about the 'tracking down and 
identifying, denouncing, of just such resources, of just such nostalgias for 
some “originary simplicity”, for the unmixed in all its forms' (Jameson, 
2008, 45).  It is, to put it in different words, a manifest disbelief and doubt 
against all assurance, precisely against the assurance of foundations. But 
what comes after the dissolution of everything unmixed, of every assured 
foundation, of every self-evident norm and law? First, the space of a non-
foundation, which, for Derrida, is the space that allows the essential 
experience of undecidability. Second, a certain responsibility not to dwell 
on undecidability, the responsibility and the care of pursuing the 
deconstructive project further, to take a decision which is always a speech 
act that constructs its referent, its state of affairs, its chains of legitimation, 
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its rules, rituals, laws, and institutions. 
 What I want to do in the next two sections is to ask precisely what 
does it mean to develop the political consequences of institutional critique 
as a deconstructive strategy in relation to the art institution? I want to offer 
an answer to this question by taking into account two levels of analysis on 
which institutional critique as a deconstruction could be carried out. The 
first one regards the relation between institutional critique as a 
deconstruction and the possibility of construction and invention that is 
always invention of the other. The other one regards the relationship 
between institutional critique as a deconstruction and the possibility of 
justice. 
2. Institutional Critique as Invention of the Other 
 
Throughout this thesis, and particularly in chapters two and three, I argued 
and explained that the logic of instituting rests on an arbitrary violence, the 
violence of an intention and will of defining and determining in an 
exhaustive manner the 'whatness' of what is, as if that is all that there is. 
This logic is binary, in the sense that it excludes that which does not 
submit to the definition and description of the 'whatness' of what is. Given 
the iterability of the sign, there is always a rest, a remainder that escapes 
the totalisation of the instituting act. I argued that, in a binary logic, that 
which escapes is always outside of the institution. But I hope to have 
shown that, in fact, there is a sense in which it could be said that what is 
outside of the institution is always already inside, constituting and 
structuring the inside; and that institutional critique operates precisely in 
the space of this inside-outside which, from the point of view of a binary 
topology of critique, is a non space. Institutional critique is both inside and 
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outside, or neither inside, nor outside of the art institution. It constructs 
precisely upon that which escapes the totalising act of instituting.  
 If this is true, then institutional critique operates precisely by inviting 
that which, from an institutional point of view, appears as the entirely other; 
but this other is always already part of the instituted same. This implies 
that institutional critique as a deconstruction posits its own constructions, 
institutes its own effects, rules and laws. In a certain sense, which I will 
explain immediately, institutional critique as a deconstruction 'invents' the 
other.  
 In Psyche: Inventions of the Other, after affirming again 
deconstruction's resilience in not settling for methodical procedures, 
Derrida wrote that  
 
 
deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all; […] its writing is not 
only performative, it produces rules – other conventions – for new 
performativities and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of 
a simple opposition between performative and constative. Its process 
[démarche] involves an affirmation, this latter being linked to the 
coming—the venire—in event, advent, invention (Derrida, 2007, 23). 
 
The positivity of deconstruction is the positivity of the act of instituting, 
constituting, producing and finally, inventing – indeed inventing new 
institutions, rituals, and state of affairs. But invention should be understood 
here as a certain 'to-come' (in-venire). It refers to the open invitation that 
institutional critique, from within the institution of art, addresses to the 
other coming from the outside: the invention of the other of institutional 
critique as a deconstruction is the invitation addressed to an outside to 
come and inhabit the inside of the art institution. This is why invention, as 
in-venire, presupposes a somewhat subversive character as it 'always 
presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts a 
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disorder into the peaceful ordering of things, it disregards the proprieties' 
(Derrida, 2007, 1). Each invention is iteration, it involves the coming of the 
other, of difference. By letting difference inhabit the same, invention does 
subvert an existing order; but by taking place inside, it reconfirms, at the 
same time, the given order. And this is, essentially, the aporetic condition 
of invention. Invention subverts an institutional condition, but it confirms it, 
at the same time, since no invention can be an invention in the absence of 
an institutional apparatus:  
 
If at first we might think that invention calls all status back into 
question, we also see that there could be no invention without status. 
To invent is to produce iterability and the machine for reproduction 
and simulation, in an indefinite number of copies, utilizable outside 
the place of invention, available to multiple subjects in various 
contexts' (Derrida, 2007, 34).  
 
This is why, if institutional critique is invention of the other, it must 
constantly invent and reinvent the other; for if it comes to an end, it would 
simply be entirely recuperated by what appears as the same. 
 If invention is iterability, and if iterability presupposes the a-priori 
dividing of the sign into a 'same' and an 'other, then invention, as well, is 
split a-priori between what Derrida would call invention of the same and 
invention of the other (Derrida, 2007, 39). The invention of the same is to 
be identified in the governmental policies of modern science and culture, in 
the pressure to invent the new, according to the order of the calculable, in 
which chance is mastered and controlled. The invention of the same might 
also refer to the invention of artistic styles or genres according to a certain 
formula or recipe to be followed. But I claimed that institutional critique 
refers precisely to an invention of the other, 'the one that allows the 
coming of a still unanticipated alterity, and for which no horizon of 
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expectation as yet seems ready, in place, available' (Derrida, 2007, 39). In 
my understanding, the invention of the other is the coming of critique as 
alterity, as that which escapes the total and exhaustive determination of 
the 'whatness' of what is. Remember how Thomas Messer argued that 
Haacke's project needed to be expelled from the art institution: Haacke 
had brought in an alien body in the organism of the institution. And 
Liberate Tate introduced into the institution something which had enough 
familiarity to be recognized as art, but also something radically different. In 
both cases, therefore, we talk about an invention of the other, as that 
which is subversive, that which abides by the rules whilst subverting them 
at the same time, subverting rules by shifting their onus, a certain opening 
in the rules themselves which allows the outside other to come in, insert 
itself, occupy the structures and the rules, virally feeding from them, and 
modifying them.   
 Gerald Raunig, who as I already announced, proposed the thesis of 
a new phase of institutional critique that is based less on factual evidence, 
but on institutional critique's 'internal logic', has edited in collaboration with 
Gene Ray a volume that collected the Institute of Progressive Cultural 
Policies' dossiers on themes concerning institutional critique. The book is 
significantly entitled Art and Critical Practice: Reinventing Institutional 
Critique (2009). The new phase of institutional critique borrows from the 
paradigms of critique advanced by Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and 
Negri; but it is surprising, however, that none of the authors included in this 
book reflected on the possibilities offered by deconstruction, precisely the 
possibilities of reinventing institutional critique. In this section, I explained 
that institutional critique, as a deconstruction, is invention of the other. If 
institutional critique needs to be reinvented, therefore, if a certain other of 
institutional critique needs to be called in, then this means that institutional 
critique has passed in the order of the same, in the order of the 
institutional recipe, of codes, rules and laws to be followed. The 
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reinvention of institutional critique is the iteration of institutional critique as 
an invention of the other, that  
 
works at not letting itself be enclosed or dominated by this economy 
of the same in its totality, which guarantees both the irrefutable power 
and the closure of the classical concept of invention, its politics, its 
technoscience, its institutions (Derrida, 2007, 46).  
  
Institutional critique as a deconstruction is, therefore, an invention of the 
other; it constructs upon what it invites and allows to come in the art 
institution, that which escapes the laws of the institution, the outside that is 
expelled and excluded. And by doing this, by inventing the other, 
institutional critique is inventing 'the polis, the city, and the world'. This is 
the political responsibility of institutional critique. But there is another 
responsibility that needs to be addressed: if institutional critique works on 
institutional foundations and laws, in what sense can it be said that it 
makes justice? 
3. Institutional Critique and the Possibility of Justice 
 
When, in chapter two, I analysed the 'impure' logic of instituting, I argued 
that in the absence of any legitimate foundation, all institutions are based 
on an irreducible arbitrary violence that, by declaration and, therefore, by 
law, defines and describes the 'whatness' of what is as if that is all that 
there is. In chapter four and five I referred to Liberate Tate's The Gift and 
to Michael Asher's Caravan as examples of institutional critique that 
constructs on precisely what escapes institutional laws, rules, norms, and 
the conventions that make something 'art'. My argument is that institutional 
critique is an invention of that which escapes the institutional 'whatness' of 
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what is, in the sense that it calls for and invites the repressed other of 
critique to inhabit the inside of the institution. If the invention of the other is 
institutional critique's response to the arbitrariness of institutional law and 
convention, then it could be said that institutional critique deconstructs law. 
But does the deconstruction of law already address the problematic of 
making justice?  
 In Force of Law (2002b) Derrida draws a distinction between justice 
and law, differentiating the two according to their relation to the order of a 
calculable chain of legitimizing rules:  
 
Law is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that 
there be law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculate 
with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, 
as improbable as they are necessary, of Justice, that is to say of 
moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never 
insured by a rule (Derrida, 2002b, 244). 
 
Derrida is arguing that, whereas law presupposes a canon of instituted 
rules, justice is unbound by any social, economic, political, and ideological 
law and, therefore, power. For a just decision is a free decision. If law has 
a foundation, grounded on an irreducible arbitrary violence, then justice 
must have no foundation and no canon, law, or recipe to follow. A just 
decision cannot be taken according to a pre-existing law, because all law 
is instituting violence. Justice, in order to be justice, is precisely that which 
cannot be violent. Therefore what we see everywhere is instituted and 
instituting law and not justice; and precisely because it is instituted, law is 
deconstructible, in the sense that one can proceed from law to law, from 
rule to rule, up to the point where one discovers foundations instituted, 
with an instituting violence, on nothing but themselves.  
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 So what does it mean that justice has no foundation? First, it means 
that there is no universal justice, but only justice that is multiple and 
singular. Second, it appears that justice rather belongs to a time-to-come 
that, in fact, never comes: the idea of justice as a justice-to-come is that 
which makes possible the deconstruction of law. The aim of making justice 
is what triggers the deconstruction of law, which is a dismantling of the 
arbitrary and violent character of law’s foundational acts. Deconstruction 
aims at making law just, but as soon as it takes a just decision, it 
reinscribes itself in the order of the speech act, law, and rule. This is the 
sense in which I observed above that deconstruction must not only 
address institutional structures and law, but also needs to address its own 
constructions. Deconstruction needs to deconstruct itself in order to 
safeguard itself from becoming law. From a certain point of view, it could 
be said that deconstruction is one of justice's names. 'Justice in itself, if 
such a thing exist, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more 
than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice' 
(Derrida, 2002b, 243). 
 What does this mean for a project of institutional critique that is a 
deconstruction? First, we should say that institutional critique does not and 
cannot demand justice from the institution and from the law, because no 
law does justice; law always encodes the arbitrary violence on which the 
institution is grounded. Consequently no institution and no art institution is 
just or can be just. They may belong to the order of the legal, in the sense 
that they are instituted according to law, but they are not just. But can it be 
said that institutional critique as a deconstruction is just? One cannot say 
that either because the intimate relation of cohabitation and symbiosis 
between institution and critique implies that as soon as institutional critique 
invents the other, it inscribes it already in the order of the institution, of law, 
rule, and norm. What can be safely said is that institutional critique aims at 
making justice, and wants to make justice. But it needs to pay attention to 
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the fact that in the name of justice it can, as well, invest an intention and 
will of exhaustively determining the 'whatness' of what is as if that is all 
that there is. Foucault tells us that critique wants to police and regulate its 
object; and Boltanski comments that critique as well can be made by 
implying totalisations of meaning which indicates, in these cases, that 
critique ends being critique.  
 Institutional critique, to be sure, faces an aporia of justice. It is the 
same undecidability that a judge faces: on the one hand, she/he has to 
make justice according to the law; on the other hand, a just decision has to 
be a free decision, which implies that it must not follow any set of rules or 
laws. The aporia in question, therefore, relates to a fundamental 
undecidability of the decision, an undecidability which points to the fact 
that the just decision must not only suspend law, or destroy it but also 
follow a rule and reconfirm it, at the same time, as if this is, in each and 
every case, a new reinstituting of the law, 'a reinstituting act of 
interpretation, as if, at the limit, the law [loi] did not exist previously - as if 
the judge himself invented it in each case' (Derrida, 2002b, 251). Thus, 
each just decision is, in a way, a fresh and new decision:  
 
In short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it must [il faut], in its 
proper moment, if there is one, be both regulated and without 
regulation, it must preserve the law [loi] and also destroy or suspend 
it enough to have [pour devoir] to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, 
reinvent it at least in the reaffirmation and the new and free 
confirmation of its principle (Derrida, 2002b, 251). 
 
 
 It can be said that there is no justice without a just decision; in fact, 
there is a necessity, a duty, and a political responsibility to take the just 
decision, to pass, as it were, the test of the undecidable. Unless one 
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experiences the undecidable, one does not take a free decision and, for 
the matter, undecidability is the inseparable, the ghost, the supplement of 
every act of justice: a decision that would not go ‘through the test and 
ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision; it would only be 
the programmable application or the continuous unfolding of a calculable 
process. It might perhaps be legal; it would not be just' (Derrida, 2002b, 
252). To take a just decision, therefore, amounts to an experience of the 
aporetic: a decision implies that something will come into effect, and 
something comes into effect only if there are rules and norms of how to 
come into effect: 'once the test and ordeal of the undecidable has passed 
[...], the decision has again followed a rule, a given, invented or 
reinvented, and reaffirmed rule: it is no longer presently just, fully just' 
(Derrida, 2002b, 253). This is the sense in which it could be said that 
justice is only a possibility that is deferred, postponed, belonging to a 
future-to-come. This is also the reason why deconstruction has no end; 
and it could be said that an institutional critique as a deconstruction must 
have no end, for as soon as it takes a decision, it is already captured by 
institutional law, rule and norm. 
 I think that something of the order of the undecidable and of the just 
decision is at play in Hans Haacke's following statement: 
 
I do not want to practice agitation which appeals or accuses. I am 
satisfied if I can provoke a consciousness of a general context and 
mutual dependence by facts alone. Facts are probably stronger and 
often less comfortable than even the best intended opinions. (Hans 
Haacke, quoted in Buchloh, 2003, 240, f. 13) 
 
 
 For what else is Haacke saying here than that he is avoiding 
precisely a critique that replaces the institutional exhaustive determination 
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of the 'whatness' of what is with another kind of exhaustive determination 
of the 'whatness' of what is? Haacke's institutional critique is a 
deconstruction that makes justice, takes the just decision by inventing and 
inviting the other of the fact, which from the point of view of the art 
institution is outside of it, but which from the point of view of critique is 
already inside. 
 Institutional critique is making justice, but it has no certainty that it 
will ever reach justice, not for itself and not for all. Justice is of the order of 
a to-come; but its proximity assures that institutional critique, if it is to 
remain an institutional critique and a deconstruction, does not end and, 
indeed, must not end. The possibility that there should be justice keeps 
institutional critique going on, assuring that with each recuperation and co-
optation it will invent an other of the institution, which comes from the 
outside to the inside, though in a way it was always already inside. It is, in 
other words, the possibility of justice that puts institutional critique in the 
position of uncovering and constructing upon institutional hermeneutic 
contradictions. 
4. Co-optation and the Possibility of Institutional Critique 
 
Throughout this chapter I argued that institutional critique is a 
deconstruction with a definite political dimension, its object being 
constituted by the structures, rules and norms of the political, economic, 
and social institutions. In the previous section I analysed in what sense 
can it be said that institutional critique's destructions and constructions are 
addressing the possibility of justice: I proposed that institutional critique is 
making justice, though it is never certain that it reaches justice. For as 
soon as it takes a just decision and reinvents the other, it is already 
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caught, recuperated, and co-opted by the institution.  
 If this is true, then it remains as a task for the last section of this 
chapter to analyse precisely what institutional critique has been accused 
of: that institutional critique has been entirely co-opted by the art institution 
and that co-optation makes institutional critique politically ineffective. My 
argument, however, will not speak against co-optation: in the light of the 
fact that there is a necessary relation of cohabitation and symbiosis 
between institutions and critique, that institutional critique is neither inside 
nor outside of the art institution and that it works on institutional frames, I 
want to show, in this section that it is, in fact, co-optation which offers to 
institutional critique the most fertile terrain to conduct its strategies and 
operations. 
 Allow me to introduce the following example. During the 2011 
edition of the Vienna Art Fair one could see on the main façade of the 
hosting building a slogan which read 'Kunst is MehrWERT'. This is a pun, 
a play of words, indicating at least two ways of understanding this 
sentence. The German noun 'Wert' simply means 'value', whereas the 
attribute 'mehr' means 'more'. Given the graphical difference (MehrWERT), 
'mehr' may function either as an adjective, or as part of a composite noun. 
As an adjective, the sentence would be translatable as 'Art is more value'. 
It could be interpreted as pointing to, perhaps, all those positions which 
stress that art is a value in itself or, precisely to the point, that art has more 
value for us than other mundane things. Art, and here I will introduce a 
connection with the old meanings of the term 'value', is worth our highest 
esteem: there is nothing worthier than art. The art fair, therefore, 
legitimises itself as an event which gathers some of the most interesting 
and valuable artists and art works around the globe.  
 But when 'mehr' is part of the composite noun 'Mehrwert', the 
sentence would be translatable as 'Art is surplus value'. MehrWERT refers, 
to a fundamental concept, which Marx defined as a measure of excess, as 
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a supplement of 'commodity value over its cost price, i.e., in the excess of 
the total sum of labour contained in the commodity over the sum of labour 
that is actually paid for' (Marx, 1981, 133). Together with what Marx 
described as the rate of surplus value, these two concepts constitute the 
'invisible essences to be investigated' (Marx, 1981, 134) of the rate of 
profit, and hence, of the accumulation of capital. Our sentence could be 
interpreted, therefore, as implying that art incorporates a value as 
commodity, it is commodity, but it is also the excess of a commodity value, 
a surplus value upon which the accumulation of capital rests.  
 But what exactly does this sentence achieve? I think that, first of all, 
it points to a certain ambiguity, between a constative and a performative, 
between the fact and the prescription. On the one hand, it describes a 
state of affairs, that art is more value/surplus value. On the other hand, 
there is, to be sure, a certain performativity involved, a prescription of what 
art ought to be, and namely more value/surplus value. Second, there is an 
undecidability involved here, at the level of the 'whatness' of what art is. 
For the art fair does indeed host art, and art is to be consumed in itself, for 
itself. In other words, this is the new paradigm of the art fair which 
progressively replaces the museum, the gallery, and the art festival. Its 
frames and borders secure the purity of art, for as long as art is a value in 
itself; but at the same time, they are already tainted, impure, porous, as 
long as art is also surplus value, the base of capitalist profit.  
 This speech act, therefore, works on the undecidability of 
pure/impure, and part of its effect is assured by the fact that it mixes the 
constative and the performative. This sentence describes as much as it 
prescribes; and it organizes a certain citationality of the sign, quoting and 
grafting the arguments of those for whom art is a value in itself, and 
perhaps a reference to Karl Marx, both carrying with themselves 
something of the previous contexts in which they have occurred, but also 
organizing a certain difference. We are in an aporia: we don't know, we 
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can't decide whether art has value in itself because it has surplus value. 
Or, the other way around: whether art has surplus value because it has 
value in itself.   
 The actual shape of the art fair is the epitome of what I have been 
describing, starting with the first chapter, as the new 'spirit' of capitalism 
that has recuperated artistic critique. It is interesting, from this point of 
view, to ask who signs this slogan? In this case, the authority is there, it 
signs with its own name; on the lower side of the same façade, an added 
sentence illuminated the first one: The MehrWERT program is sponsored 
by Erste Bank.  
 The Vienna Art Fair focuses specifically on contemporary art 
coming from Central and Eastern Europe, and the Austrian Erste Bank 
happens to be one of the most important banks in central and Eastern 
Europe. After 1990 the Erste Group bought many state-owned banks from 
the former socialist countries where they invested massive amounts of 
capital. These privatizations and their credit practices have always been 
regarded with suspicion, at least by leftist critics. Banking groups such as 
Erste were considered directly responsible for the post-2008 financial 
crash and its social effects. Erste's case is particularly interesting because 
since 2002 the Erste Group has supported the tranzit art network which 
has offices in Vienna, Bratislava, Prague, Budapest and Bucharest, Cluj 
and Iași. They sponsor conferences, art prizes, and art fairs such as the 
one in Vienna; they invest large amounts of money in social programs, and 
offer bursaries to artists, curators and theoreticians. They also support the 
translation of critical art studies and histories written in the East. Erste also 
owns the most important collection of conceptual-political art made in 
Eastern Europe after 1960.  
 I want to suggest that this state of undecidability, which amounts to 
the fact that what appears as critical is already co-opted, is 
paradigmatically structuring the artistic and cultural fields today. Co-
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optation has usually negative connotations, as it refers to processes of 
recuperation, absorption, assimilation, taking over, appropriation, and 
'selling out'. But I want to suggest that the ground of these negative 
connotations is articulated by a certain idea that recuperation, assimilation 
and appropriation are exhaustive and total. In this thesis, however, I 
argued that the institutional, exhaustive determination of the 'whatness' of 
what is as if that is all that there is, is indeed, never fulfilled. If co-optation 
and recuperation were total, then there would be no reason to talk about 
disagreement, dispute, and critique. Given that what appears as critical is 
already-always co-opted, I wonder whether we could find a positive 
function in this state of affairs. In other words, I suggest that we should, 
perhaps, look at processes of co-optation from a different angle. As the 
etymology of the term shows, co-optation involves an act of courtesy and 
generosity: it means to elect or to choose as a colleague or member of 
one's tribe (OED online, 'Co-Opt, v.', 2013, webpage). It is thus a hailing 
and an open invitation to join a group, an invitation addressed to the other. 
The other, in this case, is the other of institutional critique. But in the 
second section of this chapter I argued that institutional critique itself 
operates by inviting and inventing a certain other, from the outside of the 
institution. Institutional critique as a deconstruction recognizes the other, 
and makes the other visible. This invention of the other, upon which 
critique constructs, is the just decision that institutional critique takes and 
should take. And it is in this sense that institutional critique places itself 
both inside of the art institution and outside of it, or neither inside, nor 
outside of the art institution.  
 But in co-optation there is a certain dynamics of power that we 
cannot overlook: that is, the generosity of inviting the other of institutional 
critique occurs because it is affordable. Power can afford to be generous. 
It affords to recognize that which had previously been unrecognized and 
invisible; and, in a certain critical manner, the co-opting power judges, 
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discerns, and delimits that which now seems to be worthy of inclusion. But 
what does 'worthy of inclusion' actually mean? We doubt that, for example, 
that which would be less worthy, or unworthy, that which has no value and 
cannot be valuable, would be equally considered. But less worthy and 
unworthy are institutional determinations. We are still, therefore, on a 
terrain inhabited by a logic of violence. Nevertheless, let us not forget 
those cases in which institutional critique is not co-opted, that is, invited in 
the institution, but utterly repressed, censored, and crushed. In other 
words, the invitation does come from the side that has a certain force, the 
force of the law that makes rules; and, indeed, institutional critique, if it 
accepts the invitation, will operate according to the law. But the invitation is 
also a certain opening to the other of institutional critique. And there is a 
certain precariousness of the invitation; it is essentially an act open to the 
future, open to contingency, to the possible and to chance. We do not 
know what happens in the meeting between the art institution and 
institutional critique. Perhaps the latter fails to be a consistent 
deconstruction, and ends by being part of the institutional totalisation of 
meaning. But it might be the case, as well, that this meeting will make 
visible those institutional hermeneutic contradictions and that violence on 
which the institution grounds itself. And perhaps the operations of 
institutional critique inside the institution but also outside of the institution 
will trigger new cycles of reinstituting acts. 
 The recognition is, to be sure, two-fold. It is a co-optation: two 
parties opt to be together. And it should be said that power recognizes in 
the same measure in which it is recognized. One can take, of course, the 
decision, pertaining to a negative criticism, of not recognizing power, not 
joining in, suspending the 'co[m]' of the 'co-optare'. But one could decide, 
at the same time, to recognize the possibilities of co-optation. If anything, 
the work of Asher, Haacke, Fraser and Liberate Tate testifies that for every 
frame that represses there is a frame that liberates. For every letter of the 
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law there is a spirit of the law. And for every sign that is enclosed, 
encircled, bordered, there is a remainder and a rest that escapes. But for a 
symbolic practice that calls itself critical and political and which is, at the 
same time, an institutional critique that speaks to 'the polis, the city and 
the world', institutional co-optation is its positive condition. 
5. Conclusions 
 
The argument of this chapter claimed that institutional critique's logic, 
topology and relationship with frames amounts to the apparatus of 
deconstruction. I have explained why the accusations against 
deconstruction as politically ineffective are misguided; I suggested that 
institutional critique as a deconstruction refers to a radically political 
practice that invites and invents the repressed other in the institution of art, 
and that, through this act, seeks justice and makes justice. And finally, I 
have responded to the allegation that co-optation renders institutional 
critique as politically ineffective, by turning the argument upside down, and 
showing that, in fact, co-optation is a positive condition of an institutional 
critique that operates displacements and architectonic shifts within the 
material and symbolic layers of the art institution. Allow me to end by 
connecting what I have argued to be the positive side of co-optation with 
the essentially affirmative and constructive dimension of deconstruction, 
which Jacques Derrida argued for, on so many occasions. I also want to 
connect them with this essential observation: that negative demands, 
critical of an existing order, would not be able to push a certain 
emancipatory-critical project ahead without articulating themselves, at the 
same time, as instances that reconstruct specific arenas of social reality. In 
this sense, institutional critique is co-opting to be inside of the institution 
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granted that it is, at the same time, outside of it. It is only in the institution, 
which is one of the fundamental conditions of its existence, that 
institutional critique invents the other and makes justice. It is both 
collaborative and dissident, both partner and adversary of the institutional 
power. To the extent that the invention of the other is, I have shown, 
subversive, shifting the architectonics and the logic of what is already 
there, institutional critique will accept the open invitation of joining in, while, 
at the same time, it will work to shift the laws, rules and protocols of the 
power that invites it, co-opts it, recuperates it. It seems to me that 
institutional critique is precisely that: a political-artistic practice that accepts 
the invitation of the art institution, deconstructing it by breaking the 
necessary character of institutional laws and interfering with 
representations that take the shape of rules and norms. It essentially has 
an affirmative character, a certain instituting, constituting, and inventing of 
its own, no less problematic, however, since these can turn themselves 
into that which institutional critique deconstructs. This implies that 
institutional critique operates both on the frames of the institution but also 
on its own frames and structures. Approaching the frames of art, the 
context of its deployment, its arbitrary ways of arranging structures, and its 
subjectifying techniques, the work of institutional critique – or better, 
institutional deconstruction – can never end. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research has been conceived as a response to a hypothesis that 
Gerald Raunig and the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies 
launched in the public space nearly a decade ago. The hypothesis 
proposed that some of the conditions and possibilities of a 'phase change' 
of institutional critique had been met, though they did not refer to a novel 
transformation of the artistic practices of institutional critique. On the 
contrary, the hypothesis was launched as a reaction to the historicization 
and to certain self-defeating statements about the historical synchronicity 
of institutional critique. It was less based on empirical evidence, and more 
on a 'political and theoretical necessity to be found in the logic of 
institutional critique' (Raunig, 2009, 3). Attempting to respond to the 
question 'what are the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique?' 
this thesis has articulated the categories of its logic. I argued that this logic 
is of the type neither/nor or both/and, and that it amounts to the apparatus 
of deconstruction.  
 I explained that the recent debates on the conditions and 
possibilities of institutional critique aim at responding to the recuperation 
and neutralization of artistic types of critique by the 'new spirit' of 
capitalism. In relation to them, my own approach proposed to re-evaluate 
the potential offered by the apparatus of deconstruction. This allowed me 
to show that structural to all institutions, including the institution of art, is a 
violence that is both symbolic and material, the violence of an arbitrary will 
and intention of defining and describing the 'whatness' of what institutions 
bring into existence as if that is all that there is. It also allowed me to show 
that this totalising act which invents rule and law is never entirely fulfilled; 
something always escapes and evades it, a differential 'rest' that critique 
grasps and works upon. If institutional critique is a deconstruction, then it 
does not limit itself to the possibilities offered by a binary logic of critique of 
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the type either/or: it operates with a differential type of logic of the type 
neither/nor or both/and. This implies that institutional critique will be 
singular and different in each of its iterations. But it retains, at the same 
time, a certain identity, which pertains to the critical attitude, an attitude of 
being both partner and adversary of the powers that be. 
 If institutional critique is a deconstruction, then it occupies a non-
space, neither inside nor outside of the art institution, or both inside and 
outside of the art institution. In relation to institutional frames of art, it 
employs what I described as a parergonal logic, a logic that acknowledges 
not only the negative function of frames - closing off that which appears 
within them - but also their positive utility, of making possible and 
contributing to the performative effect of the work of art.  
  Institutional critique as deconstruction is a political project that 
interferes with and inhabits material institutions, inviting and inventing the 
repressed other into the institution of art, seeking justice and making 
justice. I showed that the potential of critical and political art is fulfilled only 
if they charge their institutional conditioning or if, in other words, they 
articulate themselves, at the same time, as an institutional critique. And 
finally, institutional critique as deconstruction is able to grasp the positive 
dimensions of co-optation and operate displacements and architectonic 
shifts from within the art institution but also and always-already from 
without the art institution. To all that has been said I would like to add 
some further concluding comments. I will introduce them through an 
example that, this time, stems from my own practice and experience.  
 At the end of 2012 I benefited from a two months residency in 
Vienna that was offered by Erste Foundation and the tranzit.org network. 
The Erste Foundation is the major shareholder in the Erste Bank; the 
Foundation practically owns the Bank. In chapter six I explained that Erste 
has been very active in the process of the privatization of banks in the 
former socialist countries. At the same time, Erste Bank is the sponsor of 
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the Vienna Art fair, and also contributes to the Kontakt Collection of the 
Erste Foundation. Kontakt is the most significant collection of post-1950s 
conceptual art from Eastern Europe.  
 During the time of my stay there, I sought to meet and discuss with 
as many people as possible from those in charge within different 
departments of the Foundation. My meetings were often yet another 
reason to confirm to myself that it is indeed the case that a certain 
undecidability, pertaining to a state of contradiction, of something being 
both positive and negative, at the same time, without the possibility of 
choosing for only one term of the pair of opposites, does structure the field 
of art and culture today. I also have to confess that I placed myself in an 
ambiguous position as well. On the one hand I resided in Romania for 
enough time to be aware of the discussions and controversies regarding 
Erste’s presence there. On the other hand, I was a guest of the institution 
and as such, I received all the hospitality, recognition, friendliness, and 
necessary support that I could have wished for.  
 One of the things I did was to interview Walter Seidl, the curator of 
the Kontakt Collection (Seidl and Morariu, 2013; included in the appendix). 
What I particularly wanted to obtain from this discussion was a clarification 
about the institutional relationships between the art collection, the bank, 
and the foundation; but also about how the art experts working for the 
collection perceive their position in relation to the bank. Walter confirmed 
that Erste is fully aware of the hegemonic position that it has in Central 
and Eastern Europe; that their intervention, including the sponsoring of the 
Vienna Art Fair, has significantly modified Eastern Europe's art market; 
and that indeed there is not much space left for independent initiatives, 
given that the art field, at least in Central and Eastern Europe, is 
dominated by corporate initiatives such as Erste and Generali1. At the 
same time, the experts that the Collection employs regard this as an 
                                            
1
 I talked about the Generali Foundation and its collection in the Introduction. 
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inevitable price, which is compensated by the fact that valuable art is 
saved, especially since the institutional infrastructure of the former socialist 
countries is very weak, if not non-existent.  
The interview with Walter Seidl represented, first of all, a spoken 
exchange, a negotiation that continued even after transcribing the dialogue 
in writing. Secondly, I regarded this exchange as an occasion to 
investigate, tackle, and engage institutional frames, which were, at that 
point, embodied in a certain representative, the person who 'takes care' of 
the collection (the curator). Indeed, many of my questions aimed at 
bringing imbalances, inconsistencies, paradoxes and contradictions to the 
surface. An inconsistency, for example, in the fact that the collection's 
annual budget is constructed with all the Bank's subsidiaries in the former 
socialist countries contributing a fraction of their yearly profits: the clients-
citizens would see little of this art because the collection does not have a 
permanent site of display and functions by loaning art works for particular 
exhibitions or projects (Seidl and Morariu, 2013, 99). An imbalance, again, 
in the fact that Erste is ‘re-writing Eastern Europe's art history’ (Seidl and 
Morariu, 2013, 102) from a position of force, which is not alien to the 
mechanisms of the art market. A counter-balancing coup articulated by 
public museums, academies and research institutes and free from market 
pressures belongs only to a time-to-come. Finally, the current 
instrumentalization of collected art is itself paradoxical. For even if the 
social and political conditions in Eastern European countries differed from 
one another, artists such as Stano Filko, Ion Grigorescu, Julius Koller, or 
Mladen Stilinović shared the fact that they occupied marginal critical 
positions in the orbit of socialist state power. Paradoxically, within this ‘re-
writing of history’, critique deserts its marginal position and comes to the 
forefront with the large support of capital and the market.  
These contradictions would constitute solid grounds for arguments 
denouncing critical art’s co-optation and recuperation. But allow me to 
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observe, at the same time, the manner in which this process of relocating 
critique deconstructs itself. For once the market prides itself for 
administering critique, it realizes that it brought forth a wandering spirit, a 
ghostly-critique: what is left when something is cut from a certain context? 
And, more to the point, what sort of possibilities will this ghost offer? There 
is no anchorage-context and, if anything, this thesis has argued that 
institutional critique has to start precisely from these paradoxes and 
contradictions, giving credit to these undecidable, wandering spirits, these 
ghosts of critique. Institutional critique should not be nostalgic, nor should 
it be defeatist and pessimist when acknowledging its recuperation. On the 
contrary, it should operate precisely on the foundations of its own co-
optation.  
 I have argued, institutional critique should do so, seeking justice 
and making justice, knowing that it never reaches justice. But this means 
to invite a problem that, from a certain point of view, is foreign to the nature 
of the present study, which essentially remains a philosophical 
investigation of the logic of institutional critique. I will define the respective 
issue as institutional critique's ethical problem. The question remains: if art 
reaches its critical and political potential only if it articulates itself, at the 
same time, as a critique of its institutional conditions and possibilities; and 
if this institutional critique is a deconstruction that recognizes its co-
optation but works, at the same time, to subvert it, what ethical choices will 
the critical artist have at hand? What is the ethics of an institutional critique 
as a deconstruction that assumes the undecidable nature of the art field 
that, I believe, the case of the Kontakt collection illustrates so well? And, 
finally, what is the ethical standpoint of an institutional critique that 
positions itself both within the frames of the art institution, but also outside 
of them as well? I see this range of questions as structuring a possible 
development of what has been said in this thesis. In other words, I see the 
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ethical problem of institutional critique as the most fertile ground on which 
these analyses could be carried further.  
 In the concrete case of my participation in the tranzit residency the 
ethical dilemma amounted to the question of how to challenge Erste's 
foundations, laws, and rationale, given that I have received respect, 
friendliness and kindness from the representatives of the institution? My 
presence there was definitely a conscious and self-aware decision; I opted 
to be co-opted. Then came the moment when the interview with Seidl was 
published back in Romania. I do not know how many people read the 
interview published in Idea art + society (Seidl and Morariu, 2013, 98-105). 
I also do not know whether the perceived constative-performative force 
with which Kontakt is describing and defining what art and the history of art 
in Eastern Europe is and ought to be, will generate indignation on the part 
of the reader. Finally, I am not sure whether indignation will lead to 
something else, perhaps to criticism. But if the findings of this thesis are 
correct, then it is a matter of certainty that art and art history are and ought 
to be a terrain of debate, contestation and struggle, and not a field that is 
exhaustively determined by the intention and will of a corporate institution. 
This amounts to stating that the work of institutional critique as a 
deconstruction should continue. It implies that it should work in partnership 
with the canon of institutional critique, for there is much to learn from 
there: precisely what did not work out, what did not succeed, what was 
defeated. We would also learn that there is no way in which one could say 
that institutional critique has been successful, or can ever be successful, 
just like we cannot say that institutional critique has ever made justice. The 
reason being simply that institutional critique does not function in a logic 
that allows the exhaustive determination of the context in which 
institutional critique should be successful; at the same time, it refers to the 
fact that justice still belongs to a time to come: justice is in the making.   
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 To be sure, what can be said is that a certain institutional critique as 
a deconstruction claims a momentous victory here or there. But it is 
momentous also in the sense that it is recuperated in an instant. If this is 
so, and if all that has been said in this thesis is correct, then institutional 
critique as a deconstruction can never stop: it has no specific or once-and-
for-all aim. In other words, institutional critique as a deconstruction has no 
end and it ought not to have an end.   
 
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 
HISTORY, ART AND MONEY: ON CONSTRUCTING A CORPORATE 
ART COLLECTION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
A discussion* between Walter Seidl** and Vlad Morariu 
 
Fig 1. Vlad Morariu, Kunst ist MehrWERT, billboard at the entrance of the Vienna 
Fairground, VIENNAFAIR, 2011. Credits: Vlad Morariu 
 
*This interview was first published in IDEA arts + society, Issue 42, 2013, 
98-105. It is part of the follow-up of the dossier on contemporary art and 
capital from IDEA arts + society, Issue 41, 2012.  
 
It is republished here with the consent of Walter Seidl and of the editors of 
IDEA arts + society. All images are courtesy of Kontakt: The Art Collection 
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of Erste Group and Erste Foundation. Except Roman Ondák's Letter 
(Project for Utopia Station, 50th Biennial Venice, 2003), and Sanja 
Iveković’s Triangle, (Photo 3 of 4), all images were included in the original 
version of the interview. 
 
The discussion was made possible through the institutional and financial 
support of the Artists-in-Residence programme of tranzit and Erste 
Foundation. Within this program, I benefited from a two months residency 
(November-December 2012) at the MuseumsQuartier in Vienna, Austria.      
 
** Walter Seidl works as curator, writer, and artist and is based in Vienna, 
Austria. Since 2004, he has been curator of Kontakt. The art collection of 
Erste Group and Erste Foundation, which focuses on conceptual art 
tendencies in the region of former Eastern Europe. Seidl has curated 
numerous exhibitions throughout Europe, North America, Japan, South 
Africa and Hong Kong. His writings include various catalogue essays for 
artist monographs, exhibition reviews and criticism. Since 2011, he has 
been adjunct professor for curatorial studies at Webster University, 
Vienna.  
 
V.M. Walter, when did you join the team of the Kontakt collection?  
 
W.S. I came in 2004, right at the beginning, when Erste Bank decided to 
have a new collection policy focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. 
Before that, the bank had purchased different works over more than a 
century, but there hadn't been any collection policy. 
 
V.M. By policy you mean a rationale for collecting? 
W.S. Yes, works had been bought, but not on a permanent basis. There 
was no concept or schedule in terms of constructing a collection: 
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sometimes people from different departments bought works for offices, but 
there was no structural content behind it. In 2000 Erste Bank started to 
purchase banks from Eastern European countries, first Česká spořitelna 
and Slovenská sporitelňa, and then continued advancing to the SouthEast. 
That was also a time when the theme of sponsoring culture emerged – 
today you would call it corporate social responsibility – and since Erste 
Bank made most of its money in Central and Eastern Europe, the thought 
was to reinvest part of it in these countries and reflect this in a cultural 
program. 
 
V.M. Erste Foundation, however, has social programs as well... 
 
W.S. Yes, but at the beginning, before Erste Foundation came into 
existence, it was the sponsoring department of the bank which had started 
this specific approach to culture. Back then it was the CEO, Andreas 
Treichl and the head of sponsoring, Boris Marte, who noticed that Erste 
Bank was growing into a huge bank group and that an adequate cultural 
policy was needed. 
 
V.M. You mean, the CEO of the Bank? I ask this because I found it quite 
disconcerting to navigate in Erste Group's institutional strata. For example, 
I was surprised to find out that Erste Foundation partly owns Erste Group – 
meaning that it has over twenty percent of its shares – and not the bank 
owning the foundation. 
 
W.S. Yes, Erste Foundation is the main shareholder of Erste Group and is 
obliged to invest its dividends into the common good. This goes back to 
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Fig 2. Július Koller, Contact, human-being-nature-objects-materials (Anti-Happening), 
1969. Courtesy: Kontakt: The Art Collection of Erste Group and Erste Foundation 
 
the beginnings of the bank in the early nineteenth century, when it started 
as a social business, an association savings bank. The foundation is the 
legal successor of this association. But the art collection is not part of 
Erste Foundation, it is an independent association. Institutionally we are 
associated with the Foundation, but legally not part of it. Again a similar 
twist: the foundation is a member of our association. Christine Böhler, who 
is director of the programme Culture of Erste Foundation, is also 
chairwoman of the board of the collection, now officially called Kontakt: 
The Art Collection of Erste Group and Erste Foundation. The collection 
itself works with membership fees from the subsidiary banks as well as 
Erste Foundation, which means that Erste Group in Austria gives a certain 
annual amount of money, and so do Česká spořitelna, Slovenská 
sporitelňa; Erste Bank Hungary and Croatia or BCR in Romania and, of 
course, the Erste Foundation. From all these different members of the 
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association Kontakt we construct an annual budget with which the 
collection operates. 
 
V.M. You are saying that there's money coming from all these countries, 
including Romania, and flowing into the budget. 
 
W.S. Yes, BCR pays an annual fee to the collection as well. We thought 
that we would build something which is taken care of Vienna, as we work 
from here, but which is a collection for all, at the same time. 
 
V.M.  You mentioned that art had been purchased even before 2004, what 
kind of art are we talking about? 
 
W.S. Initial purchases followed the trend of the late 1980s and beginning 
of the 1990s, a tendency to buy American Minimalism, works by Sol 
LeWitt, Donald Judd, and others. But this lasted only for four years, and 
this policy was related to the CEO of the time, as there were ties to 
galleries and to what they were selling. During the term of the next CEO 
(we are still talking about the 1990s), nothing really had been bought. 
Then finally Mr. Treichl came at the end of the decade, and as he initiated 
the Eastern European development of the group, he proposed to do 
something in the arts as well, thinking that each international bank has its 
art collection. Just look at other big corporate art collections such as that 
of Deutsche Bank for instance. 
 
V.M. Then, one can say that there is also a sense of a struggle for 
prestige, in comparison to other banks? 
 
W.S. Not really a struggle, I would say. Because what we thought of doing 
was quite unique. Boris Marte, head of sponsoring back then, came up 
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with the idea of focusing on the East, in the cultural sector as well. At that 
time I was working as a freelance consultant for the bank, and developed 
the concept of the collection together with Rainer Fuchs, chief curator at 
MUMOK Vienna, and also with Vít Havránek from Prague and Vladimír 
Beskid from Bratislava.  
 
Fig 3. Mladen Stilinović, Untitled, from the series Red-Pink, 1978. Courtesy: Kontakt: The 
Art Collection of Erste Group and Erste Foundation. 
 
The bank asked about our ideas and we automatically proposed a concept 
focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. However, unlike what many 
other banks were doing, we decided to focus not only on current art 
production. For example, if you look at how Deutsche Bank operates, they 
go to art fairs and buy something that they like; but there is no historical 
structure or strict thematic concept in many corporate art collections. In 
other words, it varies in degree, and I can say that because the Kontakt Art 
Collection is also member of an association of corporate art collections 
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based in Paris (IACCCA). There are a great number of corporate art 
collections, some focusing on photography, for example, or specializing on 
a certain medium, but it is very rare that you have a collection with such a 
strict focus. Another element was the attempt to articulate a historical 
dimension within the collection, and we decided to collect art made at the 
end of the 1950s and beginning of 1960s, the period with all the major 
changes in art: the emergence of public art, of performance art, the 
attention paid to gender issues, etc. We asked ourselves what could we 
find in Central-Eastern Europe that is in line with what was going on 
internationally – the feminist movement, activism, political art – and thus 
decided to focus on the very conceptual side of art and mirror its 
developments in the region. 
 
V.M. In the case of Romania, the history of recent art, that of the last fifty 
years, hasn't been written yet, and for various reasons. But thus it seems 
that what Erste Group and Erste Foundation are doing, through buying, 
collecting, and supporting all sorts of investigations and discourses, is to 
write history: you are producing the history of Eastern European art. 
 
W.S. We agreed that it is important that the collection contributes to the 
rewriting and redefinition of the European canon of art history, because if 
you look at most of the art historical books – take as an example Art since 
1900. Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism edited by Rosalind 
Krauss, Hal Foster, Yve-Alain Bois and Benjamin H. D. Buchloh (2004) - 
you hardly find anything about Eastern Europe. Things have changed over 
the last five years maybe, especially with documenta 12 (2007), which had 
about twenty artists from Eastern Europe. Subsequently, the last Istanbul 
Biennial included Geta Brătescu. Or take Ion Grigorescu as an example as 
well; Kathrin Rhomberg has been working with him for many years. 
Examples could continue just to show that all of a sudden people started 
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to be interested. Slowly these artists are getting household names within 
the canon of art, but this has taken quite some time. At least when we 
started in 2004/2005 and visited Ion Grigorescu in Bucharest and selected 
some works, nobody knew him inside the mainstream art historical canon.  
 
V.M. So then, would you say that your approach is comparative? 
 
W.S. This is what we're trying to do, to see what kind of political actions or 
art performances, practices, artists, these countries had. The interesting 
part is that although there was this common thing called socialism, artists 
were not necessarily so much in contact with each other, and more or less 
looking towards the West. It depended a lot on the different socialist 
climates, for example Yugoslavia was a bit more easy-going with Tito. 
 
V.M. I remember talking with Mladen Stilinović some years ago about the 
reasonable access to what was going on in Western Europe at the time.  
 
W.S.  Yes, people could travel; there were special relations to West 
Germany, for instance. Take also the case of Graz, Austria, where Sanja 
Iveković had her first exhibition outside of Yugoslavia, in 1971. Austria has 
always been in contact with artists from neighbouring countries, but I think 
it also depended on the country. From Czechoslovakia, for example, in the 
1970s it was nearly impossible to get out, whereas in Poland it was easier, 
people having strong connections with France (this is Edward Krasiński's 
case). And comparisons can go on. I suggest that you hardly could say 
'this or that is Eastern European art', we are rather trying to discern a 
certain conceptual practice, and here's where you could find parallels in all 
these countries, but also differences.  
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Fig 4. Sanja Iveković, Triangle, (Photo 2 of 4), 1979. Courtesy: Kontakt: The Art Collection 
of Erste Group and Erste Foundation. 
 
V.M. Then this thesis of aligning what was happening in Western Europe 
with what was happening in Eastern Europe, do you think it still holds? 
 
W.S. Context-wise or conceptually speaking, there were certain 
similarities. But then the realization of certain art practices was rather 
marginal, as nobody in these countries in the 1970s cared about the 
conservation of the work done, for example. We are mainly talking about 
ephemera pieces, sometimes backed up by photographs. There were no 
professional sites, galleries or presentation spaces, museums of 
contemporary art – the only one was in Belgrade, which opened in 1965.  
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Fig. 5. Sanja Iveković, Triangle, (Photo 3 of 4), 1979. Courtesy: Kontakt: The Art 
Collection of Erste Group and Erste Foundation. 
 
So along with this problem of the similarities, one has to introduce the 
question of representation. You had the official socialist realism on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, so called radical art practices were officially 
forbidden. All these phenomena like after art, apartment art, private 
meetings of those on the radical art scene point to the question of 
representation, as there were no exhibition spaces. Not that there was a 
hidden agenda, but I think that the way in which production went along 
hand in hand with the non-existence of representation sites is what 
constitutes the specific difference. Nevertheless, conceptually speaking 
you could find similarities. We are talking sometimes about anti-reactions – 
take Július Koller's example and his anti-happenings, as a reaction to the 
West. Ion Grigorescu's chamber studies films and actions were, of course, 
close to similar experiments that were going on in the West, but in this 
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case the political environment creates a difference. All these artists were 
reacting within a communist or socialist system in a manner that was 
unfamiliar in the West. If you look at Stilinović's work dealing with the 
history of Yugoslavia, it always includes a reflection on the threshold 
between East and West. He was well aware of what was going on and he 
reacted to the Westernised culture coming into Yugoslavia in the ‘70s. 
Each country has a different history and a different system to react to. 
 
V.M. In this process of forging, exploring and writing art history, are you 
collaborating with research institutes, or academies, or universities? This 
is one of the problems in Eastern Europe, I think. You have Piotr 
Piotrowski [whose In the Shadow of Yalta (2009) was, by the way, 
translated into English with the financial support of the Erste Foundation], 
on the one hand, proposing a non-hierarchial, pluralistic, 'horizontal' way of 
writing art history, but then, on the other hand, when you insist and ask 
further what all these presuppose, and you arrive at the question of 
resources for research, we're stuck in a dead end... 
 
W.S. This is something we also wanted to engage in, in a more intense 
publication series. But if you look at the programs of Erste Foundation you 
will see that they do a lot of work in connection with institutions, in 
conferences, symposiums, etc. My job at the collection is more or less 
concerned with buying and restoring works and making sure we have 
loans and exhibitions. Until now it's been the foundation which mostly took 
care of collaborations with universities or researchers, making plans for 
books or publications or, for instance, initiating and organizing the Igor 
Zabel Award for Culture and Theory. This combines our work for whatever 
is needed on a structural level. Erste Foundation takes care of 
collaborations, funding, and also the Pattern Lectures series. 
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V.M. What is the amount of works in the collection? 
 
W.S. We have about 90 artists at the moment, and about 1000 individual 
pieces. 
 
 
6. Stano Filko, White Space in a White Space, exhibition view, Museum of Contemporary 
Art, Belgrade, 1973 to present. Courtesy: Kontakt: The Art Collection of Erste Group and 
Erste Foundation. 
 
V.M. And you have a budget to purchase new works each year? 
 
W.S. Yes. 
 
V.M. I guess you won't tell me how big the budget is…  
 
W.S. Not really, because it varies from year to year, depending on the 
performance of the bank. In times of crisis, you get less. But more or less, 
it always stays within the same parameters. 
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V.M. Where do you buy the works from? Do you buy them at art fairs, from 
galleries or directly from the studios? 
 
W.S. It depends on how they are available. At the beginning we mostly 
bought from artists directly because they didn't have a gallery 
representation. But in the meantime – throughout the past eight years of 
the existence of the collection – a lot of artists got a gallery representation, 
and we usually talk to the artists about how they want to sell the work: if 
they want to sell it directly to us or if we need to buy it from a certain 
gallery. It also depends how well established these artists are. For 
example, in Sanja Iveković's case, we bought from her directly but also 
from galleries. In Roman Ondák's case, we only deal with galleries. It also 
depends on the kind of contract artists have.  
 
V.M. I was active in Romania within the association that organized the 
Periferic Biennial, and I would say that the scene nowadays is very much 
different than what it used to be eight-nine years ago. Currently there is a 
wave of commercial galleries, some of them relatively successful and in 
expansion, others smaller, but still fairly active. This reconfigured a scene 
that used to rely more or less on public funds. How do you think that your 
policy influences this scenery? What would you say about the case of the 
Kontakt Art Collection, buying works from Eastern European artists and 
thereby influencing the market? 
 
W.S. It definitely raises the prices and I can say that we created market 
value. At the beginning we hardly bought from galleries, as artists were not 
represented. Nevertheless, we wanted to pay a decent amount of money 
to the artists – so it wasn't the case that we paid just a little because no 
one bought this art anyway. Now you can clearly see that the prices are 
growing and the galleries are also active. For example, at the beginning 
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we bought Ion Grigorescu's work directly from him, and then later through 
Andreiana Mihail Gallery. The same with Geta Brătescu and Marian Ivan 
Gallery. It depends a lot on what is available, and where. At the beginning 
we bought nearly 80% directly from the artists and 20% from galleries, 
now it is almost the opposite. Not quite the same scale, but the proportions 
have changed in any case. 
 
V.M. When you buy new work, who takes the decision of what is supposed 
to be bought? 
 
W.S. The decision is taken by a jury, we have an art advisory committee; 
we meet twice a year and decide together, each of us proposes works, 
and then we decide together what fits in the structure of the collection. 
 
V.M. Are its members related to the foundation? 
 
W.S. Not really, the advisory board of the collection currently consists of 
Silvia Eiblmayr (art historian and curator, commissioner of the Austrian 
contribution to the 53rd Venice Biennale), Georg Schöllhammer (editor of 
Springerin, Hefte für Gegenwartskunst and documenta XII publications), 
Jiří Ševcik (curator, professor at the Academy of Fine Arts, Prague), 
Branka Stipančić (art historian and curator, Zagreb) and Adam Szymzyck 
(director, Kunsthalle Basel). 
 
V.M. You practically don't have a space to exhibit, though the collection is 
impressively large. Is this intentional? 
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Fig.7. Roman Ondák, Letter (Project for Utopia Station, 50th Biennial Venice, 2003), 
2003. Courtesy: Kontakt: The Art Collection of Erste Group and Erste Foundation. 
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W.S. Right from the beginning we thought that though money flows from 
the regional banks, we don't want to centralize everything in Vienna. We 
equally wish to exhibit works in the region, in different contexts. That's 
what we did in 2007 in Belgrade: after ten-fifteen years of an intense 
history after the breaking of the Yugoslavian federation and amongst all 
these nationalist tendencies, we brought together art works from the whole 
of former Yugoslavia. We constantly have loans, as we decided that our 
collection should be more like a research collection, and works should be 
available as loans for exhibitions. We loaned a series of Jiří Kovanda's 
works to the last São Paulo Biennial, while Sanja Iveković's works travel 
constantly, she has just opened a show at the South London Gallery and 
Calvert 22 in London. There are a lot of international curators who try to 
research certain artists and who contact us, asking for loans for different 
exhibitions. At the moment we have about ten-twenty works travelling all 
around the globe, and it is something quite interesting to be part of 
international exhibitions: in 2012 there was the São Paulo Biennial, the 
Triennial that Okwui Enwezor curated at the Palais de Tokyo in Paris, and 
examples could go on.  
 
V.M. Do you imagine having a building, at some point, which would house 
the collection? 
 
W.S. We have been talking about it, but we still need to discuss this 
through. 
 
V.M. I know that Generali Foundation has a similar collection, or with 
similar interests. When you have these sort of big players on the market, 
what is your relation to each other? Are you in a competition? 
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W.S. Yes and no. Generali Foundation started much earlier, in the late 
1980s, and has a similar approach to conceptual tendencies, but began 
focusing on Western Europe and the Americas. Later they bought some 
Eastern European artists as well, but by that time Kontakt had already 
come into existence, so we were a little ahead of them. When we started 
there was no competition apart from the fact that both Generali Foundation 
and us were oriented towards conceptual art practices. Now, of course, 
some artists that we have in the collection are also part of the Generali 
Foundation's collection, they collect Koller or Iveković, for example. But 
this is something that fits into their collection's concept as well. 
 
V.M. I happened to be here in Vienna in 2011, during the Vienna art fair – 
a particular edition, I recall, as a lot of familiar faces from the Eastern 
European art scene were present. I remember as well the entrance of the 
fairground and the image of Erste Group's slogan with its funny spelling 
'Kunst ist MehrWERT' (Art is Surplus Value/More Value). Erste Group is 
sponsoring the fair every year, right? 
 
W.S. Yes, Erste Group has been the main sponsor since the art fair 
opened at the current location (Vienna Messe), and the idea was that East 
European galleries get some money to pay the fees for the booth.  
 
V.M. In this way Erste Group is sponsoring their participation. 
 
W.S. Yes, the idea was to sponsor the stand fees for galleries from 
Eastern Europe. Every year about sixteen galleries are supported by Erste 
Group. 
 
V.M. Is this, then, contradictory? I mean, what reason would there be for a 
private enterprise to sponsor other private enterprises? 
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W.S. We see it as a help for those galleries that wouldn't come here 
because it would be too expensive for them, with all the travelling and the 
fees involved. Most gallerists in Eastern Europe have to think twice about 
participating in an art fair. At the same time, it is also difficult to bring big 
collectors to Vienna, thinking that you have a lot of important art fairs in 
Europe. Why would you, as a collector, be interested in coming to Vienna? 
We thought that sponsoring all these galleries from Eastern Europe would 
add in attractiveness, as big international collectors might then decide to 
come to Vienna because there is a special focus on Eastern Europe. 
Since I am in the board of IACCCA, the association of corporate art 
collections based in Paris, we invited their curators over to Vienna in 2012. 
Thus, twenty people from all over Europe connected with collections came 
here, people who in other circumstances would have ignored us, because 
Basel, London, Paris or Brussels are the easier option. 
 
V.M. Has the art fair itself become a space where you understand what is 
happening in Eastern Europe, in what amounts to new trends and 
tendencies? 
 
W.S. At least this should be the goal, but then it depends a lot on 
collectors, on what they buy. 
 
V.M. Last round of questions: how did you personally start to work in the 
corporate sector? You said you were freelance before.  
 
W.S. I worked freelance before, and I just happened to curate a couple of 
exhibitions in which I included artists from Eastern Europe. 
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Fig 8. Ion Grigorescu, Electoral Meeting (The walkie-talkie, before the building of the 
Central Committee of the Party), 1975. Courtesy: Kontakt: The Art Collection of Erste 
Group and Erste Foundation. 
 
V.M. This was back in the 1990s. 
 
W.S. Yes. When the bank contacted Rainer Fuchs from MUMOK to come 
with a new concept for the collection, he also recommended that I join as a 
young curator working on Eastern Europe. The bank decided to build the 
collection, and asked me to curate it – all of a sudden I was working for a 
bank, something I would have never imagined before. It happened by 
accident in a way. 
 
V.M. So having experienced both worlds, what is your take on the 
progressive corporatization of art and culture? 
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W.S. I think that this is a process one needs to acknowledge and get 
accustomed to…  
 
V.M. In Austria like in any other place…  
 
W.S. In Austria the first large scale corporate collection was Generali's, in 
the late 1980s. The model was invented as they went along, and soon the 
EVN collection appeared. Erste Group started at the same time as the 
Verbund collection, the latter having an interest mostly in American 
conceptual art. And it is interesting that you have these four major 
corporate collections, Generali, EVN, Kontakt and Verbund, in Vienna, 
which is quite a large number for a small country like this. 
 
V.M. Certainly, which means that there is a lot of money here! 
 
W.S. It’s also because these corporations are located here…  
 
V.M. If the forefront is taken, then, by corporate collections and their 
relations with commercial galleries, what space and what visibility is left for 
critical approaches and for marginal phenomena of the art world? 
 
W.S. This is THE question. Because on the one hand you have the leftist 
criticism, against the dominant role of banks in society; but then, on the 
other hand, the banks are buying radical or formerly marginalized artistic 
positions and try to offer an understanding for something that has 
previously been invisible, making it visible. This is the good thing about it – 
in all these four cases of collections, there are people from the art world 
who decide what has to be integrated in the collection and not the CEO 
sitting in the board, at least not in a way that would determine what should 
be purchased. There are always people coming from the art realm, doing 
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research about what they are proposing; and this serves the corporations 
as well, as normally the rationale is 'let's take someone from the art world 
who we trust and who bring expertise, and can work for us, and do a good 
job'. That's quite an open way of structuring things, I think. 
 
V.M. What about the art scene in Vienna, it seems to be very much 
institutionalized, with a vast array of galleries, museums and collections on 
display; do you have contacts with the non-institutionalized? 
 
W.S. Of course, as a curator who has been working in off-spaces before, I 
know everyone; but this is more of a personal issue than an institutional 
relation. As a representative of the bank's collection, the story is different. 
 
V.M. The traditional critique is that once you get critical art in a collection 
you tame it and neutralize it. Do you think that this is the case or not? 
 
W.S. I don't think so… If we talk about how the thousands of employees of 
the bank understand the collection, there is still a lot to be done education-
wise, that’s for sure. The interesting point is that not only Kontakt but also 
Verbund’s and Generali’s collections are more visible in an artistic context 
than in the context of the corporation. And the other positive aspect is that 
these collections buy art that is not so easily bought by other collectors.  
 
V.M. Walter, thanks a lot for the time and the discussion! 
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